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Abstract
This dissertation consists of four essays on the macroeconomics of financial markets. Chapter 1 presents a
theoretical framework to study the rise of securitization and secondary markets for financial assets. I show that
the interplay of banks and the non-bank financial intermediary sector can lead to credit booms that end in
financial crises, much like the financial boom and bust observed in the U.S. from 1990 to 2008. In line with
empirical evidence, I show that low risk-free interest rates driven by expansionary monetary policy or a large
inflow of savings can trigger such booms. I end by proposing regulatory tools to manage the credit cycle.
Chapter 2, co-authored with Harold L. Cole and Guillermo Ordonez, is a theoretical study of international
sovereign default crises. We propose a framework in which risk-averse investors can spend resources to learn
about the default probabilities of sovereign countries. Sovereign bond price volatility increases when some
investors acquire information because prices now more closely reflect default probabilities. This force induces
other investors to learn, further increasing volatility and raising the specter of a crisis. When investors are
exposed to the default risk of multiple countries, these crises events spill over across borders.
Chapters 3 and 4, co-authored with Farzad Saidi, analyze the impact of universal banking on the performance
of bank-dependent firms. Our basic argument, laid out in Chapter 3, is that universal banks, who are able to
concurrently offer both loans and underwriting products, are better informed about their borrower firms, and
thus can more efficiently provide external funds to these borrowers. We show empirically that the advent of
universal banking after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act led to an increase in both the volatility and
productivity of borrower firms, suggesting that more informed lenders allow firms to invest in productive
ventures further along the risk-return frontier than was previously possible. In light of recent proposals to limit
the scope of banking and re-establish the Glass-Steagall Act, our evidence suggests that there may be firm-level
efficiency gains from concurrent lending and underwriting of corporate securities that should be balanced
against the risks associated with banks becoming too big to fail and other concerns of macroeconomic
fragility.
In Chapter 4, we trace out the importance of universal banking for the structure of loan syndicates, one of the
dominant sources of corporate borrowing. Loan syndicates typically assign one member to be the prime
monitor of the borrower firm, with the other members taking a passive role. We show that universal banks are
more likely to be chosen as lead arrangers, but take smaller lead arranger shares conditional on doing so. This
result is driven only by the superior monitoring ability of universal banks and does not lead to worse firm-level
outcomes. Our findings contrast with the previous literature that argued that falling lead arranger shares prior
to 2008 were indicative of weak bank monitoring, and provides a deeper view of intermediary-firm
interactions in the modern financial system.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE MACROECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
Daniel Neuhann
Harold L. Cole
This dissertation consists of four essays on the macroeconomics of financial markets. Chap-
ter 1 presents a theoretical framework to study the rise of securitization and secondary
markets for financial assets. I show that the interplay of banks and the non-bank financial
intermediary sector can lead to credit booms that end in financial crises, much like the
financial boom and bust observed in the U.S. from 1990 to 2008. In line with empirical
evidence, I show that low risk-free interest rates driven by expansionary monetary policy
or a large inflow of savings can trigger such booms. I end by proposing regulatory tools to
manage the credit cycle.
Chapter 2, co-authored with Harold L. Cole and Guillermo Ordon˜ez, is a theoretical study
of international sovereign default crises. We propose a framework in which risk-averse
investors can spend resources to learn about the default probabilities of sovereign countries.
Sovereign bond price volatility increases when some investors acquire information because
prices now more closely reflect default probabilities. This force induces other investors
to learn, further increasing volatility and raising the specter of a crisis. When investors
are exposed to the default risk of multiple countries, these crises events spill over across
borders.
Chapters 3 and 4, co-authored with Farzad Saidi, analyze the impact of universal banking
on the performance of bank-dependent firms. Our basic argument, laid out in Chapter 3,
is that universal banks, who are able to concurrently offer both loans and underwriting
products, are better informed about their borrower firms, and thus can more efficiently
provide external funds to these borrowers. We show empirically that the advent of universal
v
banking after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act led to an increase in both the volatility and
productivity of borrower firms, suggesting that more informed lenders allow firms to invest
in productive ventures further along the risk-return frontier than was previously possible. In
light of recent proposals to limit the scope of banking and re-establish the Glass-Steagall Act,
our evidence suggests that there may be firm-level efficiency gains from concurrent lending
and underwriting of corporate securities that should be balanced against the risks associated
with banks becoming too big to fail and other concerns of macroeconomic fragility.
In Chapter 4, we trace out the importance of universal banking for the structure of loan
syndicates, one of the dominant sources of corporate borrowing. Loan syndicates typically
assign one member to be the prime monitor of the borrower firm, with the other members
taking a passive role. We show that universal banks are more likely to be chosen as lead
arrangers, but take smaller lead arranger shares conditional on doing so. This result is driven
only by the superior monitoring ability of universal banks and does not lead to worse firm-
level outcomes. Our findings contrast with the previous literature that argued that falling
lead arranger shares prior to 2008 were indicative of weak bank monitoring, and provides a
deeper view of intermediary-firm interactions in the modern financial system.
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Chapter 1 : Macroeconomic Effects
of Secondary Market Trading
1.1 Introduction
Starting around 1990, financial intermediaries in the United States increasingly began to
sell, rather than hold to maturity, many of the loans that they provided to households and
firms. The rise of such secondary market trading of financial assets was accompanied by
a credit boom that ended in the financial crisis of 2008. In the aftermath of the crisis,
policymakers and academics alike have argued that growing secondary markets were a
crucial driver of both the credit boom and eventual bust.1 Yet, the underlying mechanisms
are not fully understood. This paper offers a theory in which the endogenous growth of
secondary markets generates a macroeconomic credit cycle. I use the theory to understand
why secondary market credit booms arise, why they eventually lead to financial crises, and
how policy affects their macroeconomic consequences.
In this theory, secondary markets allow financial intermediaries to sell off risk exposure to
other intermediaries. This has two conflicting effects: first, a more efficient allocation of
risk can increase the borrowing capacity of intermediaries and allow for the expansion of
1Typically, secondary market trading occurs through the securitization of financial assets. While financial
intermediaries issued less than $100 billion in securitized assets in 1900, they issued more than $3.5 trillion
in 2006. Gorton and Metrick (2012) survey the development of secondary markets and securitization in the
United States. Mian and Sufi (2009) and Ivashina and Sun (2011) provide evidence of a credit boom for
households and firms. Brunnermeier (2009), Shin (2009), and the Report of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2011) review the role of secondary markets and securitization in the boom and bust.
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credit volumes. Second, asset sales reduce intermediaries’ incentives to screen or monitor
investment opportunities ex-ante, hampering the efficiency of investment. The adverse in-
centive effect arises only if secondary market volumes are high and intermediaries sell off a
sufficiently large fraction of their investments. Credit cycles arise because the two effects
are linked over time. The transfer of risk leads secondary market volumes to grow dur-
ing macroeconomic expansions because the wealth of those intermediaries who buy risky
assets grows when this risk pays off. Growing secondary market volumes in turn lead to
deteriorating lending incentives. Financial fragility grows during upturns because capital
increasingly flows to low-quality investments. Ultimately, a negative shock leads to a si-
multaneous collapse of secondary markets and credit volumes. Booms are triggered by low
interest rates – due to, for example, expansionary monetary policy or saving gluts – because
cheap funding increases the value of increased borrowing capacity to intermediaries.
I study a segmented-markets economy in which risk-neutral financial intermediaries make
risky investments on behalf of risk-averse outside investors subject to moral hazard. Krish-
namurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) provide evidence that investors pay a safety pre-
mium for risk-free financial assets, while Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015) argue that the production of safe assets is a key function of
the financial sector. Intermediaries thus borrow by issuing risk-free debt.2 As a result,
their funding ability is constrained by their net worth and risk exposure, and secondary
market sales serve to reduce risk exposure in order to increase borrowing. But, who buys
risk exposure? When investments are subject to aggregate risk, there are no gains from
trade among symmetric intermediaries – when one intermediary’s risk decreases, another’s
increases. Yet Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009) show that the financial assets traded on
secondary markets typically carry strong exposure to aggregate risk. I therefore study an
economy with two types of intermediaries: bankers, who have the requisite skill to access
2My results generalize to any setting in which financial intermediaries are constrained by their risk
exposure. This may be the case even when all outside investors are, in principle, willing to hold risk
exposure. In Hebert (2015), debt is the optimal security in settings that includes flexible moral hazard,
i.e. an effort choice that affects average returns and volatility. In the Diamond (1984) model of delegated
monitoring, the efficiency of financial intermediation improves when intermediaries can oﬄoad aggregate
risk exposure.
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investment opportunities in the real economy, and financiers, who cannot access these op-
portunities directly and instead purchase assets on secondary markets. Bankers represent
commercial banks or mortgage originators who directly provide loans to households and
firms. Financiers represent investors with an appetite for risk, such as hedge funds, broker
dealers, and asset managers.
Financiers are willing to take on aggregate risk exposure precisely because they do not make
investments directly and thus do not face the same funding constraints as bankers. Rather,
financiers earn intermediation rents because their risk-taking behavior allows bankers to ex-
pand borrowing and lending. This is socially valuable: bankers are less likely to engage in
moral hazard when they are less exposed to risk. Indeed, when total intermediary net worth
is scarce, a financial system with both financiers and bankers allows for more borrowing
and lending than one of equal size featuring only bankers. Secondary markets thus boost
credit volumes through the transfer of risk away from bankers. Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap,
and Shin (2008) estimate that financial institutions who purchased mortgage-backed secu-
rities on secondary markets were more exposed to mortgage default risk than commercial
banks during the 2008 financial crisis. Mian and Sufi (2009) and Ivashina and Sun (2011)
provide evidence that growing secondary markets were associated with increased credit to
households and firms.
The balance sheets of financial institutions are hard to monitor in real time. Moreover,
bankers typically trade with many financiers at the same time, and they are more informed
about the quality of the assets they produce than potential buyers. That is, secondary
markets are non-exclusive and hampered by asymmetric information. When trade is non-
exclusive, Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2011) and Kurlat (forthcoming) argue that buyers
cannot screen sellers by restricting the quantity of assets that is sold. As in Bigio (2015) and
Kurlat (2013), secondary market assets thus trade at a marginal price that is independent
of (i) how many assets the originating banker sells and (ii) the quality of the underlying
asset. This creates a pernicious motive for secondary market trading. Rather than selling
assets to alleviate funding constraints, bankers may opt to produce low-quality, high-risk
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assets just to sell them. In equilibrium, bankers find it optimal to “shirk and sell” when the
secondary market price is sufficiently high and financiers purchase a large number of assets.3
Strong demand for secondary market assets therefore affords bankers the opportunity to
sell off low-quality assets under the guise of borrowing capacity-enhancing risk transfer.
Investment efficiency falls.
The secondary market price is determined endogenously by the net worth of financiers
and bankers. When financiers have small net worth, the secondary market price is low
and bankers sell assets only to increase their borrowing capacity. When instead financiers
have large net worth, the secondary market price is sufficiently high that some bankers
begin originating low-quality assets, even as financiers earn positive returns on average.
Investment efficiency falls and financial fragility grows in the aggregate. The root cause
of this inefficiency is a pecuniary externality. Individual financiers do not internalize that
they worsen the pool of all assets by buying more assets on secondary markets.The wel-
fare consequences may be severe. A partial destruction of financier wealth can lead to a
Pareto-superior allocation. Policy that limits the accumulation of financier net worth or
hampers financiers’ ability to purchase excess amounts of loan-backed assets may therefore
be welfare-enhancing. Notably, this motive for regulation is independent of the financial
structure of financiers. Indeed, it applies to zero-leverage financial institutions, such as
asset managers, who have traditionally been outside the scope of financial regulation pre-
cisely because their lack of leverage was thought to eliminate financial fragility and agency
frictions.
The model’s key dynamic is the evolution of the intermediary net worth distribution. Be-
3One concern is why bankers ever sell high-quality assets on secondary markets, given that all assets trade
at a pooling price. I circumvent this problem in reduced form by assuming that the banker must produce
either only high-quality assets or only low-quality assets. This assumption is without loss of generality if
financiers are always guaranteed to receive at least the average quality of all assets produced by a banker
when purchasing claims on secondary markets. Under this restriction, bankers optimally monitor either all
of their investments or none of their investments. In practice, secondary markets are structured to eliminate
excessive “cream-skimming” by bankers. Sellers typically offer a whole portfolio of loans for sale, and buyers
select the subset of loans they want to purchase. Buyers can guarantee themselves at least the average
portfolio quality by using a random selection rule. The assumption can also be rationalized by fixed costs
in the monitoring or screening of borrowers.
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cause financiers buy aggregate risk exposure on secondary markets, their net worth typically
grows faster than that of bankers during macroeconomic expansions. Credit volumes ini-
tially increase as financier net worth grows because bankers are able to sell off more risk
exposure. Over time, however, rising secondary market prices induce a growing fraction
of bankers to produce low-quality assets, leading to excess risk exposure in the financial
system. Ultimately, a negative aggregate shocks is enough to trigger sharp collapses in
secondary market trading and credit. Financier net worth falls because financiers end up
holding a large fraction of low-quality assets. Credit volumes fall because bankers can no
longer manage risk on secondary markets. Secondary markets recover slowly because fi-
nanciers need time to rebuild their net worth. As a result, bankers grow vulnerable to
negative shocks, and prolonged crises also harm bank balance sheets. Longer crises thus
lead to slower recoveries. Because credit quality deteriorates gradually over the course of
the boom, longer booms similarly lead to sharper crises. Gorton and Metrick (2012) and
Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) provide evidence that the fragility of leveraged
secondary market traders was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis, and that the mi-
gration of risk back onto bank balance sheets was an important determinant of the larger
credit crunch to follow. Adrian and Shin (2010b) estimate that the combined balance sheet
size of hedge funds and broker-dealers was smaller than that of bank holding companies
before 1990 but almost twice as large by 2007. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010)
and Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2015) provide empirical evidence of falling credit stan-
dards and growing moral hazard over the course of the 2000-2007 U.S. credit boom. Bigio
(2014) provides evidence of the slow recovery of bank equity and interbank markets in the
aftermath of the 2008 crisis. Schularick and Taylor (2012), Mendoza and Terrones (2012),
and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) provide evidence that longer credit booms predict sharper
crises.
Credit booms driven by growing secondary markets can emerge even when bankers and
financiers receive the same equilibrium return on equity. Indeed, financiers earn rents
precisely because they take on aggregate risk exposure. As a result, they grow faster during
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booms even when earning the same average return. Moreover, there are asymmetries in
how financiers and bankers achieve these (same) returns. When total intermediary net
worth is scarce and funding interest rates are low, financiers employ more leverage than
bankers, and earn disproportionately high returns when this risk-taking behavior pays off.
Indeed, because bankers highly value increased borrowing capacity when interest rates are
low, financiers earn large rents by taking on risk-exposure when funding is cheap. As a
result, secondary market booms are triggered by strong demand for financial assets and
low interest rates. Bernanke (2005), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), and Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) argue that the early 2000s were characterized by a “global
saving glut” that led to a large inflow of global savings in search of safe assets produced by
the U.S. financial system. In my model, such inflows generate gradually falling asset quality
because they trigger growing imbalances between financiers and bankers. To the extent that
expansionary monetary policy leads to falling funding costs for intermediaries, the theory
also generates a novel risk-taking channel of monetary policy that operates through the
dynamics of financial intermediary net worth. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) argue
that monetary policy was indeed expansionary during the early stages of the U.S. credit
boom.
Finally, I find that tight leverage constraints on bankers may lead origination incentives
to deteriorate sooner than in their absence. Bankers use secondary markets to increase
their leverage. When leverage is limited, secondary market supply falls and prices increase.
Increasing prices in turn tempt bankers into shirking, with adverse aggregate consequences.
The effects of policy must therefore be studied in the context of the aggregate financial
system.
Related Literature. Beginning with Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), a rich literature in macroeconomics has emphasized the role of borrower
net worth and credit constraints in the amplification and persistence of macroeconomic
fluctuations. Recent contributions include Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2011) and Di Tella
6
(2014). A common theme is that borrower or financial intermediary net worth serves to al-
leviate financial frictions and facilitates more efficient financial intermediation. I emphasize
the distribution of net worth, and show how endogenous imbalances in this distribution can
harm the efficiency of investment even when net worth increases in the aggregate. Adrian
and Shin (2010b) and Adrian and Shin (2014) argue that intermediary leverage, rather
than net worth alone, is a key determinant credit conditions. My paper is complemen-
tary to theirs in that I show how intermediary leverage is determined in the aggregate of
the financial system. Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi (2011), and Bianchi and Mendoza (2012)
study pecuniary externalities during credit booms. Excessive leverage leads to inefficient
fire sales during the ensuing bust. I show how pecuniary externalities can generate falling
investment efficiency during the boom phase. Bigio (2014), Bigio (2015), and Kurlat (2013)
study interbank market shutdowns during macroeconomic downturns, while Rampini and
Viswanathan (2010) study risk management among heterogeneous agents. I study how
excessive trade among intermediaries during upturns leads to falling asset quality.
A growing literature in macroeconomics and finance emphasizes that there is strong demand
for safe assets and that safe assets are a key output of the financial system. The seminal pa-
per in this literature is Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2012), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015), and Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick
(2012) provide evidence of a safety premium and the role of the financial system in pro-
ducing such assets. Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2013) provide a theoretical analysis of safe asset
production. Caballero and Farhi (2014) study how safe asset shortages can lead to stagna-
tion, while Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) link the demand for safe assets to financial
intermediary leverage.
Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) propose a dynamic model of credit booms and busts based on
the desire of agents to trade informationally-insensitive assets. Booms and busts occur due
to the evolution of beliefs, with busts being triggered by shocks that induce information
acquisition. I emphasize the evolution of net worth and the deterioration of investment
efficiency over the credit cycle. Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013) study role of secu-
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ritization within the shadow banking sector in driving aggregate outcomes. Securitization
allows for improved sharing of idiosyncratic risk, and is efficient unless agents neglect ag-
gregate risk. I study the re-allocation of aggregate risk via securitization, and show that
excessive secondary market trading can have deleterious effects even in a fully rational
framework. Moreover, I explicitly model the dynamics of secondary markets and thus give
a reason why booms endogenously lead to financial fragility.
A rich literature in financial economics emphasizes the role of risk in shaping intermediation
incentives. Early examples are the risk shifting model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
the model of delegated monitoring in Diamond (1984). I build on these micro-foundations
by explicitly studying the process by which intermediaries diversify risk. The seminal study
of loan sales by bankers is Gorton and Pennacchi (1995). In their model, banks must retain
a fraction of any loan to ensure monitoring incentives, and do so in equilibrium. I differ in
that I allow for shirking on the equilibrium path and focus the aggregate consequences of
loan sales. More recently, Parlour and Plantin (2008) and Vanasco (2014) have studied the
effects of secondary market liquidity on moral hazard and information acquisition in primary
markets in static partial equilibrium settings. I differ in that I study the macroeconomic
dynamics of secondary markets and emphasize the endogenous evolution of intermediary
net worth. Chari, Shourideh, and Zetlin-Jones (2014) show how secondary markets may
collapse suddenly in the presence of adverse selection. I study how growing secondary
markets can lead to falling asset quality.
Adrian and Shin (2010a), Adrian and Shin (2009), and Stein (2012) study the role of
monetary policy in shaping financial stability. In Adrian and Shin (2010a) and Adrian and
Shin (2009), the emphasis is on the role of the short-term interest rate in driving the risk
appetite and leverage of financial intermediaries and, thus, credit conditions and risk-taking.
In Stein (2012), the main role of policy is to restrict the issuance of private money that
relies excessively on short-term debt. I focus instead on how short-term interest rates shape
the dynamics of intermediary net worth. By emphasizing the effects of asymmetrically
regulating different classes of intermediary, my paper is also related to Plantin (2015), who
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discusses the role of differential regulation between a core banking system and a lightly
regulated shadow banking sector and shows how relaxing core leverage requirements may
make the financial system as a whole safer.
Layout. Section 1.2 presents a static model of financial intermediation in which the distri-
bution of net worth is fixed. I use the static model to establish the key channels through
which secondary market trading affects credit volumes and investment efficiency. In Sec-
tion 1.3, I embed the static model into an overlapping generations framework to study the
endogenous evolution of net worth. Section 1.4 studies policy. Section 1.5 concludes. All
proofs are in Appendix A.
1.2 A Static Model of Secondary Markets
I begin my analysis by studying a static model of financial intermediation with secondary
markets. The distinguishing feature of this static model is that the net worth of all agents
is fixed. I use this setting to characterize the role of secondary market trading for financial
intermediation and to study comparative statics with respect to the net worth distribution.
The key friction in the model is that the funding ability of intermediaries is limited by their
risk exposure. In Section 1.3 I then embed the model into a dynamic framework to study
the endogenous evolution of net worth.
1.2.1 Environment
There is a single period, comprising of multiple stages. The economy is populated by three
types of agents, each of unit mass: depositors indexed by d, bankers indexed by b and fi-
nanciers indexed by f . Depositors are outside investors that lend money to intermediaries
to invest on their behalf. The key friction is that depositors have a strong preference for safe
assets. As a result, all aggregate risk exposure must be held within the financial system.4
4All my results generalize to any setting in which financial intermediaries are constrained by their risk
exposure. This may be the case even when depositors are, in principle, willing to hold risk exposure. In
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Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2015) provide empirical evidence of this safety premium. I use the name “depositors” to
indicate the risk-aversion of outside investors. Mapped into the real world, they may repre-
sent both individual depositors and financial institutions with a strong preference for safe
assets, such as money market funds or pension funds. Bankers are unique in that only they
can lend money to households and firms directly. Financiers purchase financial securities
produced by bankers on secondary markets. Bankers and financiers partially finance their
investments by borrowing from depositors, and are protected by limited liability. Because
depositors are infinitely risk-averse, bankers and financiers borrow by issuing risk-free bonds
subject to an endogenous risk-weighted borrowing constraints. Because financiers do not
lend money to households and firms directly, they face a different borrowing constraint than
bankers. These asymmetric borrowing constraints constitute the basic motive for trade on
secondary markets.
1.2.2 Technology
There is a single good that can be used for consumption and investment. An agent of type
j ∈ {d, b, f} receives an endowment wj at the beginning of the period. At the end of the
period, an aggregate state of the world z ∈ {l, h} is realized. The probability of state z is piz.
All agents derive utility from consumption at the end of the period. The consumption of
agent i of type j in state z is cij(z). To capture depositors’ preference for safe assets as simply
as possible, I follow Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013) and Caballero and Farhi (2014)
and assume that depositors are infinitely risk-averse and evaluate consumption streams
according to U id(c
i
d) = minz c
i
d(z). Bankers and financiers are risk-neutral and evaluate
consumption streams according to U ib(c
i
b) = Ezcib(z) and U if (cif ) = Ezcif (z), respectively.
This allows me to isolate how the risk exposure of intermediaries affects the efficiency of
investment even when intermediaries are, in principle, indifferent towards holding risk.
Hebert (2015), debt is the optimal security in settings that includes flexible moral hazard, i.e. an effort
choice and risk shifting. In the Diamond (1984) model of delegated monitoring, the efficiency of financial
intermediation improves when intermediaries can oﬄoad aggregate risk exposure.
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Endowments can be invested into two constant-returns-to-scale investment opportunities: a
risky technology indexed by R and a safe technology indexed by S. There are no capacity
constraints – an infinite amount of capital can be invested either technology. The safe
technology represents investment opportunities that do not require intermediation. For
example, all agents in the economy can purchase treasury bills and widely traded AAA-
rated corporate bonds. However, I assume that intermediaries may receive a higher return
on the safe technology than depositors. Specifically, the safe technology yields a return of
y¯S per unit of investment in every state of the world when bankers or financiers invest,
and a return of y
S
≤ y¯S when depositors invest. Here y¯S − yS ≥ 0 can be viewed as a
cost advantage accruing to specialized financial intermediaries when investing in the safe
technology. This could be due to economies of scale or informational costs. In the model,
I will use y¯S − yS to parametrize the intermediation premium that depositors are willing
to pay for financial services. For simplicity, I normalize the safe technology’s return to
intermediaries to one: y¯S = 1. Agent i of type τ invests k
i
S,τ in the safe technology
The risky technology represents investment opportunities in the real economy, such as lend-
ing to households and firms. Only bankers can invest in this technology. The assumption
here is that bankers have the requisite expertise to appropriately evaluate prospective bor-
rowers and the technology to interact directly with households and firms. Banker i invests
kiR,b in the risky technology. The risky technology requires costly effort at the time of in-
vestment to operate efficiently. This assumption is motivated by the notion that bankers
may have to engage in costly screening and monitoring to make sure that borrowers are
likely to repay their loans and behave so as to maximize the expected returns on investment
as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). For simplicity, I refer to all costly actions undertaken
by the banker as monitoring, and to the absence of monitoring as shirking.
Monitoring has a utility cost of m per unit of investment. If monitored, the risky technology
yields a return yR(z) per unit of investment in state z. If it is not monitored, it yields y
′
R(z)
in state z. To simplify notation, I write yˆR = EzyR(z) and yˆ′R = Ezy′R(z) Monitoring is
efficient, and shirking increases the downside risk: yˆR > yˆ
′
R+m and y
′
R(l) < yR(l) < y
′
R(h).
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When it is monitored, the risky technology yields a higher expected return but a lower
worst-case return than the safe technology: yˆR > y¯S but yR(l) < yS . I let e ∈ {0, 1} denote
the monitoring effort exerted by the bank, with e = 1 if the bank monitors. The bank’s
monitoring decision is private information. Financiers and depositors thus do not know
whether the claims on investment produced by bankers are of high-quality (monitored) or
low-quality (unmonitored). Hence, there is moral hazard – monitoring occurs only if it is
in the private interest of bankers to do so. Moreover, the monitoring decision applies to the
banker’s entire investment. That is, the banker produces either high-quality claims or low-
quality claims but not both. This assumption is without loss of generality if financiers are
always guaranteed to receive at least the average quality of all assets produced by a banker
when purchasing claims on secondary markets. Under this restriction, bankers optimally
monitor either all assets or on none. In the real world, secondary markets are structured to
eliminate excessive “cream-skimming” by bankers. Sellers typically offer a whole portfolio
of loans for sale, and buyers select the subset of loans they want to purchase. Buyers can
guarantee themselves at least the average portfolio quality by using a random selection rule.
The assumption can also be rationalized by fixed costs in the monitoring or screening of
borrowers.
1.2.3 Asset Markets and Investment
Agents trade two financial assets: a risk-free bond and a risky claim. The risky claim is a
direct claim on the output of the risky technology: it pays out yR(z) in state z if monitoring
occurs, and y′R(z) otherwise. The banker’s investment splits into a continuum of identical
risky claims that can be traded individually. The risk-free bond is zero coupon bond with
face value one. Bankers and financiers use the bond market to borrow funds from depositors.
Bankers use risky claims trade risk exposure to financiers. Both financial assets are in zero
net supply. I refer to bond market as the funding market, and the market for risky claims
as the secondary market. The two markets open sequentially: the funding market closes
before the secondary market opens. Investment occurs after the funding market has closed,
12
but before the secondary market opens. All investment choices are not contractible: each
agent makes individually rationally investment choices conditional on the bond holdings
determined in the funding market.
The role of secondary markets is to allow to bankers to sell off risk exposure in order to
increase borrowing. To simplify the timing of the model, I assume that bankers can issue
a commitment to sell at least ab claims when secondary markets open. In this manner, the
banker can expand borrowing through secondary market sales even though markets open
sequentially. Yet, I also allow bankers to sell more than ab claims should they find it optimal
to do so ex-post. This captures the idea that bankers can credibly promise to sell to sell a
given amount of loans – for example, by oﬄoading credit risk from a previous origination
round – while always being able to return to secondary markets at a later date.5
Given these assumptions, I now detail the market structure in each market. I summarize
the timing of events in Figure 1 below.
Funding Market Structure
In the funding market, financiers and bankers issue risk-free zero-coupon bond with face
value one to depositors in order to fund investment and risky claim purchases. They do
so subject to a solvency constraint – to be specified below – that ensures that all bonds
are indeed risk-free. Before bond trading commences, each banker posts a commitment to
sell at least ab risky claims when the secondary market opens. As I will show below, these
asset sale commitments will affect the tightness of the banker’s solvency constraint. Given
that the solvency constraint must hold for every banker and every financier, all bonds are
identical. I therefore model the bond market as perfectly competitive, with price Qb and
return Rb =
1
Qb
. Depositor i purchases bid units of the bond, and intermediary i of type τ
5Bankers may find it optimal ex-post to shirk and sell a large fraction of his assets to financiers. If
bankers do so, however, depositor payoffs are not adversely affected. As a result, there is no incentive for
depositors to require bankers to commit to not selling more than ab, even if doing so were possible. Such
ex-post shirking will affect financier’s payoffs in secondary markets, however. I discuss this issue in detail
below.
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issues biτ units of the bond subject to the solvency constraint.
The key simplifying assumptions of this funding market structure are that (i) financiers do
not fund bankers by buying bonds and (ii) bankers do not issue equity to financiers. I show
below that these assumptions are immaterial to the main results of the paper. Specifically,
credit booms can arise even when financiers achieve weakly higher returns on equity than
bankers – so that bankers would not want to issue equity, even if doing so were costless – and
the return on secondary market assets strictly dominates the return on bonds. Moreover,
market segmentation is consistent with the data. Ivashina and Sun (2011) provide evidence
that tranches of loans sold in secondary markets had lower yields than those held via direct
claims on bankers.
Secondary Market Structure
The secondary market opens after the funding market closes and is organized in two stages:
bidding and trading. Banker i enters the bidding stage having issued bib bonds and a
promise to sell at least aib risky claims. Financiers observe the pair µ ≡ (ab, bb) associated
with every risky claim that is sold. That is, each financier knows the bond position and
asset-sale promises made by the banker issuing the risky claim. Because bankers can sell
assets to many financiers at the same time, trade is non-exclusive. Financiers thus cannot
directly observe either the quality of the claims or the total quantity of risky claims sold
given banker. The motivation for this assumption is as follows. First, bankers have better
information about their own actions. Second, secondary markets are typically large and
opaque. Indeed, many financial securities are traded in over-the-counter markets that are
hard to monitor in real time. Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2011) and Kurlat (forthcoming)
show that buyers cannot screen sellers by restricting the quantity of assets that is sold
when trade is non-exclusive. That is, bankers cannot signal that they engaged in costly
monitoring by promising to retain a fraction of their assets.6 I thus restrict the contract
6One way to overcome such “anonymity” in financial markets is to allow for reputations. Yet reputations
are typically fragile – see Ordon˜ez (2013) – and may even serve to sustain pooling equilibria in which both
low-quality and high-quality assets are sold in dynamic settings (Chari, Shourideh, and Zetlin-Jones (2014)).
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space in secondary markets to menus consisting of a per-unit price Qa(µ) and a quantity
af (µ) that the financier is willing to purchase at Qa(µ). These bids are conditional on µ
because financiers can use µ to make inferences about the quality of risky claims. Bankers
then sell risky claims to the highest bidder.
This market structure allows me to tackle two concerns that would arise in a standard com-
petitive market. The first is that financiers are able to form inferences about asset quality
as a function of bankers funding market choices. As a result, multiple asset qualities can
trade simultaneously. The second is that I can accommodate secondary market shutdowns.
That is, there exist equilibria in which no claims are traded on secondary markets. This
feature will turn out to be useful to guarantee equilibrium existence more generally. The
structure nevertheless preserves an appealing feature of competitive markets. Specifically,
financiers act as price takers for any given µ when assets are traded on secondary markets.
The result is that the intermediation rents on secondary markets are split according to sec-
ondary market prices, with market prices in turn being determined by the relative wealth
of bankers and financiers.
At the commencement of the bidding stage, each financier j posts a pair
(
Qja(µb), aˆ
j
f (µb)
)
for all possible pairs of banker asset sale promises and bond issuances µ. Note that I require
financiers to post prices and quantities for any µ, regardless of whether any banker posts
such a µ in equilibrium. Since financier offers are a function of µ, I refer to all trades with
bankers who post µ as occurring on a sub-market µ. Naturally, banker i can only trade in
sub-market µi. I denote the set of bankers who post µ by Ibµ, and the set of financiers who
trade in sub-market µ by Ifµ . A sub-market is active if a strictly positive mass of bankers
and financiers makes strictly positive bids in this sub-market. The set of active secondary
sub-markets is defined as M.
In the trading stage, banker i in sub-market µi offers to sell aˆi,jb units of the risky claim
to financier j at the posted price Qja(µi). Given bankers’ offers
{
ai,jb
}
i∈Ib
µi
to financier j,
As a result, they may attenuate, but don’t eliminate, the potential for harmful hidden trading in secondary
markets. I thus abstract from reputational concerns for simplicity.
15
risky claims are allocated as follows. If aˆjb(µ) ≥
∫
i∈Ibµaˆi,jb
, so that there is excess demand
for risky claims, then each banker sells exactly ai,jb risky claims to financier j at price
Qja(µ). If aˆ
j
b(µ) >
∫
i∈Ibµ aˆ
i,j
b , so that there is excess supply of risky claims, then each
fraction of risky claim supplied is sold to the financier with equal probability, with the total
amount of claims sold equal to financier j’s demand. Financier j therefore receives exactly
ajb ≡ min
{∫
i∈Ibµ aˆ
i,j
b , aˆ
j
f
}
units of the risky claim at price Qja(µ), while banker i sells
ai,jb = min

 aˆi,jb∫
i′∈Ibµ aˆ
i′,j
b
 aˆjf , aˆi,jb

risky claims to financier j. I refer to these as realized quantities. Across all financiers, the
banker sells aib =
∫
j∈Ifµ a
i,j
b risky claims and receives
∫
j∈If
µi
Qja(µi)a
i,j
b in revenue. By the
law of large numbers, these quantities are not random variables. Finally, banker i’s stage-2
bidding strategy must satisfy aib ≥ aib. Whenever multiple financiers make identical bids in
a given sub-market, each financier receives a representative slice of all risky claims in that
market. Specifically, if both high and low-quality loans are traded in a given sub-market
then the fraction of low-quality loans received is the same for every financier. When bidding,
the financier must therefore form beliefs only about the average quality risky claims in sub-
market µ. A sufficient statistic is, of course, the fraction of low-quality loans. I denote
financiers’ beliefs about this fraction by φ(µ). Throughout, I require that financier beliefs
satisfy Bayes’ rule wherever possible. In equilibrium, furthermore, beliefs must be correct –
they must coincide with the true fraction of low-quality loans. To economize on notation, I
take this condition as given and use φ(µ) to denote the equilibrium fraction of low-quality
loans in sub-market µ.
When turning to the characterization of equilibrium, I will also require that financier bids
satisfy a regularity condition across sub-markets. In particular, I impose that the terms of
trade offered by financiers must not “decrease” in beliefs.
Definition 1 (Bid Consistency). The bidding behavior of financiers satisfies bid consis-
tency if for all sub-markets µ ∈ (ab, bb) ∈ R2+ and µ′ ∈ R2+ , if φ(µ′, ) ≤ φ(µ) then
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Qja(µ′) ≥ Qja(µ) and aˆjf (µ′) ≥ aˆjf (µ).
Bid consistency requires that financier bids be conditioned on the quality of risky claims
only: whenever the financier believes assets to be of weakly higher quality in one of two
sub-markets, he cannot offer worse terms in the sub-market where he believes the quality
to be higher. I impose this restriction to prevent “collusive” equilibria in which financiers
coordinate to punish bankers for deviating from some µ to a µ′ by offering low prices when
doing so does not change the quality of claims. It is directly linked to my assumption that
secondary markets are anonymous: financiers must make offers conditional on their beliefs
regarding the quality of the assets rather than the identity or balance sheet characteristics
of the issuer. Note that bid consistency is not a constraint on the bidding behavior in
active sub-markets since it is implied by a no-arbitrage condition stating that financiers
do not achieve strictly higher returns in one active sub-market than in another. This
no-arbitrage condition must hold in equilibrium whenever there are multiple active sub-
markets. Bid consistency thus only constrains financier bids in currently inactive sub-
markets to be consistent with those in active sub-markets. It is in this manner that the
restriction rules out the aforementioned collusive equilibria.
The next result simplifies the analysis by showing that each active sub-market behaves as
if it were a competitive market.
Lemma 1 (Secondary Market Prices and Rationing). If every sub-market µ, there exists
a unique marginal price Qa(µ) such that Q
j
a(µ) = Qa(µ) for all j. No individual banker or
financier is rationed at Qa(µ) in any sub-market µ.
The proof is standard and follows from all financiers being infinitesimally small and holding
the same beliefs. Since no agent can impact market quantities in the aggregate, no agent
can acquire risky claims below the marginal price. Yet no agent must pay more to acquire
as many claims as he wants. This line of reasoning also accommodates the requirement that
financier bids must satisfy bid consistency. The reason is that bid-consistency is implied by
a no-arbitrage condition for financier’s across active sub-markets – a condition that must
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hold when there are multiple active sub-markets – while bids on inactive sub-markets are
irrelevant for financier utility because they are never accepted on the equilibrium path.
Going forward, I thus assume that financiers take the set of active sub-markets and the
market price within that sub-market as given. Accordingly, I write all decision problems in
terms of market prices rather than bid prices, and realized quantities ab and af rather than
bid quantities aˆb and aˆf . Note that all financiers receive a representative slice of all claims
traded in all sub-markets in which they trade because all financiers bid the same marginal
price in that sub-market.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of events. In stage 1, all agents receive their endowments.
In stage 2, bankers post a commitment to sell at least ab units of the risky asset in secondary
markets, and risk-free bonds are traded in the funding market. Once the funding market
closes, we move on to stage 3. Here, bankers make investments in the risky technology
using their own net worth and the proceeds from bond issuances in the funding market,
and all agents make their investments in the safe technology. Moreover, bankers make their
monitoring decision. The secondary market opens in stage 4. Financiers post bids for risky
claims and bankers choose which financier to sell to, subject to the constraint that they
must sell at least ab units in total. To simplify notation, I take as given that the proceeds
from risky asset sales are automatically invested in the storage technology, and thus yield
a sure return of y¯S ≡ 1. Once the secondary market closes, we move on to stage 5. In
this stage, the productivity shock z is realized, returns on investment accrue, accounts are
settled, and all agents consume.
1.2.4 Decision Problems
I begin the equilibrium characterization by discussing the decision problem of each type of
agent. Given that the decision problems are symmetric for all agents of type j, I simplify
notation by dropping the superscript i. Every agent takes the bond price, the set of ac-
tive secondary sub-markets M, and the marginal prices in each secondary sub-market as
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Figure 1
Timing of Events
1. Agents receive endowments.
2. Bankers issue promise ab. Bond trading.
3. Agents invest and bankers make monitoring decision.
4. Secondary market trading. Bankers sell ab ∈ [ab, kR,b] at price Qa.
5. Aggregate state z and output realized. Accounts settled.
given.
The Depositor’s Problem
The return on a risky claim purchased on secondary markets can never be higher than
the direct return on investment on the risky technology. Hence, the worst-case return of a
secondary market claim is always below that of the safe technology, and depositors invest
only in the safe technology and/or risk-free bonds. Let kS,d and bd denote the depositor’s
investment in the safe technology and bond purchases, respectively. Then the depositor’s
problem is
max
kS,d,bd
min
z
(cd(z))
s.t. cd(z) = yS · kS,d + bd for z ∈ {l, h}
kS,d +Qbbd ≤ wd.
The first constraint determines the depositor’s consumption in state z. Since both invest-
ments are risk-free, consumption is independent of the state of the world. The second
constraint is the budget constraint stating that the depositor cannot spend more than his
endowment wd on bonds and investment. This problem has a simple solution. In particular,
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the budget constraint binds and
bd(wd, Qb) =

wd
Qb
if Qb <
1
y
S
[0, wdQb ] if Qb =
1
y
S
0 if Qb >
1
y
S
Equilibrium bond prices are thus bounded above by Q¯b ≡ 1y
S
.
The Financier’s Problem
To discuss the financier’s problem, I first establish some additional notation. Recall that
all financiers receive a representative risky claim in each sub-market, and that the fraction
of low-quality claims sold in sub-market µ is φ(µ). The state-z payoff of the representative
claim in sub-market is yR,µ(z) ≡ (1 − φ(µ))yR(z) + φ(µ)y′R(z). The expected payoff is
yˆR,µ ≡ (1 − φ(µ))yˆR + φ(µ)yˆ′R. Financiers chooses investment in the safe technology kS,f ,
a quantity of bonds to issue in funding markets bf , and the number of risky claims to bid
af (µ) for every µ ∈ R2+. Taking prices and the set of active secondary sub-markets M as
given, the financier’s problem is
max
kS,f ,bf≥0,af (µ)
Ez
[
y¯SkS,f +
∫
M
yR,µ(z)af (µ)dµ− bf
]
s.t. kS,f +
∫
M
Qa(µ)af (µ)dµ ≤ wf +Qbbf
y¯SkS,f +
∫
M
yR,µ(z)af (µ)dµ ≥ bf for all z.
The first constraint is the budget constraint. It states that sum of the expenditures on
risky assets in all active sub-markets and the safe investment cannot exceed the sum of his
net worth wf and bond issuances bf . The second constraint is a solvency constraint that
ensures that the all debts are paid in full in every state of the world.
There are two main decisions: whether to purchase risky claims, and, if so, whether to
issue bonds to do so. These decisions depend on the expected return of risky claims and
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their collateral capacity. In particular, financiers can issue more bonds more when the sub-
market they are buying in has a higher proportion of high-quality claims. The reason is that
the worst-case payoff of a highly-quality claim is strictly higher than that of a low-quality
claim. As a result, it is of better use as collateral. Depending on prices and asset quality,
financiers may issue less bonds than the solvency constraint allows them to. For example,
the bond price may be so low that it is not profitable for the financier to issue bonds to
invest in risky claims. I summarize the financier’s optimal borrowing decision by γ in the
pseudo-solvency constraint
bf = γ
[
y¯SkS,f +
∫
M
yR,µ(z)af (µ)dµ
]
.. (1)
Here, γ ∈ [0, 1] is a decision variable determining the degree to which the financier exhausts
his borrowing capacity. When γ = 0, the financier does not issue any bonds. When
γ = 1, the financier issues as many bonds as he can. I also make use of the following
definition.
Definition 2 (Return on Investment in Secondary Markets). The unlevered expected re-
turn on investment in sub-market µ is Rˆunlev(µ) ≡ yˆR,µQa(µ) . The fully levered expected return
on investment in sub-market µ is Rˆlev(µ) =
yˆR,µ−yR,µ(l)
Qa(µ)−QbyR,µ(l) . The maximal expected return
in sub-market µ is Rˆmax(µ) ≡ max
{
Rˆunlev(µ), Rˆlev(µ)
}
.
The unlevered return is achieved by purchasing the risky claim using own net worth only.
The fully levered return is achieved by purchasing claims using own net worth and the full
amount of bonds that can be issued. The following corollary states the condition under
which leverage is beneficial to the financier.
Corollary 1. In sub-market µ, the maximum expected return is equal to the fully levered
expected return if and only if QbyˆR,µ ≥ Qa(µ).
Proof. Follows directly from comparing the rates of return.
I now turn to the financier’s optimal portfolio. If there are no active secondary sub-markets,
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the solution is trivial. Specifically, the financier invests all his wealth in the safe technology.
He issues bonds to do so only if Qb ≥ y¯S = 1. To the extent that this condition holds, it is
easy to verify that the solvency constraint is never binding. As a result, every financier can
issue an infinite amount of bonds. Hence Qb ≤ y¯S when secondary markets are inactive,
and financiers issue bonds only when there is excess demand at Qb = y¯S .
Next, turn to financier portfolios when there are active secondary markets. For simplicity,
take as given that only one sub-market, µ∗ say, is active – this will be the case in equi-
librium. For secondary markets to be active, financiers must be willing to purchase risky
claims. Hence the return on risky claims must not be lower than that of the safe technol-
ogy. That is, Rˆunlev(µ∗) ≥ y¯S . The first question is whether financiers will invest in the
safe technology.
Lemma 2 (Financier Safe Investment with Active Secondary Markets.). Assume that
Rˆunlev(µ∗) ≥ y¯S. Then financiers are indifferent between the safe and the risky technol-
ogy if Rˆunlev(µ∗) = y¯S and bf ≤ yR(l)wfQa(µ∗)−QbyR(l) , and strictly prefer to invest in the risky
technology otherwise.
Proof. See appendix.
A corollary of this result is that the financier’s solvency constraint can be written as a
borrowing constraint that is independent of whether the financier invests in risky claims or
the safe technology.
Corollary 2 (Financier Borrowing Constraint). The financier solvency constraint is equiv-
alent to the borrowing constraint
bf ≤ yR(l)wf
Qa(µ∗)−QbyR(l) .
Proof. Suppose that the financier invests in risky claims only. Then the result follows
directly from re-arranging the solvency constraint. Suppose instead that the financier invests
in the safe technology. By Lemma 2, the stated condition must hold.
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When secondary markets are active, financiers thus face a borrowing constraint even when
investing in the safe technology. The reason is that secondary markets allow the financier to
engage in risk-shifting. Given that risky claims always offer a weakly higher return than the
safe technology, and that the financier’s borrowing capacity is independent of his investment
strategy, I proceed under the presumption that the banker invests in the risky technology
only. I later verify this presumption. The pseudo-solvency constraint allows me to write
the financier’s bond issuances as
bf =
γyR(l)wf
Qa(µ∗)− γQbyR(l) .
for some γ ∈ [0, 1].
The optimal degree of borrowing then follows directly from Corollary 1: the financier levers
fully when the levered return is strictly higher than the unlevered return. Specifically, the
optimal γ is given by
γ∗ =

1 if
yˆR,µ∗
Qa
> 1Qb
[0, 1] if
yˆR,µ∗
Qa
= 1Qb
0 if
yˆR,µ∗
Qa
< 1Qb .
Under the presumption that secondary markets are active and financiers strictly prefer
risky claims to the safe technology, the financier optimally chooses the following asset allo-
cation:
af (µ
∗) =
wf
Qa(µ∗)− γQbyR,µ∗(l) and b
∗
f =
γyR,µ∗(l)wf
Qa(µ∗)− γQbyR,µ∗(l) .
Accounting for bid consistency then only requires that the financier makes weakly better
bids in all inactive sub-markets in which beliefs are weakly higher than in the active sub-
market, i.e. aˆf (µ) ≥ af (µ∗) for all µ such that φ(µ) ≥ φ(µ∗).
23
The Banker’s Problem
I now turn to the banker’s problem. I assume throughout that bankers receive strictly
positive intermediation rents from investing depositors’ money on their behalf. As a result,
bankers want to issue as many bonds as possible. I will show that it may not always be
feasible to sustain monitoring in equilibrium for all bankers. I therefore begin by charac-
terizing the decision problem for a given action e ∈ {0, 1}. I denote the realized private
benefit associated with e by m∗(e) = (1− e)m, and the associated return on the risky tech-
nology by y∗R(z, e) = eyR(z) + (1− e)y′R(z). The banker’s state-z consumption cb(z) is the
sum of payoffs from investments in the safe technology, payoffs from the risky technology
net of asset sales, proceeds from asset sales, and bond repayments. By limited liability,
consumption is bounded below by zero. That is,
cb(z, ab, ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb, e) ≡ max {y¯SkS,b + y∗R(e, z) (kR,b − ab)− bb +Qa(µ)ab, 0} ,
where µ = (ab, bb). Since the banker is risk-neutral, the banker’s utility in state z is
ub(z, ab, ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb, e) ≡ cb(z, ab, ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb, e) +m∗(e)kR,b.
The banker’s optimal monitoring choice conditional on (ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb) is:
e∗(ab, ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb) = arg max
e′∈{0,1}
Ezub(z, ab, ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb, e′)
Secondary markets open after the bond market closes and investment has taken place. The
banker’s asset sales must therefore be ex-post optimal given (ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb). Note that
the banker must sell at least ab claims but can sell no more than kR,b. When deciding on
how many assets to sell, the banker takes into account that he will adjust his monitoring
decision optimally. For example, a banker that sells a large fraction of his portfolio may
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decide to stop monitoring. As a result, asset sales are ex-post optimal if and only if
a∗b(ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb) = arg max
kR,b≥a′≥a
Ez
[
max
{
y¯SkS,b + y
∗
R(e
′, z)
(
kR,b − a′b
)− bb +Qa(µ)a′b, 0}]
+m∗(e′)kR,b
where e′ = e∗(ab, a
′
b, kR,b, kS,b, bb).
Taking prices and action e as given, the banker thus solves the problem:
max
kS,b,kR,b,bb,a
Ez [max {ySkS,b + y∗R(e, z) (kR,b − ab)− bb +Qa(µ)ab, 0}] +m∗(e)kR,b
(PB(e))
s.t.
kS,b + kR,b ≤ wb +Qbbb,
bb ≤ y¯SkS,b + y∗R(e, z) (kR,b − ab) +Qa(µ)ab for all z,
e = e∗(ab, ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb),
ab = a
∗
b(ab, kR,b, kS,b, bb).
The first constraint is the budget constraint, stating that total investment in the safe and
the risky technology cannot exceed net worth and the proceeds from bond issuances. The
second constraint is the solvency constraint that guarantees that all debts are repaid in full
in every state of the world. The third constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint
that ensures that action e is privately optimal. The fourth constraint ensures that asset
sales are ex-post optimal. A helpful result is that bankers will never invest in the safe
technology in equilibrium. I impose this result going forward.
Lemma 3 (No Safe Investment by Bankers). Bankers never invest in the safe technology:
k∗S,b = 0 in any equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
I characterize the solution to the banker’s problem in two steps. I first discuss ex-post
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optimal asset sales and the monitoring decision conditional on bond issuances, investment,
and asset-sale promises. I then discuss optimal bond issuances, investment, and asset-sale
promises, given that asset-sales and the monitoring decision are chosen optimally ex-post.
Ex-Post Optimal Asset Sales. The secondary market opens once the funding market has
closed. As a result, bond issuances bb, investment in the risky technology kR,b, and the asset-
sale promise ab are all sunk. The banker makes his asset sale decision with the associated
optimal monitoring decision in mind. Specifically, the banker chooses e = e∗(ab, ab, kR,b, bb)
when he sells ab risky claims. Two observations simplify the analysis. First, the banker’s
objective function is linear because the banker is risk-neutral and he is required to be solvent
in all states of the world. As a result, the solution is bang-bang. That is, the banker either
sells everything or just as much as he initially promised, a∗b ∈ {ab, kR,b}. Second, the banker
will certainly shirk when he sells his entire portfolio because asset quality is irrelevant to
the banker’s utility when ab = kR,b. That is, e
∗(kR,b, ab, kR,b, bb) = 0.
For there to be monitoring in equilibrium, it must therefore be the case that bankers monitor
when they sell just as much as they had promised. Assume for now that this is the case.
Bankers then either sell ab and monitor or sell kR,b and shirk. The payoffs of these two
action profiles are as follows.
Shirk and Sell: QakR,b − bb +mkR,b
Effort and Hold: yˆR(kR,b − ab)− bb +Qaab
Comparing payoffs yields a simple decision rule in the secondary market price.
Proposition 1 (Ex-Post Optimal Asset Sales and Monitoring). Assume that monitoring
is optimal at ab. Then the banker sells ab assets and monitors only if
Qa ≤ Q¯a(kR,b, ab) ≡ yˆR −m
(
kR,b
kR,b − ab
)
(IMP)
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That is, bankers will choose to sell everything and shirk if the asset price is too high.
Because Q¯a(kR,b, ab) ≤ yˆR −m < yˆR, this may be the case even as financiers continue to
make receive rents on secondary market assets. It is for this reason that there is scope for
ex-post shirking when financiers are well-capitalized and bid up prices. Going forward, I will
refer to this upper bound on the secondary market price as the implementation constraint.
Monitoring occurs in equilibrium only if this constraint is satisfied for a some bankers.
If instead bankers shirk even when they sell just as many claims as they had promised (that
is, e∗(ab, ab, kR,b, bb) = 0), then bankers always shirk. In this case, the optimal asset sales
follow an even simpler decision rule: sell as many claims as promised if the secondary market
priceQa is below the expected return on a low-quality claim yˆR, and sell all claims otherwise.
Borrowing Constraints. The next step is to characterize the banker’s optimal choice
of bonds bb, investment kR,b, and asset-sale promises ab. I do so under the presumption
that monitoring is optimal. The previous section showed that monitoring can only be sus-
tained if it is ex-post optimal to sell just as many claims as promised. I therefore presume
that a∗b = ab. I then derive the borrowing constraint that ensures that bankers monitor
when they do indeed sell as many claims as promised. When turning to competitive equi-
librium, I compute the competitive equilibrium under this presumption and then verify
whether a∗b = ab in equilibrium.
There are two constraints that limit bankers’ ability to issue bonds. The first is the solvency
constraint that states the banker must be able to repay his debts in full in every state of
the world. The second is the incentive compatibility constraint that ensures bankers prefer
to monitor. This takes the form
Ez [yR(z) (kR,b − ab)− bb +Qaab]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoff Conditional on Monitoring
≥ Ez
[
max
{
y′R(z) (kR,b − ab)− bb +Qaab, 0
}]
+mkR,b︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoff Conditional on Shirking
.
It is straightforward to see that the incentive constraint binds before the solvency constraint.
The reason is that the banker is less sensitive to downside risk when he shirks than when
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monitors because the limited-liability constraints binds earlier under shirking. I refer to
bankers as collateral-constrained if the limited-liability constraint binds in the low state
conditional on shirking. The banker is collateral-constrained at (kR,b, bb, Qa) if and only
if
ab ≤ a¯b(kR,b, bb, Qa) ≡
bb − y′R(l)kR,b
Qa − y′R(l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collateral Shortfall
.
When the banker is collateral-constrained, the incentive-compatibility constraint can be
rewritten as a borrowing constraint of the form:
bb ≤
[
pih
pil
(
yR(h)− y′R(h)
)
+ yR(l)− m
pil
]
kR,b +
[
Qa − yR(l)− pih
pil
(
yR(h)− y′R(h)
)]
ab︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Banker borrowing capacity b¯b(kR,b,Qa,ab)
The next result shows that bankers can relax this borrowing constraint by selling risky
claims on secondary markets if the moral hazard problem is a sufficiently severe risk-shifting
problem (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
Lemma 4 (Risk-shifting Problem). There is scope for secondary market sales (ab > 0) to
increase banker borrowing capacity if and only if
y′R(h) > EzyR(z).
Proof. Since the secondary market price cannot be higher than the return on the risky
technology (that is, Qa ≤ yˆR) there exists a Qa such that the coefficient on ab in the
borrowing constraint is positive if and only if y′R(h) > EzyR(z).
Lemma 4 states that the losses from shirking must be sufficiently concentrated in the low
state. The intuition is that secondary market sales serve as a form of insurance – the banker
has more capital in the low state but less in the high state. For this insurance to be valuable,
the banker must be constrained by lack of capital in the low state. This is the case when the
returns of the risky technology are poor in the low state of the world, and particularly so
when shirking. I will impose this condition throughout. In order to simplify the exposition,
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I use the following special case.
Assumption 1. The returns of the risky technology in the high state are the same under
shirking and monitoring:
y′R(h) = yR(h)
This assumption allows me to write the borrowing constraint purely in terms of low-state
payoffs. As will become clear, the assumption is innocuous in terms of the main results of the
paper.7 In order to obtain easily interpretable closed-form solutions for equilibrium prices
and trading behavior, I also sometimes specialize the shirking technology as follows.
Assumption 2. The risky technology yields zero payoff in the low state conditional on
shirking: y′R(l) = 0.
I summarize the severity of the moral hazard problem by
m˜ ≡ 1− m
pilyR(l)
∈ (0, 1).
This reduced-form statistic is close to one when the moral hazard problem is not severe (m
is close to zero) and close to zero when the moral hazard problem is severe (m is close to
pilyR(l), the output loss from shirking). High values of m˜ therefore indicate a loose banker
moral hazard problem. Under Assumption 1, the banker’s borrowing constraint can then
be written as
bb ≤ yR(l)m˜kR,b︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collateral Capacity of Risky Investment
+ (Qa − yR(l)) ab.︸ ︷︷ ︸
Secondary Market Insurance
The banker can back his bonds with the worst-case payoff of the risky technology – appro-
priately discounted by m˜ to account for moral hazard – or with proceeds from secondary
market sales. Exploiting the budget constraint kR,b = wb + Qbbb reveals a constraint on
7A caveat applies if I were to allow for tranching on secondary markets. If tranching were allowed, then
my results go through as long as the high-state payoffs are different yR(h) 6= y′R(h).
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investment that can be relaxed by net worth and risky claim sales:
kR,b ≤ wb +Qb (Qa − yR(l)) ab
1−QbyR(l)m˜ (2)
What happens when the banker is not collateral-constrained – that is, when asset sales ab
exceed the collateral shortfall a¯b(kR,b, bb, Qa)? In this case, the limited-liability constraint
does not bind conditional on shirking. As a result, the incentive-compatibility constraint
becomes a skin-in-the-game constraint:
ab ≤ m˜kR,b (3)
Secondary market sales no longer boost borrowing capacity. Indeed, selling too many assets
now induces shirking. As a result, a banker will never issue a promise to sell more than a
fraction m˜ of his portfolio. As the previous section has shown, of course, the fact that he
does not promise more does not mean he will not sell more ex-post.
The impact of secondary market sales on borrowing capacity is therefore as follows. If
bankers are collateral-constrained (that is, ab < a¯b(kR,b, bb, Qa) ), asset sales alleviate the
borrowing constraint by improving the bank’s collateral position. When instead bankers are
not collateral-constrained (that is, ab > a¯b(kR,b, bb, Qa)), then asset sales reduce the stake
of the banker outcome of his risky investment and do not boost borrowing capacity.
But do bankers find it optimal to sell assets to alleviate borrowing constraints? It depends
on the secondary market price. By selling a risky claim, the bank is able to issue Qa−yR(l)
additional bonds. Upon investing this cash, each unit of investment can be used to back
another yR(l)m˜ in bonds. By issuing
(Qa−yR(l))
1−QbyR(l)m˜ in new bonds, the banker can thus increase
investment by Qb(Qa−yR(l))1−QbyR(l)m˜ . The cost is that the banker receives a return of Qa rather than
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the expected value yˆR. Bankers thus sells risky claims only if QbyˆR − 11−QbyR(l)m˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
Levered Return - Bond Repayment
 ·
 Qa − yR(l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt Capacity of Risky Claim
 ≥ [yˆR −Qa]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Secondary Market Discount
This condition implies a lower bound on the price of risky assets for trade to occur in
secondary markets:
Qa ≥ Qa(Qb) ≡
yˆR − yR(l) + yR(l)(1− m˜)yˆRQb
Qb [yˆR − yR(l)m˜] . (4)
Note that Q
a
(Qb) is strictly decreasing in Qb and Qa(
1
yˆR
) = yˆR. That is, when Qb is high,
borrowing capacity is valuable and banks sell claims at a discount; when Qb is at its lowest,
bankers are willing to sell claims only at par. Going forward, it will be useful to distinguish
two degrees of secondary market liquidity.
Definition 3 (Secondary Market Liquidity). Secondary market liquidity is high if Q∗a >
Q
a
(Q∗b) and low if Q
∗
a = Qa(Q
∗
b).
That is, secondary market liquidity is low if prices are such that bankers are exactly in-
different toward selling assets to increase borrowing. In this case, financiers receive all
intermediation rents from secondary market trading. If instead secondary market liquidity
is high, bankers strictly prefer to sell assets to increase borrowing capacity, and receive
intermediation rents from doing so. As a result, bankers sell exactly a∗b = a¯b(kR,b, bb, Qa)
claims. I fully characterize the optimal banker portfolio in the next section, where I study
competitive equilibria.
1.2.5 Competitive Equilibria in the Static Model
I now turn to characterizing competitive equilibria in the static model. Because monitoring
is socially efficient, I look for equilibria in which as many bankers as possible monitor.
A complication is that the implementability constraint (IMP) cannot be verified ex-ante
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because Q¯a is a function of the optimal banker portfolio. I therefore use a guess-and-
verify approach to computing equilibria. Specifically, I first conjecture that the equilibrium
secondary market price Q∗a does not exceed the upper bound Q¯a. Given this conjecture, all
bankers monitor. I then compute the resulting equilibrium allocations, and verify whether
Q∗a does indeed satisfy the implementability constraint (IMP). If the constraint is violated,
I construct equilibria in which some bankers shirk.
Benchmark Without Secondary Markets
To understand the role of secondary markets, I begin by establishing a benchmark without
secondary market trading. It is straightforward to show that bankers must always monitor
in the absence of secondary markets. If bankers were to shirk on the equilibrium path, the
solvency constraint would guarantee that the banker is exposed to all downside risk. Since
shirking is inefficient, the banker elects to monitor. The key upshot is that secondary market
trading is a necessary condition for shirking: investment efficiency falls only if bankers have
an opportunity to sell off assets ex-post. Given that no banker shirks, the optimal portfolios
of bankers and depositors are
k0R,b =
wb
1−Q0byR(l)m˜
, b0b =
yR(l)m˜
′wb
1−Q0byR(l)m˜
, b0d =
wd
Q0b
.
Imposing the market clearing condition bb = bd yields the equilibrium price
Q0b = min
{
wd
(wd + wb)yR(l)m˜
,
1
y
S
}
.
Here, the min operator stems from a boundary constraint on the equilibrium price. In
particular, depositors are indifferent between bonds and the safe technology when Qb =
1
y
S
.
Aggregate investment is
k0R,b = min
{
Wd +Wb,
y
S
Wb
y
S
− yR(l)m˜
}
.
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An equilibrium without secondary markets always exists. Bankers do post asset-sale promises
if they do not expect financiers to buy assets; financiers do not bid if bankers do not post
promises.8 Active secondary markets thus require some degree of coordination between
bankers and financiers.
Proposition 2 (Existence of Equilibrium without Secondary Markets). There always exists
an equilibrium without trade on secondary markets.
Proof. See appendix.
I will show below that an equilibrium with active secondary markets may fail to exist.
The above proposition above thus guarantees the existence of competitive equilibrium more
generally. To focus on the role of secondary markets in financial intermediation, I assume
that the equilibrium with active secondary markets is selected whenever it exists.
Active Secondary Markets
I now study competitive equilibria with active secondary markets. For ease of exposition,
I focus on pure-strategy equilibria but allow different groups of bankers to pursue different
strategies. There are, potentially, two groups of bankers: those who monitor and those who
shirk. I refer to bankers who monitor as the high type and bankers who shirk as the low
type. I denote the fraction of shirking bankers by Φ ∈ [0, 1]. The definition of competitive
equilibrium is as follows.
Definition 4 (Competitive Equilibrium With Active Secondary Markets). A pure-strategy
competitive equilibrium with active secondary markets is a bond price Qb, a set of quan-
tities and bidding strategies for financiers
{
kS,f , bf , {Qa(µ), af (µ)}µ∈R2
}
, a set of quan-
tities for depositors {bd, kS,b}, a set of quantities and a monitoring decision for bankers
{ab, bb, kS,b, kR,b, e, ab}, a non-empty set of active secondary sub-markets M, beliefs φˆ(µ)
for each sub-market, and a fraction of shirking bankers Φ such that:
8Bankers that did not post a promise only sell (high-quality) assets at the expected value yˆR. As a
result, financiers are indifferent between buying risky claims and investing in the safe technology. Moreover,
bankers find it optimal to shirk and sell at this price because yˆR > Q¯a.
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(i) All agents optimize given prices, the set of active sub-markets, and the bidding behavior
of all other agents.
(ii) Financier bids satisfy bid consistency in accordance with Definition 1.
(iii) Prices are such that the bond market and all active secondary sub-markets clear.
(iv) The monitoring decision of bankers is individually optimal.
(v) Beliefs are correct.
(vi) The competitive equilibrium is a called “full-monitoring equilibrium” if Φ = 0 and a
“shirking equilibrium” if Φ ∈ (0, 1]. A “pooling equilibrium” is a shirking equilibrium
in which high-type bankers and low-type bankers pool in the funding market. That is,
they issue the same quantity of bonds bb and asset-sale promises ab, and make the
same investment kR,b.
(vii) In a shirking equilibrium, bankers who monitor obtain the same expected utility as
bankers who shirk.
In Appendix A.13 I show that there do not exist separating equilibria in which high-type
bankers sell assets on secondary markets. The intuition for the result is as follows. If
bankers who monitor were to trade on secondary markets, then by no-arbitrage financiers
must offer a higher price in the high-type’s sub-market. By bid consistency, financiers offer
the same high price to any banker posting a µ consistent with monitoring incentives. Low-
type bankers can then profitably deviate to a slightly lower asset-sale promise and sell assets
at the higher price. For this reason, I focus on pooling equilibria going forward.
I also distinguish equilibria by the degree to which the financial system is borrowing con-
strained.
Definition 5 (Highly Constrained Financial System). The financial system is highly con-
strained if the equilibrium bond price Q∗b satisfies Q
∗
b =
1
y
S
and b∗f (Q
∗
b , Q
∗
a) + bb(Q
∗
a, Q
∗
b) <
wd
Q∗b
.
The financial system is thus highly constrained when (i) depositors are exactly indifferent
34
between investing in risk-free bonds produced by intermediaries and directly investing in the
safe technology, and (ii) the financial system nevertheless cannot absorb the entire wealth of
depositors. This is the case when wealth of depositors is large relative to that of financiers
and bankers.
Given these preliminaries, the goal is to characterize how secondary markets influence the
volume and efficiency of investment in competitive equilibrium. I proceed in steps. I begin
by characterizing optimal banker portfolios in both full-monitoring equilibrium and shirking
equilibrium. I then study how changes in financier net worth affect equilibrium outcomes
within in each class of equilibrium. Finally, I show that only shirking equilibria exist when
financier net worth is above an endogenously determined threshold.
Consider the full-monitoring equilibrium first. The first step is to characterize the optimal
bank portfolio. Because all bankers are symmetric and are presumed to monitor, is without
loss of generality to focus on symmetric equilibrium strategies. As a result, there is a unique
active sub-market and a unique marginal secondary market price Qa. I denote equilibrium
strategies and outcomes under full monitoring by the superscript ∗. To derive particularly
simple expressions, I impose Assumption 2 from now on and let y′R(l) = 0. The main
upshot is that the collateral shortfall now takes the form a¯b(kR,b, bb, Qa) =
bb
Qa
. That is, to
maximize borrowing capacity, the bankers sells assets until his secondary market revenue is
exactly equal to his debt burden.
Proposition 3 (Banker Portfolio in the Full-monitoring Equilibrium). If secondary market
liquidity is high, the optimal banker portfolio is
kR,b =
wb
1−QbQam˜ , bb = Qam˜kR,b ab = m˜k
∗
R,b.
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If secondary market liquidity is low, the optimal banker portfolio satisfies
kR,b =
wb +Qb(Qa − yR(l))ab
1−QbyR(l)m˜ , bb =
yR(l)m˜wb + (Qa − yR(l))ab
1−QbyR(l)m˜
and ab = ab ∈ [0, a¯b(kR,b, bb, Qa)].
Proof. The banker promises to sell ab = a¯b(kR,b, bb, Qa) assets when secondary market liq-
uidity is high so as to maximize borrowing capacity. Moreover, the borrowing constraint
binds: bb = b¯b(kR,b, Qa, a¯b). When instead secondary market liquidity is low, the banker
is indifferent between issuing claims on secondary markets and retaining his entire port-
folio. Hence, any asset sale between zero and the collateral shortfall b¯b(kS,b, kR,b, Qa, a¯b)
is consistent with banker optimality. The result then follows from imposing the budget
constraint.
The degree of secondary market liquidity is a function of the relative net worth of bankers
and financiers. In particular, secondary market liquidity is high if
af (Q
∗∗
b ) >
m˜wb
1−Q∗bQa(Q∗∗b )m˜
,
where Q∗∗b is the bond price that clears the funding market given Qa = Qa(Q
∗∗
b ). That is,
secondary market liquidity is high when there is excess secondary market demand when Qa
is at its lower bound. Since af is strictly increasing in wf , secondary market liquidity is
high when wf is large relative to wb. An implication is that financiers receive all rents from
secondary markets when they are small relative to bankers, while bankers and financiers
share secondary market rents when financiers are large. I show below that the allocation of
intermediation rents across bankers and financiers will crucially determine the evolution of
net worth.
To determine whether bankers will monitor in equilibrium, the key question is whether the
equilibrium secondary market price is below the upper bound given in Proposition 1. Given
that Q¯a(kR,b, ab) = yˆR−m kR,bkR,b−ab is a function of the banker’s portfolio, the optimal banker
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portfolio places bounds on Q¯a.
Corollary 3 (Bounding the Upper Bound). Q¯a(kR,b, ab) =∈ [yˆ′R, yˆR−m] in any equilibrium.
Proof. No banker promises to sell more claims than is optimal when secondary market
liquidity is high. Moreover, bankers never short-sell risky assets. Hence 0 ≤ ab ≤ m˜kR,b.
Evaluating Q¯a(kR,b, ab) = yˆR −m kR,bkR,b−ab at (kR,b, m˜kR,b) and (kR,b, 0) gives the result.
Bankers thus shirk for sure when the secondary market price exceeds yˆR −m. The crucial
implication is that yˆRyˆR−m > y¯S . That is, the return on a high-quality claim purchased
on secondary markets is strictly higher than the return of the safe technology even if the
secondary market price is high enough to induce shirking. But this means that sufficiently
wealthy financiers may bid up secondary market prices enough to render full-monitoring
equilibria unsustainable. The next step therefore is to characterize shirking equilibria.
There are two types of bankers in a shirking equilibrium – those who shirk and those who
monitor. Equilibrium strategies are now symmetric within type. I denote the equilibrium
portfolio of the high type by superscript H and that of the low type by L. Because the
equilibrium features pooling in the funding market, high-type and low-type bankers issue
the same amount of bonds, make the same asset-sale promises and invest the same amount
of capital in the risky technology. Moreover, all bankers are symmetric in terms of their
investment opportunities and net worth. The only way to sustain the coexistence of the
two types is for all bankers to be indifferent between shirking and monitor. As a result,
he secondary market price must exactly equal the upper bound Q¯a defined in Proposi-
tion 1. Shirking equilibria can therefore also be interpreted as bankers’ playing a mixed
strategy.
Lemma 5 (Secondary Market Price in Shirking Equilibrium). In a shirking equilibrium,
the implementability constraint is just binding and the secondary market price satisfies
Qa = Q¯a(k
H
R,b, a
H
b ) = yˆR −m
(
kHR,b
kHR,b − aHb
)
.
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The upper bound Q¯a is a function of the high-type’s portfolio. In particular, it is decreasing
in ab. This leaves open the possibility that the high-type banker will withdraw assets from
secondary markets so as to receive a higher price. Yet precisely because prices are bounded
above by a continuous function of ab, any such deviation cannot lead to a discrete price
increase, even if the banker receives the highest possible price after the deviation. Moreover,
withdrawing assets from secondary markets will typically lead to higher excess demand on
secondary markets. As will become clear, higher excess demand implies more shirking
in equilibrium, and thus strengthens the key results. For simplicity, I therefore focus on
shirking equilibria in which the high-type banker chooses the same portfolio as in an effort
equilibrium. This can be supported in an equilibrium by financiers offering the same Qa in
all sub-markets with ab ≤ a∗b .9 Because the low type differs only in the amount of assets sold
ex-post and the monitoring decision, equilibrium portfolios are therefore as follows.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Banker Portfolios in Shirking Equilibrium). The high type’s op-
timal portfolio is
kHR,b = k
∗
R,b, b
H
b = b
∗
b , a
H
b = a
H
b = a
∗
b .
The low type’s optimal portfolio is
kLR,b = k
H
R,b, b
L
b = b
H
b , a
L
b = a
H
b , a
L
b = k
L
R,b.
The fraction of low-quality claims traded on secondary markets is
φ =
ΦaLb
ΦaLb + (1− Φ)aHb
,
where φ ≥ Φ because the low type sells more assets than the high type.
The optimal portfolios of all agents are linear in net worth. This permits straightforward
aggregation. The market clearing conditions are as follows.
9More generally, an open question is how prices are constructed upon deviations to inactive sub-markets.
In the model, prices are determined by market tightness. Yet because there is no free entry, off-equilibrium
market tightness cannot be determined by a zero-profit condition as in Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010).
I sidestep this issue by focusing on the benchmark equilibrium that appropriately minimizes the degree of
equilibrium shirking, and thus understates the key results of the paper.
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(i) In a full-monitoring equilibrium with high secondary market liquidity, the
market clearing conditions are:
Primary Market :
Qam˜wb
1−QbQam˜ +
γyR(l)wf
Qa −QbγyR(l) =
wd
Qb
Secondary Market :
m˜wb
1−QbQam˜ =
wf
Qa −QbγyR(l)
(ii) In a full-monitoring equilibrium with low secondary market liquidity, the
market clearing conditions are:
Primary Market :
yR(l)m˜wb + (Qa − yR(l))ab
1−QbyR(l)m˜ +
γyR(l)wf
Q
a
−QbγyR(l) =
wd
Qb
Secondary Market : ab =
wf
Q
a
−QbγyR(l) , where Qa = Qa(Qb).
(iii) In a shirking equilibrium with high secondary market liquidity, the market
clearing conditions are:
Primary Market :
Q¯am˜wb
1−QbQ¯am˜
+
γ(1− φ)yR(l)wf
Q¯a − (1− φ)QbγyR(l)
=
wd
Qb
Secondary Market :
Φwb + (1− Φ)m˜wb
1−QbQ¯am˜
=
wf
Q¯a − (1− φ)QbγyR(l)
(iv) In a shirking equilibrium with low secondary market liquidity, the market
clearing conditions are:
Primary Market :
yR(l)m˜wb + (Qa − yR(l))ab
1−QbyR(l)m˜ +
γyR(l)wf
Q
a
− (1− φ)QbγyR(l) =
wd
Qb
Secondary Market : Φ
(
wb +Qb(Qa − yR(l))aHb
1−QbyR(l)m˜
)
+ (1− Φ)aHb
=
wf
Q
a
− (1− φ)QbγyR(l) , where Qa = Qa(Qb) = Q¯a(k
H
R,b, a
H
b ).
The fraction of shirking bankers Φ affects market clearing in two ways. First, it impacts the
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number of assets sold on secondary markets because low-type bankers sell more risky claims
than high-type bankers. All else equal, increased shirking thus pushes down secondary
market prices. Second, because y′R(l) = 0, financiers cannot use low-quality claims as
collateral for bonds. They thus borrow only against the fraction of high-type loans (1− φ)
that they receive on secondary markets. This effect reduces the demand for risky assets
and shrinks the supply of risk-free bonds. To economize on notation going forward, I use
the following definition.
Definition 6 (Aggregate Leverage Ratios). The aggregate leverage ratios of financiers
and bankers are, respectively,
λf ≡ 1
Qa − (1− φ)Qbγ and λb ≡
Φ+ (1− Φ)m˜
1−QbQam˜
The next step is to characterize equilibrium outcomes. I focus on how the distribution
of net worth shapes the volume and efficiency of investment. Throughout, I denote the
distribution of net worth by w ≡ (wd, wb, wf ), the relative net worth of financiers by
w˜ =
wf
wb
, and expected output by Yˆ ≡ [Φyˆ′R + (1− Φ)yˆR] kR,b. I first show how changes
in financier net worth affect output and investment within each class of equilibrium. I then
show that only shirking equilibria exist when financier net worth exceeds a threshold. A
large financier sector therefore leads to falling investment efficiency.
Proposition 5 (Financier Net Worth and Equilibrium Outcomes). Assume that (wd, wb)
is such that investment is inefficient in the absence of secondary markets. Then:
(i) In a full-monitoring equilibrium with high secondary market liquidity, the secondary
market price Qa, total investment kR,b and expected aggregate output Yˆ are increasing
in financier net worth wf
(ii) In a full-monitoring equilibrium with low secondary market liquidity, the secondary
market price is increasing in wf . Aggregate investment kR,b and aggregate expected
output Yˆ are strictly increasing in wf if the financial system is highly constrained.
(iii) In a shirking equilibrium, the share of shirking bankers Φ is strictly increasing in wf .
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Aggregate expected output is strictly decreasing in wf if the financial system is highly
constrained, or if financiers weakly prefer to not borrow.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind the first part of the proposition is straightforward. As financier net
worth increases, so does the demand for secondary market assets. Secondary market prices
appreciate. When prices increase, bankers receive more collateral per risky claim sold.
Borrowing and investment increase. Since all bankers monitor, expected aggregate output
also increases. The difference between the first and the second part of the proposition is that,
in a low-liquidity equilibrium, financiers receive all rents from secondary market trading. In
this region of the state space, increases in financier wealth may increase the total supply of
bonds more than banker’s borrowing capacity, leading to drop in bond prices that crowds
out banker borrowing. Nevertheless, increased secondary market demands leads to increase
in the secondary market price and, as financiers grow even larger, investment volumes grow
again. As the next proposition shows, the social benefits of increased financier net worth
can be large.
Corollary 4 (The Social Value of Financier Net Worth). Fix a full-monitoring low-liquidity
equilibrium with a highly constrained financial system. Then if y
S
< y¯S there exists a ∆ > 0
such that re-allocating ∆ units of net worth from bankers to financiers strictly increases
investment and expected output.
Proof. See appendix.
Reallocations of net worth towards financiers spur investment disproportionately when the
financial sector is highly constrained
(
Q∗b =
1
y
S
)
and when intermediation is very valuable
to depositors
(
y
S
< y¯S = 1
)
. Financiers are able to lever more than bankers when bond
prices are high because they are not subject to the moral hazard problem at the investment
stage. This advantage more than outweighs the direct costs of reducing bank net worth
when bond prices are high. As a result, putting net worth in the hands of financiers allows
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for more investment in the aggregate than putting it in the hands of bankers. Growing
secondary market volumes can thus trigger a credit boom that is larger than if bank net
worth were to grow instead. This social value of financier net worth is reflected in the
returns on equity earned by financiers and bankers.
Proposition 6 (Expected Return on Intermediary Equity). Fix a full-monitoring equilib-
rium with low-liquidity. The expected return on equity earned by bankers and financiers,
respectively, is
ˆROEb =
yˆR − yR(l)m˜
1−Q∗byR(l)m˜
and ˆROEf =
yˆR − yR(l)
Q
a
(Q∗b)−QbyR(l)
Moreover, ˆROEf > ˆROEb if Q
∗
b > 1 and ROEf ≤ ROEb if Q∗b ≤ 1.
Proof. See appendix.
That is, financiers receive higher returns on equity than bankers when the financial system
is highly constrained and depositors pay a premium for intermediation services. This is
the case even though financiers cannot invest in the risky technology directly, and thus are
technologically inferior to bankers. In the dynamic model in Section 1.3, I show that the
large rents earned by financiers when the aggregate net worth of intermediaries is low leads
financiers to grow disproportionately when they are small initially.
The downside of increased financier net worth is that appreciating secondary market prices
eventually induce some bankers to shirk.
Corollary 5 (Excessively Large Financier Net Worth). Suppose that the net worth of de-
positors and bankers (wd, wb) is such that bond price in the absence of secondary market
Q0b is such that Qa(Q
0
b) < yˆR − m. Then there exists a threshold level of financier net
worth w¯f (wd, wb) ≥ 0 such that the competitive equilibrium is a full-monitoring equilibrium
if wf ≤ w¯f (wd, wb) and a shirking equilibrium if wf > w¯f (wd, wb).
Why does the price adjustment mechanism break down in a shirking equilibrium? The im-
plementability constraint (IMP) now restricts the appreciation of secondary market prices.
42
Banker would prefer to sell and shirk if Qa were to grow further. But if all bankers continue
to monitor, Qa cannot stay constant either – financier wealth is increasing, and so secondary
markets would no longer clear. The solution is to have an increasing number of bankers
shirk. Because low-type bankers sell more claims than high types, markets can clear at a
constant price. This is the intuition behind the third part Proposition 5. Note that equilib-
rium shirking occurs even there is no financier irrationality or differential beliefs. Because
financiers earn intermediation rents when purchasing assets from high-type bankers, they
continue to earn rents even when some bankers shirk.
Why the caveat that Q
a
(Q0b) < yˆR −m? If this inequality were not satisfied, then bankers
would never sells assets at a price that does not induce shirking if secondary markets were
active. But if bankers shirk as soon as there is trade on secondary markets, then financiers
do not buy assets in the first place. To see why, recall that bankers only sell assets if
Q¯a ≥ Qa(Qb), while Q¯a ≤ yˆR−m. Because Q0b is decreasing in wb and Qa(Qb) is decreasing
in Qb, this implies that there are no equilibria with secondary market trading when wb is
large relative to wd. That is, bankers use secondary markets only if there is sufficiently
strong depositor demand.
The next result shows that the harmful effects of excessive financier net worth may be severe
in equilibria with active secondary markets.
Corollary 6 (Pareto-improving Reductions in Financier Net Worth). Consider a shirking
equilibrium in which either (i) financiers do not borrow, or (ii) the financial system is highly
constrained. Then a partial destruction of financier net worth wf is Pareto-improving.
Proof. See appendix.
A pecuniary externality is at work. Increased financier wealth grows secondary market
demand, but secondary market prices cannot appreciate beyond the upper bound Q¯a. When
prices reach this upper bound, markets clear through quantities, inducing some bankers to
shirk. Financiers impose an externality on each other by contributing to a decline in the
average quantity of assets traded on secondary markets. This negative externality is severe
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enough that financiers can be made better off by a uniform destruction of their wealth.
Moreover, falling asset quality exposes the financial system to more risk, creating financial
fragility.
Figure 2 provides a numerical illustration of the equilibrium effects of wf . Growing financier
net worth initially increases investment and expected output, but gradually induces bankers
to shirk. As a result, investment efficiency falls. Throughout the figure, red corresponds to
Figure 2
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a shirking equilibrium, and blue to a full-monitoring equilibrium. The top left panel depicts
asset prices, with the upper line representing the risky claim price Qa and the lower the bond
price Qb. As financier net worth increases, the secondary market price increases. In the
full-monitoring equilibrium, this leads to a boom in investment and increases in expected
output. As Qa continues to rise, however, the full-monitoring equilibrium can no longer be
44
sustained. In the shirking equilibrium, investment is now flat but expected output declines,
as a larger fraction of bankers begins to shirk. This can be seen in the figure on the bottom
left. The top right panel also shows the increase in aggregate risk, with the dotted lines
depicting aggregate output after a good and a bad shock. Given that low-quality assets
are more exposed to downside risk, increases in financier wealth lead to poorer worst-case
outcomes. The two last figures in the bottom row show the risk exposure of both classes
of financial intermediary. The solid line depicts the expected net worth of an intermediary
at the end of the period, with the dotted lines corresponding to a high and low aggregate
shock, respectively. As wf increases, financiers take on more and more risk. Ultimately,
financiers are the only agents in the economy exposed to any risk. For financiers, expected
net worth is equivalent to expected utility. In a shirking equilibrium, increased financier
wealth therefore reduces expected financier utility.
Overall, secondary markets play a dual role. If financier wealth is not too large, then
secondary market trading expands investment by more than banker net worth. If instead
financier wealth is large, then secondary market trading leads to deteriorating investment
efficiency with potentially severe welfare consequences. The question is whether financier
net worth might end up large enough to harm investment efficiency. The next question
provides an affirmative answer in a dynamic framework.
1.3 A Dynamic Model of Secondary Markets
I now incorporate the static model into a dynamic setting to study the endogenous evolution
of the net worth distribution. The key question is whether the net worth distribution moves
towards regions of the state space in which only shirking equilibria can be sustained, even
when starting out in the full-monitoring region.
Time is discrete and runs from 0 to T ≤ ∞. A generic period is indexed by t. The model
economy is populated by overlapping generations of financiers and bankers, each of whom
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lives for two periods, and short-lived depositors, each of whom lives one period. I refer to
intermediaries in the first period of their life as the young, and to those in the second period
as the old. There are two goods: a consumption good and an intermediary net worth
good. Only the consumption good can be consumed. Intermediary net worth is special
in that bankers and financiers must use net worth in order to intermediate and invest.
Every generation of agents is born with an endowment of the consumption good. Only
the initial generation of intermediaries are born with an endowment of net worth. When
young, intermediaries and depositors play the intermediation game described in the static
model. Before consuming their end-of-period net worth, they have the opportunity to sell
it to the young. In this intergenerational net worth market, young intermediaries pool their
endowment and instruct a market maker to purchase the old intermediaries’ equity capital.
The market maker then approaches each old intermediary individually and bargains over
the equity capital. If a trade is agreed, the old consume the proceeds from the sale and the
market maker distributes the equity capital evenly to all young intermediaries. If no trade
is agreed, the old consume their equity capital and the young do not receive any equity
capital from the old.10 I assume that young generation makes a take-it-or-leave to the old.
The old therefore always receive the consumption value of their equity capital.11
This construction implies that the objective function of a young intermediary is to maximize
expected end-of-life net worth. The dynamic model then is equivalent to repeating the static
model period-by-period, with the evolution of the net worth distribution linking equilibrium
outcomes across periods. This allows me to parsimoniously illustrate the key forces that
shape the evolution of net worth. In Appendix A.14 I consider a variant of the model in
which the old make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the young, and show that it can generate
the same qualitative dynamics as the baseline model. I use the following definitions.
Definition 7 (Credit Booms). A credit boom of length t is a sequence of t periods in which
10The role of the market maker is solely to make sure that each intermediary in every generation starts
out with the same net worth. As a result, I do not have to keep track of a wealth distribution for the same
type of agents. All results go through without this assumption.
11I assume that if a generation of intermediaries has zero net worth at the end of their life, then the new
generation receives start-up funds of 0. This ensures that both types of intermediaries are always active.
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the total net worth of the financial sector wf +wb and the total amount of risky investment
kR,b increases every period. A secondary market credit boom is a credit boom in which
the relative net worth of financiers w˜ increases in every period. A destabilizing secondary
market credit boom is a secondary market credit boom in which the economy transitions
from a full-monitoring equilibrium to a shirking equilibrium.
A necessary condition for credit booms to arise is a sequence of good aggregate shocks. Only
when the net worth of the financial system grows can credit volumes increase. Whether
the relative size of financiers increases – giving rise to a secondary market credit boom –
will depend on the equilibrium allocation of risk. The next proposition characterizes the
equilibrium evolution of relative financier net worth.
Proposition 7 (Equilibrium Evolution of Relative Net Worth). Let w˜′(z|w) denote relative
net worth of financiers tomorrow conditional on productivity shock z and today’s wealth
distribution w.
(i) The net worth of financiers and bankers increases upon a good aggregate shock and
decreases upon a bad aggregate shock in any equilibrium.
(ii) If w is such that today’s equilibrium is full monitoring with high secondary market
liquidity, then:
w˜′(h|w) =
[
m˜(yR(h)− γ(w)yR(l))
(1− m˜)yR(h)
]
.
(iii) If w is such that today’s equilibrium is full monitoring with low secondary market
liquidity, then:
w˜′(h|w) = (yR(h)− γ(w)yR(l))λf (w)w˜
yR(h)−yR(l)m˜
1−Qbm˜yR(l) −
(1−m˜)yR(l)(yR(h)−yˆR)
yˆR−yR(l)m˜ λf (w)w˜
(iv) If w is such that today’s equilibrium is shirking with high secondary market liquidity,
then:
w˜′(h|w) =
[
ΦyR(h) + (1− Φ)m˜(yR(h)− γ(w)yR(l))
(1− m˜)(Φyˆ′R + (1− Φ)yR(h))
]
47
(v) If w is such that today’s equilibrium is shirking with low secondary market liquidity,
then:
w˜′(h|w) = (φy
′
R(h) + (1− φ)(yR(h)− γ(w)yR(l)))λf (w)w˜
ΦQ
a
+(1−Φ)yR(h)−yR(l)m˜
1−Qbm˜yR(l) −
(1−m˜)yR(l)(ΦQa+(1−Φ)yR(h)−yˆR)
yˆR−yR(l)m˜ λf (w)w˜
Proof. Follows directly from the optimal intermediary portfolios and exploiting the sec-
ondary market clearing condition to cancel out kR,b when liquidity is high.
It is easy to verify that the evolution of net worth in a full-monitoring equilibrium is equal
to that in shirking equilibrium when Φ = 0. Moreover, the relative net worth of financiers
grows faster after a good shock in a shirking equilibrium, holding secondary market liquidity
fixed. The reason is that bankers sell off more risk exposure in a shirking equilibrium. The
next examples provide some intuition as to these results.
Example 1 (High Liquidity and No Borrowing by Financiers). In a full-monitoring equi-
librium in which secondary market liquidity is high and financiers do not borrow, the law of
motion for relative net worth is:
w˜′(z|w) = m˜
1− m˜ and g(w˜) = 0.
When secondary market liquidity is and financiers do not borrow, the relative wealth of
financiers is fully pinned down by the severity of the banker’s moral hazard problem. Specif-
ically, financiers take on a fraction of m˜ of aggregate risk exposure, and bankers take on
the remaining (1− m˜). A given aggregate shock therefore scales the wealth of bankers and
financiers up or down while leaving relative net worth unaltered. Perhaps contrary to intu-
ition, financiers end up being relatively wealthy when the banker’s moral hazard problem
is not too tight. The intuition is that collateral is valuable when bank’s can issue a large
quantity of bonds per dollar of collateral. Bankers thus have strong incentives to sell assets
to financiers so as to increase borrowing capacity.
Example 2 (High Liquidity and Fully Leveraged Financiers). In a full-monitoring equilib-
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rium in which secondary market liquidity is high and financiers are fully levered, the law of
motion for relative net worth is:
w˜′(z|w) = m˜(yR(z)− yR(l))
(1− m˜)yR(z) and g(w˜) = 0.
When financiers are fully leveraged, they are exposed to more risk. To borrow, they pledge
yR(l) to bondholders, and must repay this amount in any state of the world. As a result,
their relative net worth is lower than when they are not levered. Because bond prices
decrease during booms, financier leverage declines as well. Hence, the relative net worth
of financiers grows during credit booms given that secondary market liquidity is high. Of
course, secondary market liquidity is high only when financiers are sufficiently large to begin
with. The question then is whether financiers may grow to be large even when they are
small at first. To this end, I now characterize conditions under which relative financier net
worth grows in a low-liquidity equilibrium.
Corollary 7 (Growth Rate of Relative Financier Net Worth With Low Liquidity). When
secondary market liquidity is low, the growth rate of relative financier net worth in a full-
monitoring equilibrium is strictly positive upon a positive shock if and only if
(1− m˜)yR(l)
(
yR(h)− yˆR
yˆR − yR(l)m˜
)
λf w˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk Transfer
≥ yR(h)− yR(l)m˜
1−QbyR(l)m˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ROEb(h)
− (yR(h)− γ(s)yR(l))λf (w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ROEf (h)
.
This inequality holds strictly for any w˜ if Qb ≥ 1.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 6.
The left-hand side of the inequality is the degree of risk transfer from bankers to financiers.
It is increasing in relative financier net worth and financier leverage because the ability of
financiers to take on credit is risk is limited by their wealth scaled by leverage. The right
hand side is the difference between the state-h return on equity achieved by bankers and
financiers, respectively. Proposition 6 showed that the right-hand side is strictly negative.
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Moreover, the left-hand side is strictly positive. No matter how small wf is initially, the
relative net worth of financiers thus grows as long as Qb is sufficiently large.
More generally, relative financier net worth thus grows in a low-liquidity equilibrium when
the aggregate net worth of the financial system is small relative to depositor net worth,
or when financiers are not too small to begin with. Moreover, the relative net worth of
financiers grows even when wf is vanishingly small so long as interest rates are sufficiently
low. The reason is that financiers can leverage more than bankers when interest rates are
low. A financier can pledge the full worst-case payoff a risky loan yR(l), while a banker can
only pledge m˜yR(l). This borrowing advantage translates into a disproportionate advantage
for financiers in acquiring aggregate risk exposure. For any (wf , wb), there exists a wd large
enough such that Qb ≥ 1 in equilibrium. Increased demand for financial intermediation
may therefore spur secondary market booms. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) and
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015) argue that this pressure existed in the run-
up to the 2008 financial crisis. Figures 3 and 4 depict the importance of initial conditions
graphically. I plot the evolution of financier and banker net worth after a sequence of positive
aggregate shocks. In both figures, the left panel depicts a baseline scenario in which financier
net worth is smaller than bank net worth initially, but grows to be larger over time. The
right panel depicts deviations from this baseline. Figure 3 shows the effect of a reduction
in initial financier wealth. This reduction leads to less risk being transferred to financiers.
As a result, financier net worth no longer catches up with banker net worth.
Figure 3 shows the effect of a reduction in depositor net worth. Lower depositor net worth
causes a fall in the equilibrium bond price. The resulting decrease in financier leverage
induces a disproportionate fall in financiers’ return on equity and total purchases of risky
assets. Given suitable initial conditions, the model can therefore give rise to secondary
market credit booms – period of credit growth during which financier net worth grows
disproportionately. Furthermore, starting out in an equilibrium in which financiers borrow
and moving to one in which they do not, relative net worth must grow upon a good shock.
It follows that a series of good shocks pushes the economy towards the shirking region, with
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Figure 4
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growing secondary market prices leading credit standards to deteriorate, even when starting
out in the full-monitoring region. That is, given appropriate initial conditions, the model
admits secondary market credit booms.
The next question is whether the model admits destabilizing secondary market credit booms.
To answer this question, the next proposition provides conditions under which a positive
shock to the net worth of both bankers and financiers leads to an increase in secondary
market prices and/or the fraction of shirking bankers. The general theme is that this is the
case when the growth rate of relative financier net worth g(w˜) is sufficiently large.
Proposition 8 (Relative Net Worth and Equilibrium Outcomes). Let Q∗b(Φ, Qa,w) denote
the bond pricing function that clears bond markets for a given fraction of shirking bankers
Φ, secondary market price Qa and net worth distribution w. Consider a positive shock ξ to
financier and banker net worth.
1. If secondary market liquidity is high and financiers are fully levered, then Qa (in a
full-monitoring equilibrium) and Φ (in a shirking equilibrium) are increasing in ξ if
and only if
g(w˜) ≥
(
Q∗b
∂ξ
)
λf (Q
∗
aw˜ − yR(l)) .
2. If secondary market liquidity is high and financiers do not borrow, then Qa (in a full-
monitoring equilibrium) and Φ (in a shirking equilibrium) are increasing in ξ if and
only if
g(w˜) ≥
(
Q∗b
∂ξ
)
w˜
3.
Q∗b
∂ξ ≤ 0 in any full-monitoring equilibrium.
4. If secondary market liquidity is low, Qa is increasing in ξ in any full-monitoring
equilibrium. If secondary market liquidity is low and the financial system is highly
constrained, then Φ is increasing in ξ if
g(w˜) ≥ 0.
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Proof. See appendix.
Because
Q∗b
∂ξ ≤ 0 the secondary market price appreciates during booms with high-liquidity as
long as the relative net worth grows weakly and w˜ ≥ yR(l)Q∗a ∈ (0, 1). When secondary market
liquidity is low, in turn, the secondary market price always appreciates. Secondary markets
may thus be destabilizing in that the economy transitions into a shirking equilibrium over
time.
1.3.1 Characteristics of Credit Booms
The last section showed that the model admits destabilizing secondary market credit booms.
I characterize the properties of such booms in this section. I do so by computing equilibrium
outcomes as a function of a time path for the exogenous shock z and the initial wealth
distribution w0 = (w0d, w
0
b , w
0
f ). I simulate the economy for T periods. The initial Tboom
shocks are good shocks. The next Tcrisis shocks are negative. The remaining shocks are
good.
Figure 5 depicts a destabilizing secondary market credit boom. I simulate the economy
for 11 periods – an initial period, 8 positive shocks, a single negative shock, and then
another positive shock. Financiers and bankers each start out with 0.5 units of net worth.
Initial conditions are such that the economy starts out in a full-monitoring equilibrium.
The left panel plots the evolution of net worth over time. There is a rapid build-up of
net worth in the aggregate, with financiers growing faster. When a negative shock occurs,
financier net worth collapses sharply because financiers are disproportionately exposed to
risk. Banker net worth drops only moderately because financiers provide partial insurance
to bankers. The middle panel plots the evolution of investment – equivalently, credit –
over time. The blue line depicts total investment and the red line depicts the fraction of
investment that goes to low-quality projects because bankers do not monitor. Initially all
bankers monitor and there is no investment in low-quality projects. Over time, however,
continued financier growth pushes the economy into a shirking equilibrium. As a result,
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the fraction of investment that flows to low-quality increases and grows steadily during
the boom. In the aftermath of the crisis, investment falls. Yet because banker net worth
only falls some, credit volumes recover quickly. The right panel plots the evolution of
output. The solid line depicts actual output in the model economy. The dashed line depicts
output in a fictitious economy in which capital accumulation is unaltered but all bankers
are forced to monitor. During the boom phase, output increases steadily. During the crisis,
output collapses sharply. As the comparison between the solid and dashed lines shows,
almost one third of the drop is accounted for by falling credit quality over the course of the
boom. Growing secondary markets can therefore generate credit booms that end in sharp
crisis.
Figure 5
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Figure 6 shows the importance of the moral hazard parameter m˜ for the dynamics of
secondary market booms. While I set m˜ = 0.82 in Figure 5, I now set m˜ = 0.85. Recall
that larger values of m˜ mean that the banker’s moral hazard problem is less severe and
bankers can leverage each unit of net worth more. The time path of aggregate shocks and
initial conditions are the same for both simulations. Three observations stand out. First,
financier net worth grows faster when m˜ is large. This is perhaps counterintuitive given
that increases in m˜ principally allow bankers to lever more. In equilibrium, however, the
portfolios of bankers and financiers are intertwined. When m˜ is high, the shadow value
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of collateral is high for bankers. When banker net worth is scarce, bankers increase their
collateral position by selling claims on secondary markets. Increases in m˜ thus boost supply
and reduce prices in secondary markets. This allows financiers to lever more and purchase
more risk exposure on secondary markets. In equilibrium, increased scope for bank may
lead actual financier leverage to increase by more than actual bank leverage. Conditional
on a good shock, financiers thus grow faster than bankers.
Figure 6
Secondary market credit boom with high m˜
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Second, aggregate investment also increases faster because bankers can lever each unit of col-
lateral acquired on secondary markets by more. Third, increased supply of secondary market
assets means that the fraction of low-quality loans is lower and so investment efficiency is
higher. Moreover, financiers borrow more when m˜ is high because secondary market prices
are relatively low. Because bankers sell off more risk exposure when m˜ is high, they suffer
less in a crisis, and financier net worth declines disproportionately. Nevertheless, looser
banker constraints allow output and investment efficiency to increase throughout even as
volatility grows.
Next, I turn to the effects of boom duration. Figure 7 plots two simulated time paths
for identical parameters and initial conditions. The only difference being the timing of
the negative shock. Solid lines depict the case where the negative shock hits in period 9,
55
Figure 7
Effects of Boom Length
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Notes: Dashed line depicts a negative shock in period 8. Solid line depicts a negative shock in period
9.
while dashed lines depict the case where the negative shock hits in period 8. The left panel
shows the evolution of intermediary net worth. The middle panel plots total investment and
low-quality investment. The right panel plots output. Two observations stand out. First
the fraction of low-quality investment is increasing in the duration of the boom, as is the
relative net worth of financiers. Second, the decline in output is increasing in duration – the
peak is higher and the trough is lower. Longer booms generate deeper recessions because
of increased origination of low-quality credit.
Finally, I study how the dynamics of aggregate productivity during a crisis episode shape
the evolution of net worth and the recovery from a crisis. Specifically, Figure 8 plots
two simulations that differ only in the number of negative aggregate shocks that hit the
economy. The solid line depicts a simulation in which a single negative shock hits in period
8. The dashed line depicts a simulation in which there are negative shocks in period 8 and
9. The left panel depicts the evolution of net worth, and shows how the model generates
the migration of risk exposure back onto bank balance sheets once the initial negative
shock has depleted financier net worth. In particular, the second negative shock leads to a
dramatic fall in bank net worth, even as total investment falls. This is consistent with the
evidence in Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) that credit conditions were poor in
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis because bankers had to carry more risk exposure
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Figure 8
Effects of crisis duration
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Notes: Dashed line depicts negative shocks in periods 8 and 9. Solid line depicts a negative shock
in period 8.
on their balance sheets. The second negative shock can be thought as representing the
endogenous amplification of the initial shock through the real side of the economy. This
could be due to foreclosure externalities in housing markets or deteriorating labor market
conditions that force increased defaults among outstanding loans.
Returns on Equity during Secondary Market Credit Booms
Destabilizing secondary market credit booms are driven by a growing imbalance in the net
worth of bankers and financiers. Do bankers and financiers have incentives to “correct”
these imbalances by re-allocating equity across intermediaries? If issuing (inside) equity
were costless, this would be the case whenever the equilibrium return on financier equity is
below that of bankers. The next proposition shows that the model can generate destabilizing
secondary market credit booms even when financiers always receive higher returns on equity
than bankers.
Proposition 9 (Secondary Market Booms with High Financier ROE). There exist param-
eters such that (i) the model economy transitions from a full-monitoring equilibrium to a
shirking equilibrium after a sequence of good shocks, (ii) relative financier net worth w˜ grows
throughout, and (iii) ˆROEf > ˆROEf throughout.
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Proof. See appendix.
The intuition is that the harmful effects of secondary markets arise as a function of the
imbalance between bankers and financiers, while the rents accruing to both intermediaries
are partially determined by depositor’s demand for financial services. Because financiers
benefit disproportionately from low interest rates, one can always find a level of depositor
net worth wd such that financiers receive higher rents than bankers. As a result, the model’s
results are robust to allowing for endogenous equity issuances.
1.4 Policy
In this section, I ask how policy shapes the likelihood and evolution of secondary market
credit booms. Rather than characterizing optimal policy, I evaluate three extant policies
– monetary policy as a determinant of short-term interest rates, leverage requirements,
and equity injections to kick-start lending in a crisis – from a positive perspective. I then
propose a simple tool to eliminate pecuniary externalities in secondary markets.
1.4.1 Monetary Policy
I begin by studying the role of the monetary policy. I do so in reduced form. Specifically, I
assume that monetary policy determines the depositor’s investment opportunities outside
of the financial system. That is,
y
S
=M(ρ),
where ρ denotes the monetary policy environment and M ′(ρ) > 0. Monetary policy thus
works through affecting the required return on deposits. This is in line the evidence in
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) that treasuries are valued for their safety by
risk-averse investors and are thus a substitute for safe assets produced by the financial
system. Since Qb ≤ 1y
S
in equilibrium, the monetary policy environment places a lower
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bound on funding market interest rates:
Rb ≥ Rb(ρ) ≡
M(ρ)− 1
M(ρ)
,
Since R′b(ρ) > 0, I use ρ to denote the tightness of monetary policy. To the extent that
equilibrium interest rates are at their lower bound, tight monetary policy raises interest
rates.
For monetary policy to have bite, bond prices must be at their lower bound. I therefore
assume that the financial system is highly constrained. To understand whether expansionary
monetary policy leads to a growth in financier net worth even when it is initially small, I
assume that secondary market liquidity is low initially. The combination of these two
assumptions implies that all bankers monitor.
Proposition 10 (Monetary Policy and Secondary Market Booms). Fix a full-monitoring
equilibrium with low secondary market liquidity. Then a loosening of monetary policy (a
reduction in ρ) increases investment and the growth rate of relative financier net worth after
a good shock.
Proof. See Appendix.
Due to asymmetric leverage constraints, loose monetary policy biases the growth rates of
intermediary net worth towards financiers, even as both bankers and financiers can borrow
at cheaper rates. As a result, expansionary monetary policies can contribute to the build-
up of financial fragility over time by encouraging imbalances in the distribution of net
worth in the financial system, leading to a dynamic risk-taking channel of monetary policy.
The reason is that initially low interest rates set the economy on a path towards excessive
growth in relative financier net worth, which ultimately manifests itself in deteriorating
monitoring incentives and increased risk-taking. Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-
Ibanez (forthcoming) provide evidence for these precise dynamics: extended periods of
loose monetary policy are associated with increased risk-taking and higher default risk
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among financial institutions, but with a lag.
The monetary authority may find it difficult to reign in a secondary market boom once
it is underway. Corollary 7 showed that the growth rate of relative financier net worth is
increasing in relative net worth itself: financiers grow faster when they are already large. An
initial monetary policy boost to financier net worth may then mean that financiers continue
to grow when the crutch of low interest rates is removed. Halting a secondary market boom
by “taking away the punch bowl” is difficult if financiers have already stashed away the
punch.
1.4.2 Capital Requirements
Now consider capital requirements. Specifically, assume that the government puts in place
leverage limits λ¯b and λ¯f such that total investment by bankers and financiers cannot exceed
a multiple of their net worth,
kR,b ≤ λ¯bwb af ≤ λ¯fwf .
To the extent that leverage constraints can be chosen contingent on the state of the econ-
omy and are freely enforceable, it is clear that a social planner can enforce any upper
bound on market quantities by setting the appropriate capital requirements. Instead of
characterizing optimal leverage requirements in such settings, I focus on another extreme:
leverage requirements must be set once and for all, and financier leverage constraints can-
not be meaningfully enforced. The latter concern arises may arise because financiers are
amorphous institutions that may be relatively hard to regulate effectively, such as those
operating in the shadow banking sector. I therefore set λ¯f =∞, and study the implications
on binding capital requirements on bankers. For simplicity, I focus on regions of the state
space where secondary market liquidity is high in the absence of capital requirements.
Define bank leverage to be λb =
kR,b
wb
. Bank leverage in the absence of secondary markets
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and capital requirements is
λ0b =
k0R,b
wb
=
1
1−Q0byR(l)m˜
.
Bank leverage with highly liquid secondary markets and without capital requirements
is
λ∗b =
k∗R,b
wb
=
1
1−Q∗bQ∗am˜
.
For leverage requirements to influence equilibrium outcomes without shutting down sec-
ondary markets altogether, we must therefore have
λ0b < λ¯b < λ
∗
b .
I maintain this assumption going forward.
I now turn to the banker’s problem in the presence of leverage constraint. The key obser-
vation is that, since banks are prohibited from levering as much as they would like, they
sell just enough risky claims to exactly hit the leverage requirement. Recall from Section
1.2.4 that the collateral short-fall of the banker for a given quantity of bonds issued bb was
defined as
a¯b(kR,b, bb, Qa) =
bb
Qa
.
Risky claim sales relax borrowing constraints by covering this shortfall. In the absence
of capital requirements, the banker’s optimal portfolio is such that they sell off exactly
the amount of risky claims that maximizes their borrowing capacity: a∗b = a¯b. When
capital requirements bind, however, bankers are no longer permitted to exhaust their entire
borrowing capacity. Because risky claims trade below par, bankers therefore withdraw
assets from secondary markets until the capital requirement just binds. I summarize the
degree to which bankers exhaust their borrowing capacity by γb ∈ [0, 1]. The secondary
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market supply of bankers can then be written as
ab = γb
(
bb
Qa
)
.
Since the borrowing and budget constraints continue to bind, the optimal portfolio for given
prices is
kR,b =
[
(1− γb)Qa + γbyR(l)
(1− γb)Qa + γbyR(l)−QaQbyR(l)m˜
]
wb
and bb =
[
QayR(l)m˜
(1− γb)Qa + γbyR(l)−QaQbyR(l)m˜
]
wb.
Accordingly, bank leverage for a given γb is
λb(γ) =
(1− γb)Qa + γbyR(l)
(1− γb)Qa + γbyR(l)−QaQbyR(l)m˜ .
Setting λb(γ) = λ¯b reveals that the degree to which the banker exhausts his borrowing
capacity under capital requirements is
γ∗b (λ¯b) =
(
Qa
Qa − yR(l)
)[
1−
(
λ¯b
λ¯b − 1
)
QbyR(l)m˜
]
∈ (0, 1).
All else equal, the supply of risky claims is thus increasing in the capital requirement λ¯b,
but decreasing in the secondary market price Qa. The reason is that, by virtue of the fixed
capital requirement, bankers aim to fill a fixed revenue target on secondary markets. As a
result, supply curves are downward sloping. Most importantly, binding capital requirements
put upward pressure on the secondary market price by reducing the supply of assets on
secondary markets. As the next proposition shows, this price pressure may be sufficiently
large that a fraction of bankers must start shirking.
Proposition 11 (Shirking Due to Capital Requirements). Assume that the financial system
is highly constrained whether or not capital requirements are binding. Suppose that the
competitive equilibrium without leverage constraints is full-monitoring with highly liquid
secondary markets. Let λ∗b denote the associated bank leverage. If λ¯b < λ
∗
b , then a strictly
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positive fraction of bankers must shirk in the equilibrium with capital requirements.
Proof. See Appendix.
The next corollary then follows immediately.
Corollary 8 (Equilibrium with Binding Capital Requirements). If the financial system
is highly constrained in the absence of capital requirements and the capital requirement is
binding, the competitive equilibrium with capital requirements is a shirking equilibrium. The
equilibrium secondary market price Q∗a satisfies
Q∗a = yˆR −m ·
[
L¯b(Q
∗
a − yR(l))
λ¯b(Q∗a −m′)− (λ¯b − 1)
]
and is strictly decreasing in λ¯b. The equilibrium portfolio of the high-type banker is given
by kHR,b = λ¯bwb, a
H
b =
wb(λ¯b(1−yR(l)m˜))
Q∗a−yR(l) and b
H
b = wb(λ¯b−1). The equilibrium portfolio of the
low-type banker is kLR,b = k
H
R,b, a
L
b = k
L
R,b and b
L
b = b
H
b . The fraction of shirking bankers is
Φ is determined by the secondary market clearing condition
ΦkHR,b + (1− Φ)aHb =
wf
Q∗a − (1− φ)yR(l)
,
where φ =
ΦkHR,b
ΦkHR,b+(1−Φ)aHb
and Φ is decreasing in λ¯b.
In Figure 9, I plot equilibrium outcomes as a function of the capital requirement λ¯b in
an example economy in which secondary market liquidity is high in the absence of capi-
tal requirements. The top-left panel shows that secondary market sales by the high-type
banker decrease as the capital requirement is relaxed. The reason is that bankers cannot
lever beyond a fixed multiple of their net worth, and thus only issue sufficiently many risky
claims to reach the target leverage. Accordingly, the next two panels show that both bond
issuances and the level of investment increase as λ¯b increases. The bottom row plots the
secondary market price Qa, the fraction of shirking bankers Φ, and tomorrow’s relative
financier net worth after a good shock. As per the proposition, secondary market prices
as well as the fraction of shirking bankers decrease in λ¯b. The intuition is simple: tighter
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Figure 9
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Notes: The unconstrained equilibrium is depicted in solid blue, the equilibrium with capital require-
ments in dashed red. Leverage in the unconstrained equilibrium is equal to λ∗b = 4.85. Parameter
values: pih = 0.5, yR(l) = 0.5, yˆR = 2.65, yS = 1, m = 0.1. Wealth distribution: wd = 1000,
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leverage constraints push banks to withdraw assets from secondary markets, leading to
excess demand for risky claims. If only the price were to adjust to clear the market, all
bankers would have an incentive to shirk and sell. To satisfy the excess demand without
inducing all bankers to shirk, the price increases slightly as the upper bound Q¯a grows, and
more bankers .The bottom-right panel plots the evolution of relative financier net worth w˜
conditional on a good aggregate shock. Relative to the unconstrained equilibrium depicted
in blue, two effects jointly shape the degree of risk transferred to financiers. First, tighter
capital requirements lead high-type bankers to withdraw assets from secondary markets
and decreases the amount of risk transferred. Second, an increase in the fraction of shirking
bankers leads to an increase in risk transfer because low-type banker sell more assets on
secondary markets than high-type bankers. When capital requirements are not too tight,
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the first effect dominates and relative financier net worth grows more slowly in the con-
strained equilibrium. When capital requirements are tight, the second effect dominates and
relative financier net worth grows faster in the constrained equilibrium. The simulations
reveal a static and a dynamic channel through which capital requirements adversely im-
pact the flow of credit: statically, lending standards deteriorate as supply shortfalls push
up prices; dynamically, increased risk transfer leads financiers to grow faster than bankers,
inducing further falls in investment quality. It also stands to reason that the first channel
is particularly strong when capital requirements are counter-cyclical – secondary market
demand is particularly high at the peak of a boom – while the second channel is particu-
larly strong when capital requirements are risk-weighted – if selling assets for cash relieves
leverage constraints, then transferring risk on secondary markets is particularly attractive
to bankers. For this reason, the model’s predictions are also consistent with the regulatory
arbitrage view articulated in, e.g., Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013), that bankers used
secondary markets to bypass capital requirements. It is also clear that capital requirements
on financiers may be a useful policy tool to lean against some of the adverse effects of
capital requirements on bankers. My results thus highlight why bank capital requirements
may be harmful when set independently of financier regulation.
1.4.3 Post-crisis Interventions and Macro-prudential Regu-
lation
I now summarize the model’s implications for post-crisis interventions and macro-prudential
regulation. Begin by studying how to best kick-start lending in the aftermath of a financial
crisis event. To this end, suppose that the financial system is highly constrained. Corollary
4 showed that increases in financier net worth lead to more lending than an equivalent
increase in banker net worth when y
S
< y¯S . Providing equity to financiers may therefore
be a more cost-effective way to boost lending. On the downside, Corollary 7 shows that
increased financier net worth may set the economy on the path towards a destabilizing
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secondary market boom.
This suggests a role for macro-prudential policy in regulating the dynamics of secondary
market booms more generally. Indeed, Corollary 6 shows that excessively large financier net
worth may lead to Pareto-inferior outcomes within a period. A simple policy that eliminates
this static inefficiency is to place a cap on the total amount of capital financiers can spend
in secondary markets in a given period. To this end, let the regulator choose a w˜f such that
financiers must invest at least wf−w˜f in the safe technology. This cap on secondary market
investment w˜f can be chosen such that Φ = 0 whenever the competitive equilibrium in the
absence of regulation is a shirking equilibrium in which reductions in financier net worth
are Pareto-improving in accordance with Corollary 6. As a result, the policy eliminates
within-period inefficiencies. Yet it may also have dynamic benefits. Indeed, it is easy to see
that aggregate net worth wf +wb is larger in any state of the world under this policy. The
reason is that the policy eliminates shirking on the equilibrium path, while the conditions
in Corollary 6 ensure that total investment is independent of Φ. Aggregate net worth is
generally not a sufficient statistic for welfare or total investment. Figure 10 presents an
example in which the policy leads to strictly higher investment and, by extension, output
in every period.
This suggests that constraints on the asset side of financier balance sheet are a useful
macro-prudential policy tool. Three aspects of such a policy are of note. First, financier
net worth is harmful only when it is large. Because financiers grow during expansions,
the policy is pro-cyclical. Second, the policy is independent of financier capital structure.
That is, there is a motive for regulation independent of whether financiers are levered or
not. Third, the aggregate size of the financier sector, rather than the systemic relevance of
individual financial institutions, is the relevant concern. The last two points contrast with
a regulatory discussion at the Financial Stability Board, which focused on the designating
individual asset managers as systemically important because they were fearful of sudden
withdrawals from such institutions. In this sense, my results suggest a novel motive for
financial regulation.
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Figure 10
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Notes: Equilibrium Outcomes when financiers must invest at least wf − w˜f in the safe technology.
w˜f chosen such that Φ = 0 in every period in which reductions in financier net worth are Pareto-
improving as in Corollary 6. Solid lines depict the equilibrium with the policy and dashed lines the
equilibrium in the absence of the policy.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper offers a theory of the macroeconomic effects of secondary markets. Secondary
market trading impacts the flow of credit through the distribution of aggregate risk exposure
in the cross-section of financial intermediaries. Some risk transfer away from constrained
lenders relaxes a borrowing constraint and allows for the expansion of credit volumes. Ex-
cessive risk transfer destroys monitoring incentives and leads to lax credit standards and
excessive aggregate risk exposure. The level of risk transfer is determined by the distribu-
tion of net worth in the financial system. I distinguish between “bankers” – intermediaries
that lend to firms and household directly, such as commercial banks or mortgage origina-
tors – and “financiers” – those who do trade in assets originated by other intermediaries,
such as hedge funds or dealer banks. There is excessive risk transfer when financiers are
too well-capitalized relative to bankers. Dynamically, the risk transfer that allows credit
volumes to expand when financiers are not too large causes financier net worth to grow
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disproportionately after a sequence of good shocks. Endogenous secondary market credit
booms arise that gradually lead to declining investment efficiency and increasing financial
fragility.
Secondary market booms are triggered by periods of low interest rates. The model therefore
provides a novel link from expansionary monetary policy and “saving gluts” to future finan-
cial fragility. In this manner, it sheds new light on the origins of the U.S. credit boom that
eventually ended in the 2008 financial crisis. Regarding policy, I show that asymmetric cap-
ital requirements on bankers are harmful, and that there is a strong motive for pro-cyclical
restrictions on financier’s purchases of asset-backed securities.
There are two main avenues for future research. The first is to study the optimal design of
policy in the context of secondary market trading. The second is to undertake a quantitative
evaluation of the mechanisms proposed in this paper.
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Chapter 2 : Debt Crises: For
Whom the Bell Tolls*
3.1 Introduction
Several features of sovereign debt markets are difficult to explain.
First, contagion. Sovereign debt crises tend to be highly correlated across countries and
sovereign spreads (the sovereign’s cost of external funding), tend to co-move strongly. The
most recent example is the 2010 debt crisis in Europe. Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), using
information for 31 advanced and emerging economies during the crisis, find that there was a
sharp and simultaneous increase in sovereign spreads in both European and non-European
countries. Similar forces were at play in the debt crises initiated by Poland in 1981, Mexico
in 1994, Thailand in 1997, Russia in 1998, and Argentina 20012.
Previous work has attempted to explain contagion by appealing to different types of linkages
between countries. One branch of the literature focuses on real linkages. For example,
trade in goods or financial assets between countries may transmit negative shocks from
one country to the next and lead to co-movements in sovereign spreads (e.g., Alter and
Beyer (2014) and Gross and Kok Sorensen (2013)). A second branch focuses on belief
linkages through learning and herding. In this view (e.g., De Santis (2012)), contagion is
*This chapter is co-authored with Harold L. Cole and Guillermo Ordon˜eez
2For a survey of these cases see Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b).
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driven by the correlation of beliefs about fundamentals in different countries, so that bad
news about one country make investors pessimistic about other countries. Of course, a
prerequisite for belief correlation to cause contagion is that observations about one country
hold information about other countries. This requires correlation in fundamentals across
countries, or the existence of a common unobservable variable linking all countries. Theories
of contagion based on belief linkages therefore also require real linkages between countries.
Finally, a third set of explanations relies on the rationalization of crises as self-fulfilling roll-
over problems a la Cole and Kehoe (1996). To explain contagion, however, this literature
requires a correlated structure of sunspots to induce simultaneous roll-over crisis episodes
in many countries at the same time.
Because many extant theories of contagion rely on the existence of structural links across
countries, finding evidence for such linkages is imperative in providing support for them.
Problematically, however, it is often difficult to empirically identify linkages that are plausi-
bly powerful enough to induce the degree of contagion observed in many debt crisis episodes.
Again taking the recent European experience as an example, Beirne and Fratzscher (2013)
explore empirical models with economic fundamentals and find that “the market pricing of
sovereign risk may not have been fully reflecting fundamentals prior to the crisis.”
Second, sovereign risk premia seem only loosely connected to the country’s fundamentals
more generally: they frequently exhibit sudden changes without obvious changes in underly-
ing fundamentals, and sometimes fluctuate without any observable changes in fundamentals
at all. Indeed, sovereign risk premia seem to react differently to a given change in funda-
mentals at different points in time.
Third, there seems to be history dependence in the borrowing conditions faced by different
countries: the same change in fundamentals may have different effects in different countries,
and these differences are persistent over time. Indeed, a given country’s past behavior
seems to matter for how sovereign spreads react to changes in fundamentals. Consider, for
example, the diverging experiences of Argentina and the United States. The U.S. seems to
be in a “stable” environment that allows it to accumulate high debt levels without triggering
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increases in spreads, while Argentina, in contrast, seems to be in an “unstable” environment
in which slight changes in fundamentals cause large and sudden changes in spreads.
To jointly accommodate all of these features within a single framework, we construct a
model of sovereign bond markets with many countries and two key elements. First, there
is a global pool of risk-averse investors who freely allocate funds across sovereign bond
markets. Second, these investors can choose to produce information about a country’s
fundamentals at a cost. This information is valuable because informed investors are able to
exploit their superior knowledge of a country’s fundamentals to outbid uninformed investors
in particularly attractive states of the world. In equilibrium, this benefit is exactly offset
by the cost of becoming informed.
Our first result is that the free flow of capital across countries can generate contagion across
countries, even in the absence of any real linkages, correlation of fundamentals, or belief
updating about one country due to equilibrium outcomes in another country. Specifically,
when investor preferences exhibit prudence (that is, u′′′(c) > 0, as is the case for CRRA
utility functions), an increase in the probability of default in one country increases sovereign
spreads for all sovereign bonds held by the investor. This is because an increase in the
default risk of a given country increases the background risk inherent in the entire portfolio
of sovereign bonds, and thereby reduces the investor’s appetite to invest in sovereign debt
more generally. Hence, sovereign bond prices fall across all countries when one country
becomes more likely to default. If this effect is sufficiently large and the increase in spreads
is severe enough, it may no longer be feasible for countries to roll over their debt, causing
a wave of debt crises.
Our contagion result relies only on investor prudence and the fact that there is a common
pool of investors for all countries. Hence it does not rely on changes in investors’ wealth
(as in Kyle and Xiong (2001) or Goldstein and Pauzner (2004)), borrowing constraints (as
in Yuan (2005)) or short-selling constraints (as in Calvo and Mendoza (1999)). Indeed,
contagion stems only from the portfolio rebalancing of prudent investors in response to an
increase in the riskiness of a subset of assets at their disposal. For empirical evidence about
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the importance of portfolio effects on contagion see Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2004).
For empirical evidence about the importance of risk aversion to explain sovereign spreads
see Lizarazo (2013).
Our second result is that the option to produce information about countries’ fundamen-
tals can generate multiple equilibria. In particular, an uninformed equilibrium, in which
no investor acquires information about the country’s fundamentals, may co-exist with an
informed equilibrium, in which some investors do acquire information about the country’s
fundamentals. These information regimes have real effects: taking as given the stochas-
tic process for fundamentals, the average level and the volatility of spreads differ across
regimes. In the uninformed equilibrium, spreads are stable and low on average, because in-
vestors are relatively insensitive to variation in fundamentals. In the informed equilibrium,
in contrast, spreads are volatile and high on average, because investors strongly react to
variation in fundamentals and demand very high risk premia in bad states of the world.
For this reason, sovereigns strictly prefer an uninformed equilibrium to an informed equilib-
rium. Because information acquisition is costly, and information rents come at the expense
of other investors, the same is true for investors.
Why do all agents, investors and countries alike, lose in the informed equilibrium? In our
setting information does not affect any real variable, so there are no benefits of information.
Still information is costly and uses real resources that could be consumed otherwise, but
are lost in equilibrium because of investors competing for a larger share of resources. We
do not claim that information does not have benefits in terms of disciplining governments
or allocating funds to productive investment opportunities, but we assume away those
benefits to focus on the forces behind information acquisition. Any benefit of information
will naturally go in the direction of making the uninformed equilibrium less desirable.
An important upshot from our analysis is that, because investors’ optimal portfolio choice
and the information regime jointly determine the mapping from country fundamentals to
sovereign bond spreads and the likelihood of debt crises, there need not exist a unique map-
ping from economic fundamentals to spreads in sovereign bond markets even in the absence
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of roll-over crises driven by coordination failures. Indeed, since investors choose their port-
folio by taking the fundamentals and information regimes in all countries into account, the
mapping from fundamentals to prices in a single country depends on equilibrium outcomes
in all other countries. To the extent that a given pool of investors prices sovereign bonds in
multiple countries, understanding contagion and default risk therefore requires a “global”
view of bond markets.
Finally, to the extent that informational regimes are persistent (in the sense that there is a
change in regime only if the only if the old regime can no longer be sustained), only large
changes in fundamentals can force a transition across regimes. This implies that a country
starting out in an uninformed equilibrium begins to attract informed investors only if its
fiscal situation worsens substantially, while a country starting out in an informed equilib-
rium requires a substantial improvement of their fiscal situation to discourage information
acquisition. In the absence of such large shocks, two given countries may therefore be in
different informational regimes, and thus have to pay different spreads, even when their cur-
rent fundamentals are similar. A country’s past sins or virtues may therefore be important
determinants of current borrowing conditions, and may remain with the country for a long
time. We call this phenomenon hysteresis. This also implies that understanding contagion
and default risk therefore also requires a “historical” view of bond markets.
In the next section we present a model with a single country in which we discuss multiplicity
of equilibria in terms of information acquisition and the outcome in terms of sovereign
spreads. In Section 3.3 we extend the results for two countries, discussing contagion of
sovereign spreads in its purest form, without any fundamental linkage and no information
acquisition and contagion of information regimes. In Section 3.4 we reinterpret the dynamics
of sovereign spreads in the recent european debt crisis from the point of view of our model.
In Section 3.5 we conclude.
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3.2 A Single Country Model
3.2.1 Setting
Environment: This is a two period model with a mass 1 of investors and a government.
Investors have wealthW in the first period and only care about consumption c in the second
period. Their preferences over consumption are given by a strictly concave utility function
u(c) that satisfies the Inada conditions. Since investors only care about consumption in
period 2, their problem is deciding how to invest their wealth in period 1, choosing between
a safe asset that has gross return 1 (storage), and risky government debt. We describe the
source of this risky debt next.
In period 1 the government has an amount of outstanding legacy debt D coming due. This
debt is new of the country’s period 1 income and is owed to previous, unspecified, investors.
This implies that, in order to repay D the government has to roll over the debt. We assume
that the government rolls over this debt using pure discount bonds via an auction-type
market. In this market, investors specify combinations (possibly menus) of prices P and
quantities B they wish to purchase. The government sells debt to the highest bidder until it
either exhausts the bids or sells enough to roll over its debt. If the government cannot roll
over its debt then it must default on initial investors, a situation we call a debt crisis.
In period 2 the debt issued in period 1 comes due. The government then chooses whether
to repay its debt using its income Y generated in period 2, or to default. If the government
defaults in either period the total output that remains is (1 − θ)Y where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the
cost of default in terms of lost income, and it is known by the government. Both the
government’s default cost factor θ and its income Y are random. We assume the cost of
default is independent of whether the government defaults in period 1 or period 2, and since
the government is just seeking to roll over its debt during the first period, it will always do
so if it can; reserving the decision to default for the second period.
While the realization of Y is drawn in period 2 from a distribution F (Y ), the realization
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of θ is drawn in period 1 from a discrete distribution with S elements Θ = {θ1, .., θS}, such
that θ1 > .. > θs > .. > θS . The realization of θ is unknown to investors, they can choose
to become informed about it in period 1 at a utility cost K.
Auctions: Investors are ex-ante identical but end up being one of two types based upon
their information choice: informed and uniformed. Denote by n the fraction of informed
investors and by P the marginal price of government debt in period 1. If there are informed
investors then this marginal price will depend upon the realized θ, and in this case we will
denote it by P (θ). Because informed traders know θ, they know the price that the marginal
investor must pay for government debt and hence bid the price P (θ) along with the (con-
ditional) quantity that they wish to purchase at that price, BI(θ). The uninformed traders
may (and will) find it advantageous to bid heterogeneous price-quantity pairs. Because
they know the set of possible marginal prices, {P (θ1), ..., P (θS)} in an equilibrium with a
fraction n of informed investors, they will choose the quantities to bid at each one of these
prices. Let BU (θ) denote the amount that an uninformed trader bids if he chooses to bid
at price P (θ).
The auction arrangement leads to the following budget constraints for the government. In
period 1, and for a given θ, if it can roll over its debt in period 1, then
nBI(θ)P (θ) + (1− n)
∑
{
θ̂:P (θ̂)≥P (θ)
}BU (θ̂)P (θ̂) = D. (5)
Notice that the previous sum represents that, if the cost of default is θ, uninformed investors
get to buy all their bids at prices larger than P (θ).
If the government cannot roll over the debt in period 1, then
nBI(θ)P (θ) + (1− n)
∑
{
θ̂:P (θ̂)≥P (θ)
}BU (θ̂)P (θ̂) < D,
in which case it must default. We will refer to this second case as a debt crisis.
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If the government hasn’t defaulted in period 1, its debt coming due in period 2 is
R(θ) = nBI(θ) +
∑
{
θ̂:P (θ̂)≥P (θ)
}(1− n)BU (θ̂)
In this case the government’s payoff if it doesn’t default in period 2 is Y − R(θ), while it
is (1 − θ)Y if it does default in period 2. This leads to a simple cut-off rule in which the
government defaults in period 2 if and only if Y < Y¯ (θ), where
Y¯ (θ) ≡ R(θ)
θ
. (6)
Since we assume that the government’s income is (1 − θ)Y if it has already defaulted in
period 1; irrespective of whether it defaults in period 2, the government is always weakly
better off waiting to default in period 2 if possible (there are no gains from defaulting
in the first period rather than rolling over with the possibility of repaying in the second
period).
Since Y¯ (θ) denotes the government’s cut-off rule for defaulting as a function of θ, the
realized return to an investor is 1 if Y ≥ Y¯ (θ) and 0 otherwise. In other words, it is 1 with
probability Pr
{
Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)} and 0 with probability 1−Pr{Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)} . Then, so long as the
total amount coming due, R(θ), is weakly decreasing in θ (the higher the cost of default, the
higher the price of debt and the less debt comes due in period 2), it follows that the default
cut-off is strictly decreasing in θ and the default probability is also weakly decreasing in θ.
In words, the higher the cost of default θ the less likely is that the country defaults, this
decreases the repayment needs and reduces the probability of default, which is consistent
with a lower repayment need.
Short-sale Prohibition: We will assume that our private investors cannot short the
government’s bond. We make this assumption for two reasons. First, in our two-period
context shorting the bond does not mean pledging to deliver a unit of the bond later.
Rather it means committing to the same state-contingent payoff profile as the government.
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But, in order to do this, the private investor would need access to exactly the sort of
commitment technology as the government. Second, in an equilibrium in which uninformed
investors were seeking to short the bond the ability to trade would reveal information about
the realization of θ. This is because the other party to the trade will be an informed trader
who is only willing to buy because the marginal price is weakly greater than the price asked
by the uniformed investor. Similarly, an offer to sell the bond outside of the auction by
an informed investor to an uninformed investor would also reveal information about the
realization of θ.
Investors’ Problem: An informed agent knows θ and takes as given the marginal price
of debt P (θ). Therefore, their maximization problem is given by
U I(θ) = max
BI(θ)≥0
u
(
W + [1− P (θ)]BI(θ))Pr{Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)} (7)
+u
(
W − P (θ)BI(θ)) [1− Pr{Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)}]−K,
which implies that their first-order condition is,
u′
(
W + [1− P (θ)]BI(θ)) [1− P (θ)] Pr{Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)}
+u′
(
W − P (θ)BI(θ)) [−P (θ)] [1− Pr{Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)}] ≤ 0, (8)
and with strict equality if BI(θ) > 0.
An uninformed agent must choose how much to bid at each one of the possible marginal
prices P (θ). The maximization problem of an uninformed agent is then
UU = max
{BU (θ̂1),...,BU (θ̂S)}
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr(θ)

u
(
W +
∑{
θ̂:θ̂≥θ
} [1− P (θ̂)]BU (θ̂))Pr{Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)}+
u
(
W −∑{
θ̂:θ̂≥θ
} P (θ̂)BU (θ̂)
)[
1− Pr{Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)}]
 ,
(9)
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which implies that his first-order condition for BU (θ̂) is,
∑
{
θ:θ≤θ̂
}Pr {θ}

u′
(
W +
∑{
θ′:θ≤θ′≤θ̂
} [1− P (θ′)]BU (θ′)
)[
1− P (θ̂)
]
Pr
{
Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)}+
u′
(
W −∑{
θ′:θ≤θ′≤θ̂
} P (θ′U (θ′)
)[
−P (θ̂)
] [
1− Pr{Y ≥ Y¯ (θ)}]
 ≤ 0,
(10)
where this condition holds as an equality if BU (θ̂) > 0. As the decision of the quantities to
bid at different prices are linked through first order conditions, the bids in equilibrium are
the solution to the system of equations (10) for all θ.
Finally, if an interior fraction of investors choose to become informed, n ∈ (0, 1), then the
investors must be indifferent between being informed or staying uninformed. If none of the
investors become informed then this condition becomes an inequality with UU being weakly
preferred. Alternatively, if n = 1 then the inequality is reversed with the payoff from being
informed. Hence
∑
θ
Pr {θ}U I(θ)−K
≤
=
≥
UU
if n = 0,
if n ∈ (0, 1),
if n = 1.
(11)
Equilibrium: The previous discussion summarizes the main elements of the problem of a
single country, which is completely indexed by n from equation (11). Next we define the
equilibrium.
Definition 8. An equilibrium will consist of a set of cut-offs Y¯ (θ), prices P (θ), quantities
for the informed and uninformed (BI(θ) and BU (θ) respectively), a fraction of informed
investors (n) such that the following conditions are satisfied.
1. The period 1 bond market from equation (5) clears in each country for each state θ,
or P (θ) = 0 then Y¯ (θ) =∞ and there is a debt crisis in state θ.
2. The set of cut-offs, Y¯ (θ), satisfy the threshold condition (6).
3. The choices of BI(θ) and BU (θ) are solutions to the informed and uniformed investors’
problems (first order conditions (8) and (10) respectively).
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4. The fraction of informed investors n must satisfy the indifference condition (11). The
country is an informed equilibrium when n > 0 and in an uninformed equilibrium
when n = 0.
There are a variety of equilibria. This is in part because the price of government debt affects
the likelihood of repayment, and this in turn can rationalize different prices of the debt.
For example, no-lending with P (θ) = 0 and Y¯ (θ) = ∞ for all θ is always an equilibrium.
At a zero price the government will not be able to rollover its debt and therefore must
default, this in turn rationalizes the zero price. This multiplicity is well-known since the
work of Calvo (1988) and Cole and Kehoe (1996). Next we present a simplified special case
to characterize the other (potentially multiple because of information acquisition) equilibria
in a tractable and intuitive way.
Simplifications: First, we assume just two possible costs of default (that is, S = 2), such
that 0 < θL < θH < 1, where θH is realized in period 1 with probability a (situation that
we denote as good state) and θL is realized in period 1 with probability 1 − a (situation
that we denote as bad state). Second, we assume just three possible income realizations in
period 2, YL < YM < YH , where YL happens with probability x and YM with probability z.
Finally, we assume θs and Y s are such that default cutoffs are exogenous. Formally,
Assumption 3.
YL < Y¯ (θH) < YM < Y¯ (θL) < YH
This assumption guarantees that when the cost of default is high (good state), the country
only defaults when the income is low, which implies a default probability of κH ≡ x. When
the cost of default is low (bad state), the country only repays when the income is high,
which implies a default probability of κL ≡ x+ z.
The previous assumption relies on endogenous variables (the prices of debt P (θL) and
P (θH)). For example, for any D and θ, if P = 0, then Y¯ = ∞, which implies that the
country always defaults and P = 0 is indeed an equilibrium. There may be other equilibria
under which the income level is equal to the cutoff and the government randomizes between
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repaying or not in case such income is realized. We do not consider these equilibria as we
are interested in the impact of changes in the probability of default of a country on prices
and not on the impact of changes in prices on the probability of default. Notice that both
effects are intertwined in the general setting in which the probability of default and prices
are jointly determined. We relax this restriction later.
3.2.2 Characterization of Equilibria
First we study an equilibrium in which no investor is informed about the state of the country
in terms of its cost of default. Then we study equilibria in which some investors may decide
to become informed about the state of the country. Finally we describe the possibility
of multiplicity, in which these equilibria coexist, and discuss its robustness to changes in
parameters.
Uninformed Equilibrium
Define the expected probability of default as
κ̂ ≡ ax+ (1− a)(x+ z)
Since there is no information about the country’s state there is a single marginal price P .
Given this price, we can rewrite the first order condition (8) as
u′(W + [1− P ]B)
u′(W − PB) =
Pκ̂
(1− P )(1− κ̂) (12)
The next proposition displays properties of this first-order condition in terms of how bid
quantities depend on parameters.
Proposition 12. The investors’ demand of sovereign bonds is decreasing on the price of
the bond and on its default probability.
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Proof. Rewriting the first order condition (12) as
F (B|P, κ̂) ≡ u
′(W + [1− P ]B)
u′(W − PB) −
Pκ̂
(1− P )(1− κ) = 0
define u′(+) ≡ u′(W + [1− P ]B) and u′(−) ≡ u′(W − PB). Differentiating with respect to
κ̂, dBdκ̂ is negative as
∂F
∂B
=
(1− P )u′′(+)u′(−) + Pu′′(−)u′(+)
u′2(−) < 0
and
∂F
∂κ̂
= − P
(1− P )(1− κ̂)2 < 0
Similarly, differentiating with respect to P , dBdP is negative if
∂F
∂P
=
B
u′2(−) [u
′′(−)u′(+)− u′′(+)u′(−)]− κ̂
(1− P )2(1− κ̂) < 0
A sufficient condition for this to be the case is that u
′′(−)
u′(−) ≤ u
′′(+)
u′(+) , which is always the case
for CRRA and CARA preferences.
The first-order condition together with the resource constraint pins down the price in equi-
librium. Substituting the resource constraint PB = D into the first-order condition,
u′(W −D + DP )
u′(W −D) =
Pκ̂
(1− P )(1− κ̂) (13)
Proposition 13. There is always an equilibrium with rollover failure and a debt crisis at
P = 0. If there exist other equilibria with P > 0, the highest price equilibrium price decreases
with the probability of default κ̂ and the country’s debt D.
Proof. Define
F (P |κ̂) = u
′(W −D + DP )
u′(W −D) −
Pκ̂
(1− P )(1− κ̂)
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A price P ∗ in equilibrium is given by F (P ∗|κ̂) = 0. At one extreme, the zeros of the
function F include P = 0. To see this note that under the Inada conditions (this is
limc→∞ u′(c) = 0) the first term is zero and trivially the second term is 0 too. Hence,
F (P = 0|κ̂) = 0. However, assuming Y has finite support, then a rollover failure occurs at
P ∗ = 0. and hence this price can be an equilibrium. At the other extreme, for P = 1 − κ̂,
F (P = 1 − κ̂|κ̂) < 0 (the first term on F (P |κ̂) is less than one and the second term is
equal to one), then P = 1 − κ̂ is never an equilibrium with risk aversion. Indeed, under
risk-aversion, P < 1− κ̂ as the first term of F (P |κ̂) is less than 1 and then the second term
should also be less that 1.
If parameters are such that F (P |κ̂) < 0 for all P ∈ (0, 1− κ̂], then the only equilibrium is
given by P ∗ = 0. If F (P |κ̂) > 0 for some P ∈ (0, 1 − κ̂], then there are other equilibria
besides P ∗ = 0. Among those, the maximum P ∗ sustainable in equilibrium is such that
∂F
∂P < 0 (recall F (P
∗|κ̂) = 0 and F (P = 1− κ̂|κ̂) < 0).
The maximum sustainable price in equilibrium is decreasing in κ̂ and D/W as, on the one
hand, dPdκ̂ = −
∂F
∂κ̂
∂F
∂P
and ∂F∂κ̂ = − P(1−P )(1−κ̂)2 < 0 whereas on the other hand, dPdD = −
∂F
∂D
∂F
∂P
and
∂F
∂D = −
1−P
P
u′′(+)+u
′(+)
u′(−)u
′′(−)
u′(−) < 0
To provide intuition, the next figure plots the left-hand side of equation (13), in black and
the right-hand side in different colors for three different levels of κ̂. The equilibrium price is
determined by the intersection of the two curves. The higher is the expected probability of
default, the higher is the right-hand side and the smaller is the price P in equilibrium. When
κ̂ is large enough, the only feasible equilibrium is P ∗ = 0 and there is a debt crisis.
The next figure shows the right hand side of equation (13) in black and the right hand
side in different colors for three different levels of D/W . As before, the equilibrium price is
determined by the intersection of the two curves. The higher is the relative indebtedness
of the country, the higher is the left hand side and the smallest the price P in equilibrium.
When D/W is large enough, the only feasible equilibrium is a P ∗ = 0 and there is a debt
crisis.
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Figure 11
Price Determination for Different Levels of κ̂
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When is an uninformed equilibrium sustainable? To answer this question, we have to
determine the incentives for a single uninformed investor to deviate and acquire information,
paying a utility cost K. Because a single investor’s bidding behavior does not impact
equilibrium prices, the benefits of acquiring information come from the possibility of re-
optimizing the quantities the investor bids at the marginal price P in equilibrium, given
that there is a single price.
If the investor learns the state is good, he would like to bid more than uninformed individ-
uals. This is immediate from the first order condition (12) evaluated at P and κH , as the
bid is decreasing in the probability of default and κH < κ̂. Similarly, If the investor learns
the state is bad, he would like to bid less than if he were uninformed.
Defining the expected benefits of acquiring information as
χU ≡ a [U(B(κH , P ))− U(B(κ̂, P ))] + (1− a) [U(B(κL, P ))− U(B(κ̂, P ))]
As U(B(κ, P )) is obtained by re-optimizing the quantities bid, it is clear that χU cannot be
negative (as the investor can always replicate his uninformed bid). Then, the uninformed
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Figure 12
Price Determination for Different Levels of D/W
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equilibrium is feasible as long as
K > χU ≥ 0
Notice that the difference between the optimal bid in each state and the bid without infor-
mation (this is, B(κs, P ) − B(κ̂, P )) is increasing in the absolute difference κs − κ̂. Since
κ̂− κH = (1− a)z and κL − κ̂ = az, the gap increases with z and it is maximized at inter-
mediate levels of a. In the extremes, when a = 0, U(B(κL, P )) = U(B(κ̂, P )) and χ
U = 0.
This is also the case for a = 1.
The incentives to acquire information is also increasing in D/W as more exposure to the
risky asset increases the differences in utility from knowing the probability of default in
each state.
Informed Equilibrium
The critical difference between the informed and uninformed equilibrium is that in the
informed equilibrium there will be as many prices as states, as informed investors will bid
different quantitates in those different states. In a sense, the existence of informed investors
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changes the structure of equilibrium as they will generate prices that are conditional on
underlying fundamentals that are unknown unless information is produced, the cost of
default θ in our setting.
Denoting the two prices PL ≡ P (θL) and PH ≡ P (θH) we can rewrite the first order
condition (8) as
u′(W + [1− Ps]BIs )
u′(W − PsBIs )
=
Psκs
(1− Ps)(1− κs) (14)
where κs ∈ {κL, κH} are the expected probabilities of default in each state s and Ps ∈
{PL, PH} are the prices in each state s.
As in the uninformed equilibrium, the next proposition describes the features of these first
order conditions, which are identical to those in Proposition 12, as is the proof.
Proposition 14. Informed investors’ demand of sovereign bonds is decreasing on the price
of the bonds and on their default probability.
For uninformed investors bidding in the informed equilibrium, we can rewrite the first-order
condition (10) for the bid at the marginal price in the low state, BUL , as
PLκLu
′(W −PHBUH −PLBUL ) = (1−PL)(1− κL)u′(W + (1−PH)BUH + (1−PL)BUL ) (15)
and for the bid at the marginal price in the high state, BUH , as
a
[
PHκHu
′(W − PHBUH)
]
+ (1− a) [PHκLu′(W − PHBUH − PLBUL )] =
a
[
(1− PH)(1− κH)u′(W (1− PH)BUH)
]
+(1− a) [(1− PH)(1− κL)u′(W + (1− PH)BUH + (1− PL)BUL )] (16)
Critically, auctions with discriminatory pricing implies that, as PH > PL, the sovereign will
sell BUH to the uninformed at PH in the good state (as the price is PH) but also in the bad
state, in which the marginal price is PL. This implies that uninformed understand that
they will always buy whatever they decide to bid at PH , but in a bad state they are buying
at an overprice.
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By comparing these first order conditions, the next proposition describes general properties
of the total expenditures on sovereign debt by uninformed investors.
Proposition 15. Uninformed investors spend more than informed investors in the bad state
and less than informed investors in the good state.
Proof. First, we prove that informed investors spend less than uninformed investors in the
bad state, that is PLB
I
L < PHB
U
H + PLB
U
L .
Suppose not, so that PLB
I
L ≥ PHBUH + PLBUL . Then
PLκLu
′(W − PLBIL) ≥ PLκLu′(W − PHBUH − PLBUL )
From the first-order conditions for informed investors in the bad state (14) and the first-
order condition for uninformed investors at the marginal price for the bad state (15), this
implies
u′(W + (1− PL)BIL) ≥ u′(W + (1− PH)BUH + (1− PL)BUL )
or
BIL − (BUH +BUL ) ≤ PLBIL − (PHBUH + PLBUL ) < BIL − (
PH
PL
BUH +B
U
L )
where the second strict inequality is the result of PL < 1. This is a contradiction for all
PH > PL.
Second, we prove that informed investors spend more than uninformed investors in the good
state, this is, PHB
I
H > PHB
U
H . Notice the first-order condition for uninformed investors for
bidding at the marginal price for the good state (16) can be rewritten as
(1− a) [PHκLu′(W − PHBUH − PLBUL )]
− (1− a) [(1− PH)(1− κL)u′(W + (1− PH)BUH + (1− PL)BUL )] =
a
[
(1− PH)(1− κH)u′(W (1− PH)BUH)− PHκHu′(W − PHBUH)
]
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From equation (15) and PH > PL the left hand side is positive. This implies
u′(W + [1− PH ]BUH)
u′(W − PHBUH)
>
PHκH
(1− PH)(1− κH)
Comparing with the first order conditions for informed investors in the good state (14),
then BUH < B
I
H .
The intuition for this result is as follows. On the one hand, uninformed investors pay an
overprice for a fraction
BUH
BUL+B
U
H
of the debt that they purchase in the bad state. This implies
that, if uninformed investors spend the same amount as informed investors in the bad state,
they incur the same losses as the informed in case of default, but receive smaller gains in
case of repayment as BUL + B
U
H < B
I
L. The marginal benefits of spending more in the bad
state are thus larger than the marginal costs, which induces the uninformed to spend more
than informed in the bad state. On the other hand, whatever uninformed spend in the
good state, they also spend in the bad state. As they are overexposed to sovereign debt in
the bad state they would rather reduce their exposure in the good state when compared to
informed investors.
We refer to the set of parameters under which BUH = 0 (that is, parameters under which
short selling constraints bind and uninformed investors bid nothing at PH , not purchasing
any bond in the high state), as the partial participation region (partial because only informed
investors participate in the good state and purchase debt). For completeness, we refer to
the set of parameters under which BUH > 0, so that uninformed investors also purchase some
debt in the good state on the good state, as the full participation region.
Notice that, in the partial participation region, uninformed investors know the default prob-
ability conditional on being able to purchase debt in equilibrium, because they know they
are only able to purchase debt in the bad state. Hence, the informed and the uninformed
behave symmetrically in the bad state, bidding the same amount at the same price, PL.
This is straightforward from replacing BUH = 0 in the first order condition (15) and com-
paring it with the first-order condition (14). This implies that all information rents in the
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partial participation region stem from informed investor’s ability to purchase bonds in both
states of the world.
Now that we have characterized how informed and uninformed investors bid at different
prices, we continue solving the informed equilibria as follows. Using the demand functions
for bonds in each state along with market clearing in each state, we can characterize prop-
erties of the prices as a function of the fraction of investors that are informed, which we
denote by n. Then we will endogenize the fraction of investors in equilibrium, n∗, by ex-
ploiting a free-entry condition under which investors are indifferent between being informed
or uninformed.
Proposition 16. Consider the equilibrium with the highest sustainable prices. The good
state price, PH , increases with the fraction of informed investors, n.
Proof. If the economy is in a partial participation region, market clearing for the good state
is just
nPHB
I
H = D
Increasing n is isomorphic to decreasing D, and as we showed in Proposition 13 this implies
dPH
dn > 0.
In contrast, if the economy is in a full participation region, market clearing for the good
state is
nPHB
I
H + (1− n)PHBUH = D,
which we can rewrite it in terms of excess demand as
ED(PH) = B
U
H + n(B
I
H −BUH)−
D
PH
= 0.
Then
dPH
dn
= − B
I
H −BUH
n
∂BIH
∂PH
+ (1− n)∂BUH∂PH −
(
− D
P 2H
) > 0.
To see that this fraction is positive for the highest equilibrium price, note first that the
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numerator is positive, as we have shown that BIH > B
U
H . With respect to the denominator,
however, as the slope of the demand (given by n
∂BIH
∂PH
+(1−n)∂BUH∂PH ) and of the supply (given
by − D
P 2H
) are both negative, in principle the denominator could be positive or negative. For
the highest price in equilibrium, however, the denominator is negative: when evaluated at
PH = 1− κ there is an excess of supply, as BIH = 0 and BUH = 0 (then there is no demand),
while the supply is given by D1−κ . The highest price in equilibrium is computed at the
highest price at which demand and supply equalize, which implies that n
∂BIH
∂PH
+(1−n)∂BUH∂PH <(
− D
P 2H
)
< 0.
In Figure 13 we illustrate how prices PH and PL depend on the fraction of informed investors
n in the economy. As reference we also include in the figure the price for the uninformed
equilibrium, which we denote by PU . The are two distinct regions in the graph. When n is
low, the economy is in a full participation region and when n is high (in the figure to right
of the arrows, for n above 0.55), the economy is in a partial participation region.
In the partial participation region, PL does not change with n as B
I
L = B
U
L and the resource
constraint in the bad state is just PLB
I
L = D, which is independent of n. Even though in
the figure it looks as if PL always declines with n in the full participation region, this is not
necessarily the case, as PH also enters in the market clearing for the bad state and the the
evolution of PL is jointly determined by an increase in n and by an increase in PH , which
act as forces in opposite direction.
In contrast, PH increases with the fraction of investors that are informed in the market,
n, in both regions. In the full participation region the sensitivity of PH to n is moderated
by the participation of the uninformed investors, but in the partial participation region
the sensitivity is larger (the rate of increase of PH with n is larger) as there is a pure
cannibalization effect among informed investors, as the market in the good state is populated
by a larger mass of informed investors, driving up demand and, thus, prices.
In Figure 14 we show how the utility of both informed and uninformed investors depend on
the fraction of informed investors in the market. These utilities depend on the evolution of
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Figure 13
Prices and Information
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prices, which we have shown depend on the fraction of informed investors. We also show
the utility of investors in the uninformed equilibrium for reference. While the utility of
uninformed investors decline with n in the full participation region, it is independent of
n in the partial participation region as PL is independent on n in this region, and this is
the only price at which uninformed investors participate. For informed investors, however,
utility always declines in the partial participation region (because of the cannibalization
effect), while the utility in the full participation region may increase and then decline. Even
though in the figure the utility of informed investors always decline with n, the reason is
that in this specific numerical example PL always declines with n as well.
The utility of informed investors in the informed equilibrium is always above the utility
of investors in the uninformed equilibrium and the utility of uninformed investors in the
informed equilibrium is always below their utility in the uninformed equilibrium. This does
not imply, however, that informed investors are better-off in the informed equilibrium, as
they have to spend utility costs to become informed in the first place. In Figure 15 we show
that the informed equilibrium is characterized by the fraction of investors n∗ that make
investors indifferent between being informed or uninformed, this is U I(n∗)−K = UU (n∗),
which implies that all investors are always worse-off in the informed equilibrium.
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Figure 14
Utilities and Information
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It is important to highlight at this point that the utility of investors in the informed equilib-
rium is lower as they end up spending resources to acquire information that is only useful to
compete for whom gets the larger fraction of resources. There are no real benefits from in-
formation acquisition, and then information just implies a costly redistribution of resources
across investors.
Multiplicity
Here we show that both the uninformed and informed equilibrium can coexist. Figure 15
shows a situation of multiple equilibria. The informed equilibrium, as discussed above, is
the point at which the utility gap between informed and uninformed investors is equal to the
utility cost of producing information K. In this specific case, a situation where all investors
are uninformed is also an equilibrium since χU < K.
The complementarity among the informed that generate this multiplicity is somewhat com-
plicated. There is no complementarity among informed investors in the informed equilibrium
(the utility of informed investors decrease as there are more informed investors, n), which
is the reason there is an equilibrium n∗. However, there is an initial complementarity that
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arises from moving from a regime with a single price in equilibrium (uninformed equilib-
rium) to multiple prices (informed equilibrium). A deviation of becoming informed when
there is a single price is lower than a deviation of becoming uninformed when there are
many prices in equilibrium.
In other words, multiple equilibria arises because of the discontinuous increase in the incen-
tives to become informed at n = 0 when comparing the situation under which information
allows to reoptimize quantities bid at a single price (uninformed equilibrium) and the situ-
ation under which information allows paying the right price in each state. The larger gains
are intuitively higher as they imply reoptimizing bidding at prices that more closely aligned
with correct default probabilities.
Figure 15
Equilibrium Multiplicity
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Now we show how equilibria changes when changing fundamentals, in particular the average
probability of default, κ̂. There are in principle different ways in which κ̂ can increase. For
example, there can be an increase in the probability of a mediocre output z, an increase
in the probability of a bad output x, and an increase in the probability of a bad state, a.
As we discuss later all these changes will have different implications for equilibria, which
implies that it is not sufficient to know how the average probability of default changes to
predict changes in bond prices. Instead, one needs to know where the change comes from (a
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reduction in the probability of a very good output, an increase in the probability of a very
bad output, a change in the cost of default) to predict how information and bond prices
change in our setting.
We start by analyzing how our equilibria change when there is an increase in z (a reduction in
the probability of a high income realization and an increase in the probability of a mediocre
realization). This change induces an increase in the gap between κL and κH . Figure 16
shows how the set of possible equilibria change in response to an increase in z. An increase
in the probability of default, which is generated by an increase in the gap between the two
states, induces more information acquisition.
Figure 16
Effect of z on Equilibrium Multiplicity
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The solid lines represent a low z and the dotted lines a higher z. On the one hand, an
increase in z increases the individual incentives to deviate and become informed in the
uninformed equilibrium (increasing χU ). In the case of the numerical simulation this effect
is large enough for the uninformed equilibrium to become unsustainable. On the other
hand, it increases the gap between informed and uninformed investors in the informed
equilibrium, thus increasing n∗ in the informed equilibrium (the point at which the red
solid line and the dotted black curve cross). A similar figure arises if we compare two levels
of indebtedness, with a higher debt D/W also increases the incentives to become informed
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in both equilibria.
Figure 17 shows the equilibrium fraction of informed investors, n∗, in the informed equilib-
rium, as we change the gap between the states in terms of default probabilities, z, and also
as we increase D/W , the indebtedness of the country.
Figure 17
Effect of z and D on Information in Equilibrium
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Now that we have characterized both the conditions for the uninformed equilibrium and
the equilibrium fraction of informed investors in the informed equilibrium, we can compute
the price PU in the uninformed equilibrium and the prices PH and PL in the informed
equilibrium for different levels of z (for the optimal n∗ at each fundamental z). We displayed
these prices in Figure 18.
First, there are clearly three regions of equilibria as a function of z. For low levels of z there
are low incentives to acquire information and only the uninformed equilibrium is sustainable.
In contrast, for high levels of z there are high incentives to acquire information and only the
informed equilibrium is sustainable. For intermediate region of z both equilibria coexist.
Interestingly, once we compute the weighted average of prices E(P ) = aPH +(1−a)[ωPH +
(1−ω)PL], where ω = (1−n)B
U
H
(1−n)(BUH+BUL )+nBIL
the informed equilibrium is not only characterized
by higher volatility of prices (which can fluctuate between PL and PH), but also by a lower
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average price, E(P ).
Figure 18
Equilibrium Prices
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This result is important because not only investors are worse off in the informed equilibrium,
as his cussed before, but also countries are worse off, both because debt can be roll over at
lower prices and because they face higher volatility on those prices. This result on prices
translate into the debt burden of countries: as the expected prices at which a country
raises funds in the informed equilibrium are lower than in the uninformed equilibrium, the
expected debt burden is higher in the informed equilibrium, as shown in Figure 19.
In other words, the informed equilibrium is inferior from both the country’s and the in-
vestors’ point of view. As we explained above, in this model information does not affect
allocations, and then its costly acquisition motivated by obtaining a larger share of resources
is only detrimental. even though the cost of information acquisition lies on investors, there
is a pass through to the country in the form of lower sovereign bond prices.
This characterization of equilibria and potential multiplicity has implications for interpret-
ing how shocks to fundamentals affect a country’s debt burden, as well as the volatility that
countries experience in their sovereign spreads. Assume for example a simple and plau-
sible equilibrium selection under which a country remains in a given equilibrium as long
as sustainable. This “conservative” equilibrium selection introduces history dependence,
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Figure 19
Equilibrium Debt Burden
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or hystheresis, such that small shocks to fundamentals may generate large changes in the
behavior of sovereign prices.3 In different words, the past matters and two countries with
identical fundamentals can have different average price of their debt, different debt burdens
and different price volatility just because their past was different.
These results are relevant in interpreting the mapping from fundamentals to sovereign debt
prices. Periods of calm sovereign experiences do not necessarily imply that fundamentals
are calm, as it may be that the country raises funds in an uninformed equilibrium, in
which prices are simply not sensitive to movements in fundamentals. In contrast, periods
of turbulent sovereign experiences do not necessarily imply that fundamentals have become
much more turbulent than normal, as it may be that the country transitioned to an informed
equilibrium in which prices are more sensitive to movements in fundamentals.
3.3 Two-Country Model
So far we have studied the different informational equilibria under which a single country
may raise funds. Now we study a setting in which the same mass 1 of investors bid in two
3A history-dependent selection criterion is formally proposed and solved by Cooper (1994).
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different countries, with the same characterization of income Y and default costs θ, but
possibly different parameters. First, we focus on a situation in which information about
θ cannot be produced and discuss contagion on sovereign debt prices and debt crises in
its purest form, without any fundamental linkage across countries other than this common
pool of investors. We show in this case that the condition for contagion just relies on the
utility functions displaying prudence, that is u′′′(c) > 0.
Second, we introduce again the possibility of information acquisition and we show that there
are complementarities across countries in the incentives to acquire information. This leads
to a second form of contagion based on information regimes: A country transitioning to
an informed equilibrium increases the likelihood the other country moves to an informed
equilibrium as well.
To extend our analysis to a two-country environment and maintain tractability we make the
following assumptions. We assume that the investor household is composed of two mem-
bers who each attend one of the two simultaneous auctions in the two countries. Before
each auction takes place the household splits its wealth up between its two members. Each
household member can become informed about the country whose auction they are attend-
ing but cannot communicate this information to the other member at the other country’s
auction. They then place their binds without knowing the bids of the other household
member. These assumptions allow us to restrict the number of equilibrium prices, and the
conditional bids that a household might undertake. Thus, reducing the dimensionality of
the problem to draw crisp conclusions.
Without these assumptions the number of prices can become quite large as the number of
countries increases to 2. If there were J values of θ in each country the number of prices in
each country would be J2 if some investors were becoming informed in each country. This
in turn would imply that a household that was not informed about a particular country
would be choosing J2 possible marginal bid levels in each country for a potential total of
2J2 bids across the two countries. Our assumption reduces this number to a maximum of
2J prices in equilibrium.
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3.3.1 Pure Contagion on Sovereign Debt Prices
We start by analyzing the simpler case in which both countries are in the uninformed
equilibrium, and hence no investor is informed about the state in either country. This case
turns out to be a fairly straightforward extension of the one-country uniformed case. Since
there are now three possible assets (a safe asset, or no investment, country 1’s bonds and
country 2’s bonds) the maximization problem can be written simply as
max
B1,B2
U = κ̂1 [κ̂2u(W − P1B1 − P2B2) + (1− κ̂2)u(W − P1B1 + (1− P2)B2)]
+(1− κ̂1) [κ̂2u(W + (1− P1)B1 − P2B2) + (1− κ̂2)u(W + (1− P1)B1 + (1− P2)B2)]
The first-order condition for the quantities bid in country j is
Ej(u
′(+))
Ej(u′(−)) =
Pj κ̂j
(1− Pj)(1− κ̂j)
where
Ej(u
′(−)) = κ̂−ju′(W − PjBj − P−jB−j) + (1− κ̂−j)u′(W − PjBj + (1− P−j)B−j)
and
Ej(u
′(+)) = κ̂−ju′(W +(1−Pj)Bj−P−jB−j)+(1− κ̂−j)u′(W +(1−Pj)Bj+(1−P−j)B−j)
The next proposition shows that, when utilities follow CRRA utility functions and display
prudence (that is u′′′(c) > 0), an increase in the expected default probability in one country
reduces the sovereign price in the other country. Notice we have constructed a simple
portfolio problem where the returns on the two risky assets are i.i.d. and there is no feedback
other than the one imposed by investors rebalancing their portfolio. Furthermore, there is
no feedback from information acquisition, which we explore in the next subsection.
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Proposition 17. There is contagion (i.e.
∂Pj
∂κ̂−j < 0) when preferences are CRRA.
Proof. Impose resource constraints P1B1 = D1 and P2B2 = D2 for each country in the first
order conditions. Denoting R = P1B1 + P2B2 = D1 +D2, write first-order conditions as
κ̂−ju′(W −R+ DjPj ) + (1− κ̂−j)u′(W −R+
Dj
Pj
+
D−j
P−j )
κ̂−ju′(W −R) + (1− κ̂−j)u′(W −R+ D−jP−j )
− Pj κ̂j
(1− Pj)(1− κ̂j) = 0
For simplicity
κ̂−ju′(+−) + (1− κ̂−j)u′(++)
κ̂−ju′(−−) + (1− κ̂−j)u′(−+) −
pj κ̂j
(1− pj)(1− κ̂j) = 0
where the first argument of u′ corresponds to the repayment or not of country j and the
second argument to the repayment or not of country −j.
dPj
dκ̂−j
= −
u′(+−)−u′(++)−(1−κ̂−j) Dj
P2−j
∂P2−j
∂κ̂−j u
′′(++)
Ej(u′(−))
−DjEj(u′′(+))
P 2j Ej(u
′(−)) −
κ̂j
(1−Pj)2(1−κ̂j)
+
Ej(u
′(+))
Ej(u′(−))2
[
u′(−−)− u′(−+)− (1− κ̂−j)D−jP 2−j
∂P 2−j
∂κ̂−j u
′′(−+)
]
−DjEj(u′′(+))
P 2j Ej(u
′(−)) −
κ̂j
(1−Pj)2(1−κ̂j)
There is contagion, by which we mean
dPj
dκ̂−j < 0, when the denominator is negative which
is the case (as was discussed in the one country case) for the highest P ∗j in equilibrium, and
the numerator is also negative. The numerator is negative when,
u′(+−)−u′(++)
1−κ̂−j −
D−j
P 2−j
∂P−j
∂κ̂−j u
′′(++)
Ej(u′(+))
<
u′(−−)−u′(−+)
1−κ̂−j −
D−j
P 2−j
∂P−j
∂κ̂−j u
′′(−+)
Ej(u′(−))
In words, the relative change in the gains from bidding in country j are smaller than the
relative change in the losses. This implies a reduction in bidding in country j, a decline in
the demand and then a decline in sovereign prices.
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Figure 20 is similar to Figure 12, but for different levels of risk aversion (which, for CRRA
utility functions, also implies different levels of prudence) and with the left hand side com-
puted by the ratio of marginal utilities in expectation (which depends on the probabilities
of default in the country that suffers a shock). We can draw several conclusions from the
figure. First, as we already discussed, the larger the level of risk aversion the smaller the
sovereign price in equilibrium.
Second, we show in blue a situation in which the other country has a low expected proba-
bility of default and in red when the expected probability of default in the other country
is higher. As is clear from the figure, given a shock in the probability of default in the
other country, contagion is stronger the larger the risk aversion (and then the larger the
prudence). This result arises for two reasons. On the one hand, the higher level of prudence
the larger is the reaction of investors, moving investment away from risky sovereign bonds.
On the other hand, the higher the level of risk aversion the lower the price in equilibrium
and more sensitive it is to movements in the left hand side (this is, the left and right hand
sides coincide in flatter regions).
Figure 20
Contagion Depends on Risk Aversion
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3.3.2 Contagion on Information Regime
With informed investors in at least one of our countries, the model becomes more compli-
cated. To handle that and impose the restrictions implied by our assumptions about time
and lack of information sharing within investor households, we define the state vector as
s = (θ1, θ2, Y1, Y2) where θi is the realized default cost and Yi is the realized output level in
country i and we denote by Bij(θi) the investor’s investment in country i at marginal price
j, Pij . Given this notation the payoff to the investor’s portfolio is given by
W +
2∑
i=1
∑
j:θj≥sθi
[
I(Yi > Y (θi))− Pij
]
Bij(θi),
where sθi is the realized value of θi. For the uninformed investor in country i, there is an
additional restriction which takes the form of a simple measurability condition, or
Bij(θj) = Bij′(θj′) for all j and j
′. (17)
The portfolio payoff to the investor is given by
∑
s
U
W + 2∑
i=1
∑
j:θj≥sθi
[
I(Yi > Y (θi))− Pij
]
Bij(θi)
Pr{s}, (18)
where Pr{s} denotes the probability of state s. The maximization problem of an uninformed
investor household is to choose {Bij(θi)} for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2 subject to our measurability
condition (17) for both i = 1, 2. The problem of an investor who is informed in country 1
is to choose {Bij(θi)} subject to our measurability condition (17) for both i = 1, 2. Note
that the payoff is (18) minus the cost of information, K. The problem of an investor who
is informed in both countries is to choose {Bij(θi)} to maximize (18) where we need to
subtract 2K to get the final payoff.
Figure 21 shows a situation in which both countries are symmetric with respect to the
fundamentals and plots the incentives to acquire information vs. the cost in three different
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equilibrium configurations with respect to information acquisition. Two of the configura-
tions are symmetric - both countries in the uniformed equilibrium and both countries in
the informed equilibrium. In these two cases we focus on symmetric equilibria. This means
that the price in each country will be the same in the uniformed equilibria. It also means
that prices PH and PL are the same in both countries in the informed equilibrium.
The third case we consider in figure 21 is an equilibrium in which the home country is
informed and the other country is uniformed. In this case, the incentives χI to acquire
information in a country are computed imposing the no information equilibrium in the
other country (the solid black curve). In this case there is a single price in the other
country and the the information incentives depend on the marginal prices in the country
where information is a possibility.
Figure 21
Complementarity on Information Incentives
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The green functions in the figure show the incentives to acquire information under a sym-
metric informed equilibrium in which both countries have the same fraction of informed
investors. While χI1 shows the incentives to acquire information in one country (solid green
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function), χI2 shows the incentives to acquire information in a second country (this is, the
additional gains from acquiring information on a second country, the dashed green func-
tion). As we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, when n < 0.5 there is a mass 2n of investors
who are informed in one of the countries, and 1− 2n uninformed investors. When n > 0.5,
then all investors are informed, with mass 2(n− 0.5) informed in both countries and mass
2(1− n) informed in only one of the countries.
The Figure shows a situation in which, conditional on no one being informed in the other
country, only the uninformed equilibrium is sustainable (this is, χU < K and χI < K for all
n). In contrast, conditional on a symmetric information equilibrium, there are two equilibria
that are sustainable, an uninformed equilibrium where no investor is informed about any
country (as χU < K) and an informed equilibrium where all investors are informed about
at least one country (as χI1 > K and χ
I
2 = K for N
∗ > 0.5). This shows the strength of
complementarity across countries in the incentives to acquire information.
This result has important implications for the contagion of information regimes, with their
implications on expected prices, volatility of prices and debt burden. As long as a country
remains in the uninformed equilibrium it is less likely that investors decide to acquire
information about other countries. As soon as a country changes to an informed equilibrium,
then there are more incentives to acquire information in other countries.
The intuition for this result can be explained as follows: If one country is in an uninformed
equilibrium while the other is in the informed equilibrium, investors that are uninformed in
both countries do not have that much of an incentive to become informed as they can always
participate more in the country with a single price. In contrast, when both countries have
informed investors, investors that are uninformed in both countries cannot avoid paying
excessive prices in some states of the world, and this increases their incentives to acquire
information.
This intuition can be corroborated in Figure 22, which shows the bidding in country 1 of
an investor who is uninformed about country 1. The bids are plotted as function of z1 = z2
103
shows how these bids react to a symmetric increase in both z’s. BU1 shows the bidding in
country 1 when both countries are in the uniformed equilibrium. In contrast, BI1,H and B
I
1,L
shows the bidding in country 1 when both counties are in the informed equilibrium and the
investor is informed in country 2 (but not about country 1). In the informed equilibrium
case there are two marginal prices in each country and the graph shows his bids for each of
these prices. H and L respectively. This shows the segmentation that information generates.
Informed investors tend to invest more in the country in which they are informed, and at
some point exclusively in such a country.
Figure 22
Segmentation
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3.4 An illustration Based on the European Debt
Crisis
Sovereign bond spread in Europe have displayed an interesting pattern since the Euro was
introduced in 1999. After a long period in which government bond yields were relatively
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stable and quite similar across countries, they showed the first signs of divergence on Septem-
ber 2008 (right after the banking crisis in Ireland that followed the collapse of Lehman).
This divergence then become magnified during 2010 and 2011 (during the so-called “Greek
sovereign crisis”). As can be seen in Figure 23, after 2009 government bond yields increase
significantly in comparison to the mean during the five years preceding the crisis for some
countries (notably Greece, Ireland and Portugal), while for some other countries declined
(notably Germany, France and Netherlands). The “fanning out” of spreads across european
countries stopped right after Mario Draghi’s influential statement during a panel discussion
in July 2012, where he claimed that the ECB ”...is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve
the Euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” Since then, the spreads of most countries
started a process of convergence.
Figure 23
European 10 years bond yields (in %)
Source: Eurostat, EMU Convergence Criterion Database. Notes: As in Wright (2014), data are derived
from secondary market information on prices of government bonds issued in local currency with a residual
maturity of around 10 years.
One explanation of this pattern is that government yields closely reflect fundamentals and
that these fundamentals diverged considerably following the 2008 global crisis, substantially
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Table 1
Regression Results
Coeff. s.d.
β1 -0.204*** (0.023)
β2 -0.174*** (0.050)
β3 -0.023*** (0.008)
β4 0.027*** (0.005)
R2 0.64
N 1493
FE Yes
deteriorating in countries like Greece and Ireland and improving in countries like Germany
and France. Another explanation is that, even though fundamentals did not change dra-
matically, the sensitivity of yields to fundamentals increased during the crisis.
To capture these explanations we run the following simple OLS regression
Y ieldsit = (β1 + β2Ic)∆GDPit + (β3 + β4Ic)
(
Debt
GDP
)
it
+ ηi + ηt + it
with yearly data from Eurostat for 28 european countries since 2000.4 Y ieldsit correspond
to 10 year government bond yields for country i in year t. The observed fundamentals we
include are the yearly change of real GDP per capita, ∆GDPit and the outstanding level
of public debt over GDP,
(
Debt
GDP
)
it
. We allow for country and year fixed effects and also for
the possibility that the sensitivity of yields to fundamentals changes during crises, captured
by the indicator Ic, which is equal to 1 for the crisis years, 2009-2013.
This regression controls for the first explanation, as GDP growth and debt over GDP seem
to be significant variables explaining the evolution of yields, and shows that the second
explanation is partly correct, as the sensitivity of yields to GDP growth and debt over GDP
increases significantly during the crisis. Still these explanations are not enough to explain
the evolution of sovereign yields during the recent european debt crisis, as shown in the
4Countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
106
evolution of the regression errors, it for 2009-2013. Figure 24 shows that the regression
errors increased significantly between 2009 and 2013, which is the time frame in which yields
diverged significantly.5
Consistent with these results, Bocola and Dovis (2015) find that standard empirical models
that tend to capture the evolution of yields in normal times, are not able to accommodate
their dynamics during the recent european sovereign crisis. This implies the divergence
cannot be explained by the observed behavior of the usual fundamentals, such as GDP
growth or the level of indebtedness of the country. More specifically, the standard deviation
of the regression errors increased by a factor of three during the crisis when compared to
normal times.
Figure 24
Regression ErrorsInformational Regimes?
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Our paper provides an alternative interpretation of this residual, which cannot be accom-
modated by the more standard explanations. The divergence of the errors and the higher
5For more involved empirical analyses, but similar results, see Borgy, Laubach, Mesonnier, and Renne
(2012), von Hagen, Schuknecht, and Wolswijk (2011) and Baldacci and Kumar (2010).
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sensitivity to publicly observable fundamentals during crises may be the reflection of a dif-
ferent information regimen. This explanation can account not only account for variables
that are publicly observable but also for variables that are not public and costly to obtain
by investors. In the recent european debt crisis these variables may include the political
cost of default, the health of the domestic financial institutions, the exposure of domestic
banks to certain assets, etc.
Indeed both the larger sensitivity to observed fundamentals and the larger errors from a
regression based on those fundamentals can be explained by our model when one country
suffers a shock that pushes it into an informed equilibrium. To see this, imagine a situation
with seven countries with different z levels, which can be interpreted as the inverse of the
GDP growth (the larger the GDP growth, the lower the expected probability of default for
the country). Imagine also that during normal times these countries are all in an uninformed
equilibrium. In Figure 25 this is captured by the seven green dots having a sovereign price
according to pU . As can be seen, prices are not very sensitive to fundamentals and can
be perfectly explained by the observed fundamental z (in this extreme there would be no
errors if running a regression as the one above).
Figure 25
Simulation During Normal Times
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Imagine now that the country with the largest z (or the smaller GDP growth) has a negative,
relatively small, shock that reduces its GDP growth even more. For such a country the
uninformed equilibrium would become unsustainable, then attracting information about its
economy. As now there is information in some other country there are more incentives to
acquire information about the countries that have not being hit by the GDP growth shock,
and some of them would also move to an informed equilibrium. After this reinforcing effect
on information acquisition across countries, the Figure 25 may change to Figure 26.
Figure 26
Simulation During Crises
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In Figure 26, the five countries with the lowest GDP growth (highest z) have moved to an
information equilibrium. Sovereign bond prices reflect now information not only about z
but also about θ, which is not publicly observable and is not included in the regression.
This effect has two implications. First, for some countries information about θ is “positive”
(θH or high cost of default) and their price will be pH , which is above what p
U would
imply. For some countries information about θ is “negative” (θL or low cost of default) and
their price will be pL, which is below what p
U would imply. This immediately implies that
during a crisis any regression model that uses standard publicly observable data to explain
yields will have more errors that in normal times, as there are variables not observed by
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the econometrician that enter into the pricing of debt. Second, since in the informed
equilibrium the average price is lower than in the uninformed equilibrium, having more
countries in the informed equilibrium makes the sensitivity of prices to fundamentals z
larger (higher slope in the regression, which is now an average between the blue pU that
uninformed countries follow and the purple E(p) that country sin the informed equilibrium
follow in expectation).
3.5 Conclusions
We constructed a simple model of portfolio choice with information acquisition, where the
portfolio is composed by sovereign debt of different countries and information about some
determinants of default are not easily observable and costly to acquire.
For a single country we have shown that the participation of informed investors (informed
equilibrium) is more likely when the country is highly indebted and when there is more
certainty about its fundamentals. An equilibrium in which a country raises funds from
informed investors is inferior, as investors obtain less utility and the country faces higher
and more volatile prices, then higher debt burden.
Given that an informed and a uninformed equilibrium may coexist, small changes in fun-
damentals can generate large changes in the sovereign debt experience. If the selection of
equilibrium is hysteresis (the country remains in a given equilibrium as long as it is sustain-
able) then the sovereign price of two countries with the same fundamentals but different
past can have very different experiences.
Once we allow for many countries, there are two important sources of contagion. On the one
hand, contagion of sovereign debt prices does not require fundamental linkages or common
factors, just a common pool of investors that react to changes in fundamentals of each
country and rebalance the portfolio. On the other hand, the information regime is also
contagious, as one country moving to an informed equilibrium increases the incentives to
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acquire information about other countries, even in the absence of economies of scale to
acquire information.
Our results show why it is not straightforward to interpret changes in sovereign debt prices
as informative about the country’s fundamentals, as they depend not only on publicly
observable fundamentals but sometimes also on fundamentals that are not easily observable,
as they depends not only on the country’s own fundamentals but also on other countries’
fundamentals, as they depend not only on the country’s informational regime (and thus,
potentially on past fundamentals) but also on other countries’ informational regime.
We have highlighted the main forces behind information acquisition and then behind the
mapping between observable and non-observable fundamentals to sovereign debt spreads.
There are many reasons why we may expect these forces to be also quantitatively relevant.
Just to mention a few magnifying forces. First, the probability of default is endogenous
and depends on sovereign prices. There is a feedback effect across countries: an exogenous
increase in default probability in one country induces a reduction of prices in several other
countries, increasing the probabilities of default in all those countries, further reduction
of prices, and so on. Second, fundamental linkages across countries naturally magnify
contagion. Third, if there is time varying prudence, for example because of time varying risk-
aversion or time varying wealth. Fourth, market segmentation can concentrate contagion in
certain regions, buffering others. Finally, how a shock in a country changes the informational
equilibrium in other countries depend on the structure of the costs to acquire information: if
a country attracts informed investors and then makes easier for them to acquire information
about other similar countries, then it is more likely that those other countries also attract
informed investors.
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Chapter 3 : Does Universal
Banking Affect the Risk and
Productivity of Firms?*
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we exploit the stepwise repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the U.S. to empiri-
cally evaluate the effects of bank-scope deregulation on the performance of bank-dependent
firms. In doing so, we take a step towards measuring the value added of large universal
banks as suppliers of financing to the real economy.
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 imposed a strict separation between commercial banking,
such as borrowing and lending, and investment banking, such as securities underwriting.
Its repeal allowed for the formation of universal banks able to offer both loans and non-loan
products. We argue that this deepening of bank-firm relationships led to reduced informa-
tional asymmetries and broader financial contracting opportunities, generating economies
of scope in financial intermediation and relaxing constraints in the provision of external
finance.
We map this channel to the data by asking whether the deregulation of universal banks led
to an increase in the supply of credit for firms making risky investments. Our argument is
*This chapter is co-authored with Farzad Saidi
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that constraints on external finance stemming from asymmetric information are typically
particularly tight for volatile projects (see, e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Greenwood,
Sanchez, and Wang (2010)). As a result, volatile ventures are the marginal projects that
stand to benefit the most from reduced informational asymmetries under universal banking.
We answer this question in the affirmative: the deregulation of universal banking led to
increases in firm-level sales-growth volatility of at least 14%. We find effects of similar
magnitude for firms’ stock-return and idiosyncratic volatilities. We also show that these
risk increases were accompanied by higher total factor productivity, capital expenditure,
and market capitalization of universal-bank-financed firms.
To identify the effect of bank scope on firm-level outcomes, we focus on a deregulatory event
in 1996 that removed some of the firewalls in extant universal banks. Prior to 1996, these
firewalls limited universal banks’ ability to offer loans and concurrent non-loan products in
a coordinated manner. Their removal allowed universal banks to share more resources and
information across their commercial-bank and securities divisions, and to potentially use
this information to enter richer intermediation relationships. Our empirical strategy, thus,
is to use the 1996 deregulation as a shock to universal banks’ propensity to engage in deeper
relationships with their borrowers. We then compare changes in the volatility of universal-
bank-financed firms before and after 1996 to the volatility of firms that received loans from
banks whose scope of banking was unaffected by the deregulation. In this manner, we
provide evidence that the increased scope of universal banking boosted lending to riskier
firms.
Figures 28 and 29 illustrate our findings. We plot the loan-weighted average six-year sales-
growth volatility of public firms in the U.S. that received loans from commercial and uni-
versal banks. In Figure 28, we focus on loans granted by universal banks. Among universal-
bank loans, we differentiate between cross-sold and non-cross-sold ones, where we label loans
as cross-sold when the respective debtor firms also received an underwriting product from
the same universal bank. Until 1996, cross-sold and non-cross-sold universal-bank loans
are associated with similar levels of firm risk, but after 1996 the firm-level risk associated
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with cross-sold universal-bank loans exceeds that of non-cross-sold loans. In Figure 29, we
contrast cross-sold universal-bank loans and commercial-bank loans. The two series exhibit
similar levels of firm risk prior to 1996, but cross-sold universal-bank loans are associated
with substantially higher firm-level volatility after 1996. This suggests that informational
economies of scope from cross-selling are a key driver of firm-level volatility.
Our empirical results hold up to the inclusion of firm fixed effects, so that we identify the
treatment effect off firms with multiple bank relationships. This implies that the treatment
effect does not operate solely at the extensive margin, but also at the intensive margin.
That is, the deregulation of universal banks relaxed financial constraints for risky firms
that otherwise would not have received any financing, and also allowed firms to realize
riskier projects than the ones for which they were already able to secure financing from
universal banks before the deregulation.
As our identification strategy is based on time variation at the bank level, we need to ensure
that our treatment effect is not contaminated by other shocks to credit supply around the
1996 deregulation. A key concern in this period is the state-level deregulation of bank
branching. We control for this by including state-year fixed effects, after which our results
remain robust.
We then turn to the question as to whether the 1996 deregulation of universal banks led to
the financing of excessively risky firms that may be more likely to default, or whether the
risk-increasing developments were accompanied by higher productivity of universal-bank-
financed firms. First, we provide evidence that the increases in firm-level risk were not
associated with higher default risk. Second, we show that the deregulation of universal
banks led to long-lasting within-firm increases in total factor productivity of approximately
3%. Further results indicate that these productivity increases stem from increases in cap-
ital expenditure, which are furthermore associated with positive market valuations. Our
findings attest to a potentially efficiency-increasing effect of deregulating bank scope: when
universal banks receive the enhanced ability to cross-sell loans and non-loan products, this
leads to an increase in the supply of credit for firms making risky, productivity-increasing
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investments.
Next, we provide evidence that the firm-level real effects of universal banking are due to
informational economies of scope across divisions, rather than higher bank revenues from
cross-selling. To do so, we exploit bank mergers among commercial and investment banks
as a source of variation in the resulting universal banks’ information about borrower firms.
Specifically, we consider firms who received both a loan from a commercial bank and an
underwriting product from an investment bank, and contrast two groups: those whose
lender and underwriter merged with each other, and those whose lender and underwriter
both merged with another bank to form a universal bank, but not with each other.
While both groups’ banks are now universal banks and, thus, have access to the same
contracting opportunities going forward, only the former group’s banks are able to access
both extant loan and non-loan private information about the same firms. As a result,
our approach varies universal banks’ information about borrower firms, but holds constant
potential revenues from the intermediation relationship. We find that firms dealing with
better informed lenders, once again, exhibit increases in total factor productivity of up to
3%, which lends support to the idea that our treatment effects are due to informational
economies of scope.
Last, we complement our analysis based on loans issued by mature, public firms with
evidence on firms early in their life cycle. Namely, we examine whether universal banks
extended their risk-taking behavior to their role as underwriters by serving as bookrunners
for IPOs of younger and, thus, potentially riskier firms. To this end, we compare the age
of firms in IPOs run by universal banks compared to investment banks, whose scope of
banking activities was unaffected by the deregulation, before and after 1996. We find that
as a response to the deregulation, universal banks took firms public that were at least 6
years younger than those serviced by investment banks. Our evidence on IPO age supports
the idea that the deregulation of universal banks facilitated the entry of younger and riskier
firms into the U.S. stock market.
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In summary, our paper documents the real effects of bank-scope deregulation. We establish
that by allowing universal banks to proactively cross-sell loans and non-loan products,
they reap informational economies of scope that enable them to finance riskier projects
with higher productivity. Thus, increasing bank scope from pure commercial banking (i.e.,
lending) to combined lending and corporate-securities underwriting has not just changed
the landscape of U.S. banks, but also left its mark on publicly listed firms that obtained
external financing through universal banks.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to two main strands of literature. The first is on the impact of banking
deregulation on firm-level real outcomes, most notably in the context of bank branching
deregulation. The second is on the effects of expanding bank scope and relationship bank-
ing.
Regarding bank branching deregulation, Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) and Correa
and Suarez (2009), respectively, find stabilizing effects on state-level growth and firm-level
volatility among large, publicly listed firms in the U.S. Most closely related to our paper
is Krishnan, Nandy, and Puri (2015), who show that interstate branching increased the
supply of credit for financially constrained firms, allowing them to use these funds to invest
in productive projects. By focusing on bank scope rather than branching deregulation,
we provide evidence of increasing volatility and productivity. We also employ a different
identification strategy than is typical in the branching literature. Rather than exploiting
the staggered timing of branching deregulation across states, and then distinguishing be-
tween bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent firms in treated states,2 we use data on
firms’ lending relationships with universal banks to directly identify the impact of financial
deregulation on firm-level outcomes.3 Butler and Cornaggia (2011) share our focus on the
2See Amore, Schneider, and Zaldokas (2013); and Benfratello, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli (2008) using
Italian data.
3While this idea is similar in spirit to that pursued by Herrera and Minetti (2007) using data from Italy,
the authors do not make use of any regulatory quasi-experiment to identify the impact of informed lending
on firm outcomes.
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effects of finance on productivity, but exploit variations in demand interacted with access
to external finance rather than variations in bank structure.
Drucker and Puri (2007) survey the literature on expanding bank scope and its effects on
relationship banking. One part of this literature looks at the bank-level effects of the repeal
of the Glass-Steagall Act as in Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) and Cornett, Ors,
and Tehranian (2002). Ang and Richardson (1994), Kroszner and Rajan (1994), and Puri
(1994) argue that there is little evidence of a conflict of interest in universal banking in the
pre-Glass-Steagall era by by examining the long-run performance of bank-underwritten se-
curities.4 In line with a certification role for universal banks, Puri (1996) finds that investors
were willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by universal rather than invest-
ment banks, while Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997) show that price differentials
between universal-bank and investment-bank underwritings are higher when information
costs are large. In line with these papers, we also highlight economies of scope from con-
current lending and underwriting, but track their impact on firm-level real outcomes.5 We
also present direct evidence suggestive of informational economies of scope.6
The importance of cross-selling has been pointed out in Yasuda (2005), Bharath, Dahiya,
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007), and Santikian (2014), among others. With the notable
exception of Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) and Puri and Rocholl (2008), most
studies document pricing effects of cross-selling. Drucker and Puri (2005) and Calomiris
and Pornrojnangkool (2009) present evidence that universal banks are more likely to offer
discounted yield spreads on concurrent loans, which is also confirmed by Calomiris and
Pornrojnangkool (2009). We advance this research by providing evidence of universal banks’
ability to bring economies of scope to bear on firm-level real outcomes. Another example is
Schenone (2004), who finds significantly less IPO underpricing for firms that have pre-IPO
4More recently, Duarte-Silva (2010) shows that an issue’s certification is enhanced by private information
acquired through pre-existing lending relationships.
5Note that our paper does not focus on universal banks’ holding equity stakes in companies and their
representation on the latter’s boards (see Ferreira and Matos (2012)), as is the case under the classical model
of universal banking in Germany.
6Kanatas and Qi (1998) and Kanatas and Qi (2003) theoretically study the impact of informational
economies of scope on underwriting, but not on firm-level real outcomes.
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lending relationships with prospective underwriters (i.e., universal banks). Unlike Schenone
(2004), we use firm-level risk and productivity of universal-bank-financed firms to infer
informational economies of scope in universal banking.
3.2 Empirical Strategy and Data
We start our analysis by first describing the institutional background of the stepwise repeal
of the Glass-Steagall Act. We then develop our key hypothesis, and present our identification
strategy. Finally, we describe the empirical implementation and the data.
3.2.1 Institutional Background
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 separated commercial and investment banking, and until its
stepwise repeal starting in 1987, shaped the financial architecture of the U.S. Under Section
20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks were prohibited from engaging in any kind of
underwriting or securities business. These activities were subsequently entirely in the hands
of investment banks and other investment houses. The repeal allowed for the formation of
universal banks combining both commercial and investment banking services.
Starting April 30, 1987, commercial banks were allowed to open so-called Section 20 sub-
sidiaries and generate up to 5% of gross revenues from underwriting and dealing in cer-
tain securities, namely municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-related securities, consumer-
receivable-related securities, and commercial paper. Two years later – on January 18, 1989
– banks were allowed to engage in veritable investment-banking activities, most notably
corporate debt and equity underwriting, and on September 13, 1989, the revenue limit
was raised to 10%. This gave rise to another possibility for commercial banks to become
universal banks, other than through Section 20 subsidiaries, namely by purchasing or merg-
ing with investment banks. These measures constitute the first stage of the repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act, followed by seven years of regulatory inactivity.
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While at that point universal banks were able to engage in both lending and corporate-
securities underwriting, there were still firewalls in place that separated the two activities.
An important consequence of this was that universal banks could not actively cross-sell
loans and non-loan products to their clients. Indeed, such cross-selling was prohibited,
or at least severely restricted, under the Federal Reserve Act (Sections 23A and B). This
affected banks’ lending decisions insofar as loans are granted upon approval by a credit
committee, often on the basis of high expected depth of cross-selling.7
In a major expansion of cross-selling opportunities, the Federal Reserve Board proposed
the elimination of some of the informational and financial firewalls on August 1, 1996, and
simultaneously raised the revenue limit on underwriting securities from 10 to 25%.8 This
also enabled more commercial banks to expand into universal banking by directly merging
with an investment bank.
In particular, the removal of informational firewalls interacts with cross-selling in a mean-
ingful way, as it allows for the possibility of sharing non-public customer information across
commercial-bank and securities divisions. Thus, the 1996 deregulation deepened bank-firm
relationships and enhanced banks’ monitoring capabilities, generating economies of scope
across financial products.
3.2.2 Hypothesis Development
Our basic hypothesis is that the advent of universal banking led to increases in firm-level
risk. Specifically, we argue that the 1996 deregulatory shock boosted cross-selling by uni-
versal banks, while cross-selling in turn represents a positive shock to the quality of banks’
information about borrower firms (Kanatas and Qi (1998) and Kanatas and Qi (2003)).
7This phenomenon has also been discussed in the academic literature: Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and
Srinivasan (2007) provide ample evidence of cross-selling of loans and non-loan products (fee-generating
services), such as debt and equity underwriting. Furthermore, Drucker and Puri (2005) and Yasuda (2005)
examine the relationship between past lending relationships and seasoned equity offerings and debt under-
writing, respectively. Santikian (2014) shows the importance of cross-selling in small business lending.
8This specific regulatory event period culminated in the Federal Reserve Board’s announcement of re-
placing further firewalls on August 22, 1997.
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A robust conclusion from theoretical corporate finance is that lender informedness is par-
ticularly effective at reducing barriers to external finance for risky firms. For example,
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010) show that in a canonical costly-state-verification
framework, cash-flow volatility reduces the firm’s pledgeable income and borrowing capac-
ity, but that these frictions can be overcome more easily by an informed lender. Infor-
mation frictions thus disproportionately reduce risky firms’ access to external finance, and
informational economies of scope in universal banking improve the funding ability of risky
enterprises.
For a given set of investment opportunities, relaxed information frictions allow firms to
invest in relatively risky but productive ventures for which they could not previously ob-
tain external financing. Accordingly, our key empirical hypothesis is that universal-bank-
financed firms exhibit higher risk after an increase in the scope of the respective universal
banks’ activities, and that these increases in risk are accompanied by increased firm-level
productivity and profitability. We will show that this holds across various risk measures,
not just limited to corporate lending, but also in terms of risk associated with younger
firms taken public by universal banks. We furthermore show that universal-bank-financed
firms exhibit higher total factor productivity, capital expenditure, and market capitaliza-
tion.
3.2.3 Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy exploits the 1996 deregulation as a shock to universal banks’
propensity to cross-sell loans and non-loan products to their clients, allowing them to
derive informational economies of scope. In order to empirically evaluate the impact of
such increases in bank scope on real outcomes of borrower firms, we employ a difference-
in-differences framework. Our treatment group consists of borrower firms that received
universal-bank loans. The control group consists of firms that received loans from other
types of banks, typically commercial banks, whose scope of banking was unaffected by the
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1996 deregulation.
To test the impact of the 1996 deregulation on the characteristics of universal-bank-financed
firms, we estimate the following difference-in-differences specification at the level of years
in which a firm i received at least one loan from one or multiple banks j:
yijt = β1Universal-bank loanjt ×After(1996)t + β2Universal-bank loanjt
+β3Xijt + δt + ηj + ijt, (19)
where yijt is a firm-level outcome in year t, e.g., change in firm-level volatility, Universal-
bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether at the time of any loan transaction in year
t any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal bank, After(1996)t is an indicator for
whether the firm’s loan year in question was in 1997 or later, Xijt denotes other control
variables measured in year t, and δt and ηj denote year and bank fixed effects, respectively,
where bank fixed effects are included for all lead arrangers of all loans in a given year.
This bank-level specification effectively estimates the average risk associated with loans
granted by universal banks compared to pure commercial or investment banks before and
after 1996. In particular, we do not rely on the establishment dates of universal banks
– i.e., the conversion of commercial into universal banks – as our main variation in bank
scope, as commercial banks endogenously chose to become universal banks.9 Conversely, it
is unlikely that banks and firms were anticipating the deregulatory policy before 1996. This
is affirmed by the fact that the banking industry had already proposed the elimination of
firewalls in 1991, which was rejected by the United States House Committee on Financial
Services.
In the presence of bank fixed effects ηj , the difference-in-differences estimate β1 is identified
off the lending behavior of commercial banks that became universal banks prior to the
deregulation and, thus, experienced a shift in the scope of their activities in 1996. That is,
9As noted by Bhargava and Fraser (1998) among others, the initiation of universal-banking deregulation
from 1987 to 1989 was based on the Federal Reserve’s responses to specific requests from large banks (Bankers
Trust, Citicorp, and J.P. Morgan).
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to estimate β1 and β2, a given bank j needs to be observed as a lender in at least three
instances: when it is still a commercial bank, after it has opted to become a universal bank
but before the 1996 deregulation, and as a universal bank after the 1996 deregulation.
A potential concern is that post-1996 risk taking by universal banks may be due to the
sorting of new firms with different risk profiles seeking financing from universal banks after
the deregulation was implemented. This would render it problematic to compare universal-
bank loans before and after 1996. To address this issue, we also include firm fixed effects
in our regressions. We thus identify the treatment effect off firms that received multiple
loans over time. More specifically, after the inclusion of firm fixed effects, the difference-
in-differences estimate β1 is identified off multiple loans to firm i granted by at least two
different banks. Each bank j, in turn, needs to be observed to contract with firm i at least
twice, as a commercial and as a universal bank.
Note that as the difference-in-differences estimate is at the bank-year level jt, we cannot
include bank-year fixed effects. In order to interpret β1 as a shift in bank-level supply for
risky firms, we need to ensure that β1 is not contaminated by other shocks to credit supply
around the 1996 deregulation. The key concern in this period is the relaxation of bank
branching restrictions (see, among others, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)), which constituted
a positive credit-supply shock at the state level while allowing commercial banks to expand
the range of their products through mergers with already existing universal banks within
and across states. To control for this possibility, we also include state-year fixed effects, as
defined by the state of the borrower firm’s headquarter.
We then take one more step to provide supporting evidence of our conjecture that observed
increases in risk and productivity are due to informational economies of scope. To do so,
we must take into account that cross-selling does not only vary lenders’ information about
borrower firms, but also enables universal banks to derive greater profits from their rela-
tionships with firms. The two channels may even be intertwined, in that informational
economies of scope support the cross-marketing efforts of universal banks, leading to in-
creased revenues, and the very process of cross-selling generates further information about
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the client through closer intermediation relationships.
To identify the effect of information on firm-level outcomes, we exploit that in addition
to removing firewalls, the 1996 deregulation also lifted the revenue limit on underwrit-
ing securities from 10 to 25%. This spurred a wave of bank-scope-expanding mergers be-
tween commercial, or already existing universal, banks and investment banks. We use such
bank mergers as a shock to bank-level information acquisition about borrower firms, be-
cause merged universal banks can make use of the information embodied in both its extant
commercial-bank and investment-bank division.
We operationalize this strategy by comparing firms that in the past received both a loan
from a commercial (or already existing universal) bank as well as an underwriting product
from an investment bank. In the treatment group, the two institutions merge with each
other, thereby pooling their information about borrower firms. In the control group, both
banks merged with financial institutions of complementary scope – i.e., the commercial/uni-
versal bank merges with an investment bank and vice versa – but not with each other. In
this manner, we hold constant the potential for future revenues through cross-selling to
treatment and control firms, as both treated and control firms remain in relationships with
universal banks after the mergers. Yet, firms in the treatment group interact with a better
informed universal bank, while those in the control group do not.
We show that all results based on our difference-in-differences estimations hold for this
alternative universal-bank-mergers identification strategy. This serves as evidence that uni-
versal banks’ ability to finance riskier firms is indeed due to informational economies of
scope rather than differences in revenues from bank-firm relationships.
3.2.4 Empirical Implementation
To test our claim that universal banks financed riskier firms, we use transaction-level data
on syndicated loans issued by publicly listed firms in the DealScan database. We focus
on lead arrangers when characterizing the types of banks that granted the loan. For our
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analysis, we collapse our loans sample to the firm-loan-year level, i.e., we summarize all
loans of a firm in a given year.
In order to determine whether a bank was a universal bank at the time of a given loan
transaction, we compare the completion date of a bank-scope-expanding (from commercial
to investment banking) acquisition or the opening date of the respective bank’s first Section
20 subsidiary to the transaction date.
As an example, consider the historical anatomy of J.P. Morgan. Before acquiring Bank One
on July 1, 2004, J.P. Morgan had already become a universal bank by opening a Section
20 subsidiary on April 30, 1987, followed by a merger with Chase Manhattan, which had
a Section 20 subsidiary since December 30, 1988 (and later merged with Chemical Bank).
Similarly, Bank One, J.P. Morgan’s acquisition target in 2004, maintained a Section 20
subsidiary which it had opened on February 2, 1989. Thus, despite a series of mergers, J.P.
Morgan became a universal bank through opening a Section 20 subsidiary in 1987, and any
loan granted by J.P. Morgan after April 30, 1987 is labeled as a loan granted by a universal
bank.10 In Table 2, we provide an overview of all universal banks in our loan data.
In our baseline regression, we run the difference-in-differences specification (19) on the
sample of firm-loan years to estimate the treatment effect of the 1996 deregulation on the
riskiness of borrowers contracting with universal banks. As dependent variable, we use
the difference between a logged six-year volatility measure from t to t + 5 and that from
t − 6 to t − 1, where t is the firm-loan year in question. That is, the outcome variable
measures the percent change in risk around year t in which a firm received at least one loan.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level, using a vector of all banks j that acted as
lead arrangers to firm i in a given year t
10Note that we also have U.S. banks of international origin in our sample. These banks are special cases
in that before the International Banking Act of 1978, they were not subject to the Glass-Steagall Act. As a
consequence, international banks that were active in the U.S. before 1978 and established as universal banks
outside the U.S. were allowed to continue their business model in the U.S. (as long as they would not expand
their activities further). None of the banks in our sample were subject to the International Banking Act.
For instance, Deutsche Bank became a universal bank only after acquiring Morgan Grenfall, a London-based
investment bank, in 1990. Similarly, Cre´dit Suisse acquired a controlling stake in the American investment
bank First Boston Corporation in December 1988.
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As the sample is limited to years in which firm i received at least one loan, the omitted
category consists of firm-loan years with only commercial or investment banks as lead
arrangers, none of which experienced a change in their scope of banking activities following
the 1996 deregulation.
When we move to analyzing firm-level outcomes such as firms’ total factor productivity
(TFP) that do not require multiple years of data for their calculation, we also include all firm
years (from Compustat) without any loan transactions. As changes in productivity might
not materialize immediately after a loan issue, we define firm-loan years based on whether a
firm received a loan anytime in the past five years.11 This implies that our estimated effects
of universal-bank vs. non-universal-bank-loans on, among other outcomes, TFP last, or
show only in, up to five years. Given that we also include firm-year observations for which
all loans-related variables are zero, firms with no loan in a given year become the omitted
category. Furthermore, this enables us to include firm fixed effects and estimate within-firm
effects of universal-bank loans by estimating the following regression specification:
yit = β1Universal-bank loanjt ×After(1996)t + β2Universal-bank loanjt
+β3Xijt + δt + µi + ηj + it, (20)
where yit is the natural log of firm i’s outcome variable in year t, Universal-bank loanjt is
an indicator variable for whether, given any loans received by firm i from year t − 4 to t,
at the time of any loan transaction any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal bank,
After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the year in question was in 1997 or later, Xijt
denotes other control variables measured in year t, and δt, µi, ηj denote year, firm, and
bank fixed effects, respectively, where bank fixed effects are included for all lead arrangers
of all loans granted to firm i from year t − 4 to t. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm-year level.
Finally, in order to disentangle the revenue channel from informational economies of scope
11Note that for all loans after 1996, this definition is censored at the year 1997. Our results are robust to
variations of the five-year horizon, and are available upon request.
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using bank mergers, we estimate the following specification similar in spirit to (20):
yit = β1Loan from CB, underwriting from IB, both merged jt
+β2Loan from CB that merged jt ×Underwriting from IB that merged jt
+β3Loan from CB that merged jt
+β4Underwriting from IB that merged jt
+β5Any loanit ×Any underwriting it
+β6Any loanit + β7Any underwriting it + β8Xijt + δt + µi + it, (21)
where yit is the natural log of firm i’s outcome variable in year t, Loan from CB, underwriting
from IB, both merged jt indicates whether anytime from t − 10 to t − 1, firm i received a
loan from a commercial or universal bank, an underwriting product from an investment
bank, and both banks merged with each other until year t, Loan from CB that merged jt
is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t − 10 to t − 1, firm i received a loan
from a commercial or universal bank that merged with an investment bank thereafter, and
Underwriting from IB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t−10
to t−1, firm i received an underwriting product from an investment bank that merged with
a commercial or universal bank thereafter. Any loanit and Any underwriting it are indicator
variables for whether firm i received any loan or any underwriting product, respectively,
from any commercial, universal, or investment bank anytime from t − 10 to t − 1, Xijt
denotes other control variables measured in year t, and δt and µi denote year and firm fixed
effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level.
The relevant time window comprises eleven years so as to realistically accommodate the
triplet of events (loan transaction, underwriting, and any mergers). Note that our ten-year
window for the two transactions (loan and underwriting) ends in t − 1, rather than t (the
last possible year that we consider for a potential merger). In this manner, we safeguard
that both loan and underwriting transactions took place before any potential merger of the
two banks, rather than their being a result of the merger. We show that our results are
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robust to a shorter window in the Online Appendix.
The treatment effect is captured by β1,
12 which estimates the effect on a firm that received
a loan from a commercial or universal bank and an underwriting product from a separate
investment bank after these two banks have merged. We interpret this as an intention-to-
treat effect under the premise that the respective firm is likely to continue contracting with
the newly formed universal bank that now has more information about its borrowers after
pooling information from previous loan and underwriting transactions.
This assumption is verified, for example, in the literature on lock-in in underwriting rela-
tionships (see, for example, James (1992) and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)).
We find similar evidence in our regression sample. Among firms in the treatment group,
50.9% (68.3%) returned to the merged universal bank for another loan (underwriting prod-
uct) within five years after the merger, and in the control group, 52.1% (59.8%) returned to
any one of the two universal banks involved in mergers for another loan (underwriting prod-
uct). These ex-post probabilities are high, and remarkably similar despite the comparison
between returning to one vs. two universal banks involved in mergers.
3.2.5 Data Description
The focus of our analysis will be on estimating the impact of universal banking on different
firm-level outcomes, most notably risk and productivity. To this end, we use as our main
data sources Compustat accounting data, CRSP stock prices, DealScan loan data,13 and
SDC debt- and equity-underwriting data. As is customary, we drop public-service, energy,
and financial-services firms from our analysis. On the transaction level, we focus on loans
granted to public firms in the U.S. in the DealScan database since 1987, as well as on U.S.
IPOs listed in the SDC database since 1976. For IPOs we consider the bookrunners, and
we focus on the lead arrangers of syndicated loans in the DealScan database.
12The treatment effect equals the difference between treatment and control group, for both of which it
holds that Loan from CB that merged jt ×Underwriting from IB that mergedjt = 1.
13We match DealScan with Compustat data using the link provided by Chava and Roberts (2008).
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In addition, we use string matching to generate unique bank identifiers for commercial,
universal, and investment banks across these datasets. To identify mergers between any
two banks in DealScan loan data and SDC underwriting data, we use the SDC M&A
database, in conjunction with hand-collected mergers obtained through a LexisNexis news
search.
Outcome Variables
Among the most important outcome variables considered in this paper are firm-level risk
measures. We focus primarily on the six-year volatility of sales-growth rates γit of firm i
in year t.14 For sales-growth volatility, we follow Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
(2007) in constructing annual growth rates that accommodate entry and exit:
γit =
xit − xi,t−1
1
2 (xit + xi,t−1)
, (22)
where xit denotes sales from Compustat.
Using these growth rates, we obtain the six-year standard deviation of firm i’s sales growth
over six years, σ(ŝalesi)
6y. As alternative measures of firm-level risk associated with loans,
we also consider six-year stock-return volatilities σ(returni)
6y, which are calculated us-
ing monthly CRSP stock-return data, and idiosyncratic volatilities σ6yidiosyncratic,i, estimated
from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. As a robustness check (in the On-
line Appendix), we use three-month implied volatilities calculated using the volatility sur-
face from option prices, which are obtained from Option Metrics and available starting in
1996.
Given that public firms in DealScan are typically mature, we use another outcome measure
to capture firm risk earlier in the firm’s life cycle: the firm’s age at the time of its IPO. To
calculate the latter, we use the founding dates of firms with IPOs recorded in SDC until
14We use six-year volatilities to limit the number of firms dropping out of our sample due to survival
reasons.
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2006, collected by Loughran and Ritter (2004).
Besides the above-mentioned risk measures, we also analyze effects on firm-level TFP, for
which we use data from Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014), who employ the semiparametric
estimation procedure by Olley and Pakes (1996) for the panel of Compustat firms.15 As
alternative outcome variables, we will also use capital expenditure (from Compustat) as
well as market capitalization (i.e., market value of equity) from CRSP.
Summary Statistics
In Table 24, we present summary statistics of firm-specific and transaction-level variables
for all major regression samples used in the paper. We start with our loans sample from
DealScan, on the basis of which we generate the firm-loan-years sample comprising only
years in which a given firm received at least one loan. Next, we construct the Compustat
sample by using Compustat to add observations on years in which firms did not receive any
loans. Finally, we use SDC IPO data to generate our IPO sample.
Our loans sample is based on DealScan data from 1987 to 2010. The respective regression
sample comprises 19,053 loans of public firms in general, 64% of which were granted by
universal banks. Another 11% were granted by investment banks, and the remainder by
commercial banks (i.e., banks that remained pure commercial banks throughout the sample
period, or universal banks during their former commercial-bank period). Only universal and
investment banks can offer both loans and non-loan products. Among such loans granted
by universal and investment banks, 12,061 were associated with concurrent underwriting
of corporate securities of the same borrower firm within a five-year circle around the loan
issue, of which 79% were cross-sold by universal or investment banks. Within this sample,
11,863 loans were associated with concurrent debt underwriting, and 4,008 with concurrent
equity underwriting.16 Loans were much more likely to be cross-sold with debt-underwriting
15We thank the authors for sharing their data with us.
16Note that these numbers add up to more than 12,061 because we separately account for debt and equity
underwriting.
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mandates: 85% of loans associated with concurrent debt underwriting were cross-sold by
the same universal or investment bank, while only 19% of loans associated with concurrent
equity underwriting were cross-sold.
We also give an overview of the number of banks in DealScan. In particular, 6 out of 8
universal banks that came into existence through mergers and acquisitions were established
prior to August 1, 1996, and 28 out of 37 commercial banks turned into universal banks
through opening Section 20 subsidiaries before the deregulation.
In the second panel, we move to the firm-loan-years sample, which summarizes all loans
that a given firm received in a year. For firm-loan year t, ∆tln(σ(ŝalesi)
6y) is the difference
between the logged six-year standard deviation of firm i’s sales growth from t to t+ 5 and
that from t − 6 to t − 1. ∆tln(σ(returni)6y) is the difference between the logged six-year
standard deviation of firm i’s stock returns from t to t + 5 and that from t − 6 to t − 1.
∆tln(σ
6y
idiosyncratic,i) is the difference between the logged six-year idiosyncratic volatility of
firm i’s stock returns from t to t+5 and that from t− 6 to t− 1, estimated from the Fama
and French (1993) three-factor model and expressed in annualized terms. In the case of
multiple loans per firm in consecutive years, t− 1 is replaced by the last year without any
loans for the respective firm prior to the sequence of years with loans, and t is replaced
by the last year in the sequence. Remarkably, the average effect of a loan on a borrower
firm’s riskiness is close to zero across all three variables, which correspond to the dependent
variables in Tables 4 to 6.
For the third panel, we merge our DealScan data with Compustat data starting in 1987,
including firms that never received loans recorded in DealScan. The variables in the first four
rows correspond to the dependent variables in Tables 8, 14, 15, and 21. The smaller sample
size for the TFP measure is due to data availability in our TFP-data source (Imrohoroglu
and Tuzel (2014)), which covers the period from 1987 to 2009. Similarly, option-implied
volatility σimpliedit is available from 1996 only. We also provide summary statistics for the
definition of treatment and control observations based on our alternative universal-bank-
mergers identification strategy.
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Our SDC IPO sample in the last panel is limited to IPOs with no more than one bookrun-
ner, leaving us with a regression sample of 3,835 initial public offerings. This sample is
conditional on the availability of IPO age (based on Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Unlike
in the loan data, investment banks dominate the IPO market: 460 investment banks were
responsible for 83% of the IPOs, whereas the remainder of the firms were taken public by
universal banks. 31% of the firms were taken public by investment banks that eventually
merged with, or were eventually acquired by, universal banks. In the SDC IPO data, 5
out of 5 universal banks established through M&A existed before August 1, 1996. Among
Section 20 subsidiaries, 12 out of 15 were opened before the deregulation.
3.3 Results
We now turn to the estimation results using the loan data, and investigate whether univer-
sal banks financed riskier firms. We exploit the 1996 deregulation as a shock to the scope of
universal banks’ activities, especially their mode of cross-selling loans and non-loan prod-
ucts. We then investigate whether these risk-increasing developments were accompanied
by within-firm increases in total factor productivity and investment. To isolate informa-
tional economies of scope as the driving force underlying our results, we use universal-bank
mergers as a source of variation in bank-level information acquisition. Finally, we also con-
sider risk taking by universal banks in the market for initial public offerings, and analyze
whether universal banks took public younger firms than investment banks following the
1996 deregulation.
3.3.1 Impact of Universal Banking on Firm Risk
In Table 4, we estimate (19), and use as dependent variable borrower firms’ percent change
in six-year sales-growth volatility, ∆tln(σ(ŝalesi)
6y). After including industry fixed effects
alongside transaction-specific and firm-level control variables in the second column, we find
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that sales-growth volatility increased by 13.8% for universal-bank-financed firms following
the 1996 deregulation. As we always include bank fixed effects, the difference-in-differences
estimate is identified off the lending behavior of commercial banks that converted to become
universal banks before the deregulation. As we saw in the first panel of Table 24, this applies
to three-quarters of all universal banks.
This already substantial impact on borrower firms’ sales-growth volatility increases to 17.9%
in the third column after including state-year fixed effects. We introduce these fixed effects
to control for the possibility that our difference-in-differences estimate, which varies at the
bank-year level, may capture any effects of bank branching deregulation. For instance, bank
branching could interact with universal banking by expanding the geographical access to
universal banking for firms.
In the fourth column, we add firm fixed effects, which further increases the difference-in-
differences estimate to 23.6%. This indicates that the increase in firm risk also operates at
the intensive margin. That is, the increase in firm risk is not driven exclusively by firms
that would not have received any loan in the absence of the 1996 deregulation. Instead,
firms that previously obtained financing from universal banks also engage in riskier ventures
after the 1996 deregulation.
The inclusion of firm fixed effects forces our identification to come from firms with multiple
loans granted by at least two different banks. Out of 3,362 firm-loan years, a majority of
1,972 are associated with firms that had at least two bank relationships. As we include bank
fixed effects, we furthermore require each bank-firm pair to be observed at least twice, i.e.,
before and after a commercial bank became a universal bank, or if the bank was already
a universal bank at the time of the first loan, before and after 1996. This is the case
for 1,731 observations. We achieve full identification within firms that contracted with
multiple banks, one of which granted loans to the same firm at all three stages (when it was
a commercial bank, a universal bank before 1996, and a universal bank after 1996). This is
the case for 434 observations.
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Thus far, the omitted category consists of all banks whose scope of banking activities was
unaffected by the 1996 deregulation, i.e., commercial and investment banks. The latter
are the least active category of banks in the syndicated-loans market, as seen in the first
panel of Table 24. As these two types of banks differ along other dimensions as well, it is
worthwhile to separately estimate the effect of the 1996 deregulation on their lending be-
havior. To this end, we re-run the same specification as in the fourth column, but explicitly
include a difference-in-differences term for investment banks, leaving commercial banks as
the omitted category.17 The estimated coefficient of 0.004 in the last column suggests that
investment banks did not finance differentially risky firms compared to commercial banks.
The estimate is, however, significantly lower than the difference-in-differences estimate for
universal banks.
As a final robustness check, we test whether there were any notable pre-trends in universal
banks’ lending behavior. In particular, we replace After(1996)t by a placebo year, 1993.
The difference-in-differences estimates in Table 11 are insignificant throughout.
Our key hypothesis was that the differential risk-taking effect is due to universal banks’
economies of scope from cross-selling after the 1996 deregulation. To provide further ev-
idence for this channel, we compare the incidence of cross-selling before and after the
deregulation for universal and investment banks, the two types of banks that theoretically
have the capacity to offer both loans and non-loan products. In Table 12, we limit the
sample of loans to those that were associated with concurrent underwriting of corporate
securities by the same borrower firm within a five-year circle (from year t−2 to t+2, where
t corresponds to the year of the loan issue in question), and use as dependent variable an
indicator for whether the loan and the underwriting mandate were accompanied by the
same bank.
In the first three columns of Table 12, we employ the same fixed-effects structure as in the
second to fourth columns of Tables 4 to 6, and find that following the 1996 deregulation,
17Note that this may lead to a change in the estimated coefficient on Universal-bank loanjt× After(1996)t,
as some firms may have received loans from both universal and investment banks in a given year.
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universal banks were six percentage points more likely to cross-sell than investment banks.18
Focusing only on universal banks and their mode of establishment in the last three columns,
it appears that universal banks that were established through Section 20 subsidiaries, rather
than through M&A, were seven percentage points more likely to cross-sell after 1996, which
could be due to their early specialization in corporate-securities underwriting, rather than
any other investment-banking operations.
All results from Table 4 carry over to using firms’ stock-return volatility, ∆tln(σ(returni)
6y),
and the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility, ∆tln(σ
6y
idiosyncratic,i). The results are in Tables
5 and 6, respectively. The risk-increasing effect for stock-return volatility is similar to
that estimated for sales-growth volatility across the first three columns, but is lower after
including firm fixed effects. Conversely, the estimates for idiosyncratic volatility are similar
to those for stock-return volatility after including firm fixed effects, but tend to be somewhat
lower without them.
To better characterize the source of this increase in firm-level volatility, we next assess
whether universal-bank loans were associated with higher credit risk. That is, we examine
whether universal banks relaxed financial constraints for risky projects, or whether they
financed excessively risky firms that were on the verge of defaulting. Our hypothesis is that
they did the former.
In Table 7, we return to our firm-loan-years sample, and use as dependent variable an
indicator for whether the borrowing company went bankrupt19 in the ten years following
the loan-issue year.20 As can be seen in Table 7, universal-bank loans were not associ-
ated with greater default risk among borrower firms after the 1996 deregulation, i.e., the
18However, we do not find that universal banks, on average, extended loans at more favorable terms after
the 1996 deregulation, as measured by the so-called all-in-drawn spread, which is the sum of the spread over
LIBOR and any annual fees paid to the lender syndicate (cf. Table 13).
19We use the following CRSP delisting codes to identify bankruptcy: any type of liquidation (400-490);
price fell below acceptable level; insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity; insufficient (or non-compliance
with rules of) float or assets; company request, liquidation; bankruptcy, declared insolvent; delinquent in
filing; non-payment of fees; does not meet exchange’s financial guidelines for continued listing; protection of
investors and the public interest; corporate governance violation; and delist required by Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC).
20Our results are robust to variations in the horizon.
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difference-in-differences estimate is not significantly different from zero. However, after the
inclusion of firm fixed effects in the fourth column, universal-bank loans were associated
with significantly less default risk after 1996. Furthermore, in the last column, we find that
following the 1996 deregulation, investment banks – unlike commercial and universal banks
– financed firms that were 10 percentage points more likely to be delisted for bankruptcy-
related reasons within ten years after the loan issue. The effect is significant at the 1%
level.
These results also address another concern. Namely, recall that our benchmark measures
of firm risk were based on the within-firm change in risk after vs. before loan issues.
A potential downside to this forward-looking definition of the outcome variables is that
we may be systematically omitting (or prematurely dropping) firms that did not survive
6+6 = 12 years, which was necessary for constructing our outcome variables, because they
were excessively risky. Our results in Table 7 indicate that this was not the case.21
3.3.2 Impact of Universal Banking on Productivity and In-
vestment
Thus far, we have considered only measures related to firm-level risk as outcomes. We
now turn to the question as to whether the additional risk of universal-bank-financed firms
was rewarded by higher productivity, as suggested by a risk-return trade-off. Our analysis
proceeds much like that in the previous section. The only difference is that we estimate
long-run within-firm effects on annual observations rather than six-year volatilities. For this
purpose, we modify our loans-related variables to be based on any loan transactions within
the past five years.22 We also include all firm years without any loan transactions.
The resulting sample comprises all publicly listed firms for which all our non-banking-related
variables are available. This corresponds to what we label as our Compustat sample in the
21Note also that the sample we use for these default-risk tests is not conditional on the availability of
six-year-volatility data before and after the firm-loan year.
22Bank fixed effects are defined accordingly.
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third panel of Table 24. We then run regression specification (20) on this sample, including
all firm-year observations from 1987, and cluster the standard errors at the firm-year level.
Note that we now also include firm-year observations for which all loans-related variables
are zero, so that firms with no loan in a given year become the omitted category.
In Table 8, we use the natural logarithm of firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) in
year t+1 as dependent variable. We use TFP in t+1 because our TFP measure is the result
of an estimation, conducted by Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014), that uses as input variables
capital and labor in t, which are potentially correlated with our right-hand-side variables.
After including transaction-specific and firm-level controls in the second column, we find
a significantly positive difference-in-differences estimate of 2.9% for universal-bank loans
after 1996. This estimate holds up to including state-year fixed effects in the third column.
Conversely, in the last column, we find a negative and insignificant difference-in-differences
estimate for investment-bank loans after 1996. These results paint an analogous picture to
the risk estimates. What is more, our estimated treatment effects are relatively long-lived,
up to six years, due to the definition of the five-year window and an additional lag due to
measurement of TFP in year t+ 1.
To show that these increases in productivity also translate into increases in actual invest-
ment and higher market capitalization, we re-run the regressions from Table 8, and use as
dependent variable the natural logarithm of the firm’s capital expenditure in year t as well
as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity in year t.23 The results are
in Tables 14 and 15, respectively, and demonstrate that our previous findings for TFP are
also valid for these measures. Capital expenditure increase by at least 2%, although not all
results are robustly significant, and firms’ market capitalization by at least 9%.24
To conclude, we find that universal-bank loans were associated with significantly higher
23As we used as outcome variables TFP in year t+1 for the above-mentioned reasons, but capital expen-
diture and market capitalization in year t, in untabulated tests, we verified that our results for the latter
two dependent variables are robust to using their realizations in year t+ 1.
24Note that these treatment effects are unlikely to be due to equity-raising activities, as universal banks
cross-sold loans and debt-underwriting services much more frequently than loans and equity-underwriting
services (cf. first panel of Table 24).
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TFP, capital expenditure, and market capitalization after the 1996 deregulation, as com-
pared to loans granted by commercial and investment banks. These results complement our
findings for firm-level risk, and guide the economic interpretation. Our evidence is consistent
with universal-bank relationships resulting in firms making risky, productivity-increasing in-
vestments along a risk-return frontier. This implies that there is a real component to the
increase in risk that we document in this paper. Still, this leaves open the question as to
whether the increases in productivity are large enough to compensate for increased risk. A
revealed-preference argument would suggest that it does. At the very least, our evidence
does not contradict the possibility of firm-level efficiency gains from universal banking.
3.3.3 Bank-level Information Acquisition through Universal-
bank Mergers
In this section, we provide evidence that the treatment effects are due to increased informa-
tion on the part of universal banks rather than due to higher revenues from cross-selling.
Specifically, we use universal-bank mergers as a variation in bank-level information acquisi-
tion. To do so, we follow the identification strategy associated with regression specification
(21). We compare firms that contracted with a loan-granting commercial bank and also
received an underwriting product from an investment bank, both of which have merged
– either with each other (treatment group) or with other banks of complementary scope
(control group). In Figure 31, we provide evidence of parallel pre-trends in terms of TFP,
capital expenditure, and market capitalization among our treatment and control groups in
the period leading up to the bank mergers.
In Table 9, we estimate (21),and use as dependent variable firm-level TFP as in Table 8.
The treatment effect is given by β1 in the first row, and indicates that TFP increases by 2
to 3%, which is similar to the effects in Table 8. This result is robust to including state-year
fixed-effects in the third column and, in addition, industry-year fixed effects in the last
column, which capture time-varying factors underlying banks’ considerations to merge with
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each other, such as the nature of client portfolios.
We also report positive treatment effects on capital expenditure and market capitalization
in Tables 16 and 17, respectively. The magnitude is somewhat higher for capital expenditure
than in Table 14, and significant at the 1% level throughout. However, the magnitude is
weaker for market capitalization in comparison to Table 15, and loses statistical significance
after including state-year fixed effects in the third column of Table 17.
These estimates are robust to changing the time window for the triplet of events (loan trans-
action, underwriting, and a potential merger) from eleven years to nine years (see Tables
18 to 20). In summary, the results based on our alternative universal-bank-mergers identi-
fication strategy point to informational economies of scope as the driving force underlying
the firm-level real effects of universal banking we document in this paper.
To show that this insight holds also for the risk-increasing effect of bank-scope deregulation,
we consider an alternative risk measure, namely option-implied volatility σimpliedit , which
has the advantage of allowing the construction of an annual measure, thereby fitting our
empirical setup in (21).25
The results are in 21, and suggest a significantly positive treatment effect on this risk
measure, ranging from 5.5% in the first column to 2.3% after including state-year and
industry-year fixed effects in the last column. While somewhat weaker in magnitude than
our difference-in-differences estimates in Tables 4 to 6, our results should be comparable
in their interpretation given the forward-looking nature of option-implied volatility: as
argued by Christensen and Prabhala (1998), it does not just subsume information from
past-realized volatility, but is also forward looking in the sense that it helps forecast future
volatility.
25Note that the respective data are available only starting in 1996.
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3.3.4 Impact of Universal Banking on IPO Age
The evidence from the loan data suggests that universal-bank-financed firms were more
volatile, but the analysis is confined to publicly listed and, thus, mature firms. We now
complement our loans-based analysis with evidence on firms earlier in their life cycle, and
scrutinize the impact of universal banking on the age of firms when they go public.
For this IPO-level analysis, we implement a difference-in-differences strategy, and compare
the average age of IPOs with universal banks as bookrunners to the average age of IPOs
with investment-bank bookrunners before and after 1996. We use the age of firms at the
time of their IPOs as a risk measure following the logic that younger firms are typically
riskier (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Pastor and Veronesi (2003), and Schenone (2010)).
Looking at the effect of universal banking on IPO age may also be a fruitful exercise in
the sense that previous research by Brown and Kapadia (2007) and Fink, Fink, Grullon,
and Weston (2010) has found that higher idiosyncratic risk in the U.S. stock market was
associated with younger firms that went public.
In Figure 30, we plot the market-value-weighted average age of firms at the time of their
IPOs and the proportion of IPOs accompanied by universal banks. We observe a negative
correlation that is stronger after 1996. Note that the IPO market share of universal banks
soars around 1996 as well.
In a difference-in-differences setup akin to that employed before, we test whether following
the 1996 deregulation, universal banks took younger firms public than investment banks
whose scope of banking activities was unaffected by the deregulation. Given that com-
mercial banks that are not yet universal banks cannot be bookrunners, the control group
consists of investment banks, a subset of which was eventually acquired by commercial or
already existing universal banks. For a universal bank to be treated under the 1996 dereg-
ulation, it needs to be established before the deregulation. We run the following regression
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specification:
IPO ageijt = β1UB j × Est.(1996)j ×After(1996)t + β2UB j × Est.(1996)j
+β3UB j + β4Eventually UB through M&Aj
+β5After(1996)t + β6Xijt + β7industry i + µt + ijt, (23)
where IPO ageijt is firm i’s age in years at the time t of its IPO with bank j as bookrunner,
UB j (M&A or Section 20 ) is an indicator variable for whether the bookrunner was a univer-
sal bank (formed through a merger or through opening a Section 20 subsidiary), Est.(1996)j
indicates whether a universal bank (through M&A or Section 20) was established prior to
August 1, 1996, After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the IPO date was on or after August
1, 1996, Eventually UB through M&Aj is an indicator variable for whether the bookrunner,
which was still an investment bank, eventually becomes a universal bank through M&A,
IPO count jt denotes the number of IPOs accompanied by universal or investment bank j,
up to and including the current IPO, Xijt denotes firm and IPO characteristics, and indus-
try i and µt are industry and year fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered
at the bookrunner level.
In the first column of Table 10, we estimate (23) without any firm or IPO-specific controls.
The difference-in-differences estimate for universal banks established before the deregulation
compared to the control group of pure investment banks, which is captured by the coefficient
on UB j × Est.(1996)j × After(1996)t, is significantly negative (at the 1% level), reflecting
8.7 years younger and, thus, riskier IPOs. Note that in the absence of bank fixed effects,
the coefficient on UB j captures universal banks established after the deregulation.
The 1996 deregulation carries particular significance for the underwriting activities of uni-
versal banks. Besides the increased scope for cross-selling, transactions between commercial-
bank and securities divisions could be used to cross-finance riskier investment-banking oper-
ations.26 An alternative explanation may be that commercial banks inherited the risk-taking
26The Federal Reserve Act limits such loans to any single securities affiliate to 10% of a bank’s capital.
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properties of the smaller investment banks that they acquired or merged with. To test this,
we include an indicator for whether the bookrunner was an investment bank that eventually
merged with a commercial or an already existing universal bank, Eventually UB through
M&Aj , on the right-hand side. However, the respective coefficient is significantly larger
(at the 5% level, implying that these investment banks took older firms public) than the
sum of all three coefficients for universal banks established before 1996.27 Therefore, this
alternative explanation seems unlikely.
In the second column of Table 10, we include bank fixed effects for all universal and in-
vestment banks, as in our previous analyses. This refined difference-in-differences estimate
suggests that universal banks served as bookrunners for IPOs of firms that were 6.1 years
younger after the deregulation. This estimate holds up to the inclusion of state-year fixed
effects (leading to a drop in the sample size due to data availability) in the third column,
which capture any confounding effects of, for instance, bank branching deregulation. The
average reduction in the age of firms that were taken public by universal banks is econom-
ically significant, and corresponds to one-third of a standard deviation of IPO age.
In the fourth column, we delineate the treatment effect by the universal banks’ mode of
establishment, namely whether the universal bank in question was established through M&A
or through opening a Section 20 subsidiary. The difference-in-differences estimates are both
negative, but only significantly so for universal banks established through M&A.
In order to evaluate whether these results may be driven by any other characteristics that
differ between universal banks established through M&A and Section 20 subsidiaries, we
collected key summary statistics for the bank-holding companies in our sample a year before
to a year after becoming universal banks. As Table 22 shows, universal banks established
through M&A are typically larger than Section 20 subsidiaries. Such mergers constitute
one-time increases in total assets, net income, cash flow (approximated by EBIT), and
the number of employees. Section 20 subsidiaries grow more gradually.28 Nevertheless,
27The coefficient on Eventually UB through M&Aj is also larger, and significantly so at the 1% level, than
that on UBj , which captures the average age of IPOs run by universal banks established after 1996.
28Note that we could not include universal banks for which the data do not cover all three time periods,
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both types of universal banks are strikingly similar in their equity-to-assets and cash-to-
assets ratios. As a result, higher risk taking by universal banks established through M&A
cannot be readily explained by a different leverage position or excess cash. Loan-to-assets
ratios are somewhat higher for universal banks formed through Section 20 subsidiaries, as
investment-banking operations are a smaller portion of their business model.
Finally, we consider another, market-structure-based explanation for the younger age of
firms that were taken public by universal banks. Commercial banks entering the underwrit-
ing business as newly formed universal banks naturally lack a track record for IPOs. This
may force them to take younger firms public in an effort to build a track record.
To test this, we include interactions with IPO count jt, which is the number of IPOs accom-
panied by the respective universal and investment banks, up to and including the IPO in
question (of firm i with bookrunner j at time t). If lack of a track record was responsible
for our findings, then one would expect the respective interaction effects to be positive,
indicating that universal banks with an established track record of IPOs took older firms
public. However, we fail to find any differential effect of IPO count jt for either type of
universal bank. This suggests that the explanatory power of this alternative mechanism for
the effects of increased bank scope on IPO age is limited.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on a narrowly defined set of deregulatory events that expanded
the scope of banking in the U.S. to evaluate bank scope as a determinant of firm-level real
outcomes. Our empirical strategy exploits a deregulatory shock to the scope of banking
activities in 1996. We provide evidence that the advent of universal banking improved the
access to finance for risky but productive enterprises through informational economies of
scope across loans and non-loan products.
i.e., we had to drop universal banks that were established right when the data became available (1987) or
that were eventually acquired by other banks.
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Our findings are in accordance with previous research on the evolution of firm-level volatility
in the U.S. Based on Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), Comin and Philippon
(2006) document that idiosyncratic firm risk has been rising over the past thirty years. Our
results suggest that bank-scope deregulation may have contributed to this phenomenon.
Indeed, the explanation we propose in this paper can accommodate the dichotomy found
in Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2007) that volatility has been increasing for
publicly listed but not for private firms, because the cross-selling of underwriting products
affects primarily public firms. An interesting direction for future research could be to
quantify the explanatory power of increased bank scope for the observed run-up in firm-
level fluctuations.
In light of recent proposals to limit the scope of banking and re-establish the Glass-Steagall
Act, our evidence suggests that there may be firm-level efficiency gains from concurrent
lending and underwriting of corporate securities that should be balanced against the risks
associated with banks becoming too big to fail and other concerns of macroeconomic
fragility.
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Chapter 4 : Does Bank Scope
Improve Monitoring Incentives in
Syndicated Lending?*
4.1 Introduction
Loan syndication refers to the joint provision of loans to a firm by a group, or syndicate,
of financial institutions. Typically, the syndicate consists of lead arrangers and partic-
ipants, with lead arrangers expected to actively monitor the borrower, and participants
serving to diversify loan risk without actively monitoring. To ensure that lead arrangers
have an incentive to diligently monitor the borrower, they tend to hold relatively large
fractions of syndicated loans on their balance sheet, so as to create bank exposure to firm
outcomes.
In the U.S., syndicated-loan markets have grown dramatically. In 1990, the total syndicated-
loan-issuance volume was $20 billion; in 2008 it was $790 billion (Ivashina and Scharfstein
(2010b)). Over the same time frame, loan shares retained by lead arrangers fell sharply,
from a peak of around 70% in 1990, to around 30% in the years leading up to the 2008
financial crisis. To some observers, these developments serve as evidence that syndicated
lending is a valuable financial innovation that helps to diversify loan risks and lowers the
*This chapter is co-authored with Farzad Saidi
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cost of borrowing for firms. Yet, they have also led to concerns that because lenders do not
have incentives to diligently monitor borrowers when lead shares are small, the growth of
syndicated-loan markets may have contributed to a loss of efficiency in financial intermedi-
ation and precipitated the crisis (see, for example, Gorton and Metrick (2012) and Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010b)).
In this time period, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act drastically changed the architecture
of the financial system in the U.S., and led to the rise of universal banks able to offer a broad
array of financial instruments, ranging from lending to corporate-securities underwriting.
This has had important consequences for the nature of bank-firm relationships: the simul-
taneous provision of multiple financial products by a universal bank to a given firm has
become a key feature of many intermediation relationships (for evidence, see Drucker and
Puri (2005) and Neuhann and Saidi (2014)). In this paper, we propose that this broadening
of bank-firm interactions also substantially altered the structure of loan syndicates and the
distribution of loan shares within syndicates.
In particular, we argue that in the presence of broad interactions across financial products,
loan shares alone are no longer a sufficient statistic for a lead arranger’s monitoring incen-
tives, since a bank’s total exposure to firm outcomes may be much greater than its loan
share alone would suggest. If a bank cares about firm performance for reasons other than its
loan share, it may no longer need to retain large loan shares to have incentives to monitor.
In this view, then, falling loan shares are merely a benign side effect of broader bank-firm
relationships rather than a symptom of worsening of monitoring efficiency. We attempt to
understand these developments in the context of financial deregulation leading to changes
in the nature of bank-firm interactions and, thus, in banks’ total exposure to the firms they
are servicing.
In Figure 27, we plot the average loan share retained by lead arrangers from 1987 to 2009
for three samples: all syndicated loans, syndicated loans in which at least one lead arranger
was a universal bank, and syndicated loans in which no lead arranger was a universal bank.
The average lead share fell across all samples. We find large cross-sectional differences:
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Figure 27
Average Loan Share Retained by Lead Arrangers in Syndicates (1987-2009).
Source: own analysis based on DealScan loan data.
syndicates in which at least one lead arranger was a universal bank exhibit substantially
lower lead shares than syndicates without any universal-bank lead arrangers throughout the
time series. What is more, these differences are particularly pronounced in the years leading
up to the financial crisis. These facts are suggestive of our hypothesis that the advent of
universal banking and the resulting richness of bank-firm interactions are a key determinant
of the evolution of lead shares from the mid 1990s onwards.
We formalize our argument in a model of syndicated lending with banks of heterogenous
scope. In the model, firms contract with a syndicate of banks to obtain loans. We assume
that banks can increase firm value by monitoring, subject to moral hazard, but dislike
large balance-sheet exposures to a single borrower because managing the resulting risk
is costly. We analyze the model in two steps. First, we take the value of monitoring as
given, and characterize the optimal syndicate structure as a function of bank characteristics,
such as scope and prior or future exposure to the firm. Second, we link the value of
monitoring to firm characteristics, such as volatility and productivity, and characterize the
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comparative statics of syndicate structure as we jointly vary the fundamentals of bank and
firm. In doing so, we explore the mechanisms through which bank monitoring impacts firm
performance.
In the first step, we find that banks monitor the firm only if they are assigned a sufficiently
large share of the loan. Since holding large exposures to a single loan is costly for banks, the
firm provides monitoring incentives through large loan shares to a subset of banks only, and
spreads the remaining loan shares across the rest of the syndicate. We refer to banks that
monitor as lead arrangers, and to banks that do not as participants. To minimize borrowing
costs, the firm chooses banks for whom relatively small loan shares suffice for incentive
provision as lead arrangers. We refer to the smallest loan share consistent with monitoring
incentives as the required loan share, and find that it varies with bank characteristics. In
particular, the required loan share is smaller if (i) the bank has underwritten corporate
securities for the firm in the past, or expects to do in the future, and (ii) is exposed to
the firm’s performance through non-loan products. This is likely to be the case for banks
of wide scope, because these banks have ample opportunities to provide non-loan products
to the firm. Thus, a key prediction of our model is that banks of wide scope, such as
universal banks, are more likely to be chosen as lead arrangers, but receive lower loan shares
conditional on being lead arrangers. Crucially, lower loan shares for banks of wide scope
do not imply a loss in monitoring efficiency; loan shares are smaller because it is easier
to provide monitoring incentives to banks of wide scope. In addition, because reduced
loan shares allow for better risk diversification, increased bank scope reduces borrowing
costs.
In the second step, we extend our model to explicitly analyze the process by which bank
monitoring increases production efficiency at the firm level. We use the extended model
to derive two key quantities of interest as a function of firm fundamentals and the optimal
intermediation contract: the value of information, as measured by the increase in production
efficiency when the lender monitors, and the monitoring incentives provided by the optimal
intermediation contract, as measured by the additional payoff the lender obtains when
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monitoring, given the contract.
Since the optimal intermediation contract is specific to firm characteristics, so are monitor-
ing incentives. We find that both the value of information and monitoring incentives are
increasing in the volatility of the firm’s production technology. Hence, monitoring is par-
ticularly valuable for volatile firms, i.e., even banks of narrow scope are willing to monitor
highly volatile firms. The monitoring benefits of wider bank scope are more pronounced for
low-risk firms that would otherwise not be monitored by banks of narrower scope. Linking
these results to our earlier finding that banks of wide scope are more likely to become lead
arrangers, and receive smaller lead shares, we find that the loan-share-decreasing effect is
less pronounced for riskier firms.
We find empirical support for all of these predictions by exploiting the variation in bank
scope generated by the stepwise repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. As in Neuhann and
Saidi (2014), we focus on a shock to bank scope through a deregulatory event in 1996 that
removed informational and financial firewalls between securities and lending divisions in
existing universal banks. In particular, we argue that the 1996 deregulation led to a boost
in cross-selling of loans and non-loan products by universal banks, thereby enabling them to
realize economies of scope. This maps to an increase in the extent of bank-firm interactions
in our model.
To distill the impact of bank scope on syndicate structure, we separately analyze the choice
of lead arrangers within syndicates, and the resulting lead share at the more aggregate loan
level. For this purpose, we employ a difference-in-differences specification around the 1996
deregulation for universal banks established before that date vs. commercial banks whose
scope of banking was not affected by said deregulation. In this manner, we find that within
loan syndicates, universal banks were at least ten percentage points more likely to be chosen
as lead arrangers following the 1996 deregulation. Similarly, we show that syndicates with
universal banks assigned up to five percentage points smaller shares to their lead arrangers
after the 1996 deregulation than did syndicates without any universal-bank participation.
We also use this setup to generate empirical evidence in favor of the comparative statics of
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our model with respect to borrower-firm-level volatility.
In sum, our findings provide new theoretical and empirical insights into to the provision
of monitoring incentives in financial markets. In particular, we find that banks’ non-loan
exposures to firms are a key determinant of monitoring incentives, and may substitute for
loan shares. Furthermore, our results suggest that falling lead shares may not have had
adverse effects on monitoring incentives. In this sense, we argue for a holistic view of bank-
firm interactions, especially in the aftermath of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the
subsequent functional heterogeneity of banks in the syndicated-loans market.
4.1.1 Related Literature
Our paper relates to the empirical and theoretical literature on lending under asymmetric
information.
On the empirical side, our paper is related to the literature that investigates the determi-
nants of lead shares in syndicated lending. Sufi (2007) argues that unrated firms are harder
to monitor than rated firms, and finds that lead arrangers retain a larger share of loans to
unrated firms as a result. Our paper differs in that we investigate the bank-level, rather
than the firm-level, determinants of syndicate structure. In addition, we also interact firm-
level and bank-level characteristics, thereby refining the results in Sufi (2007). Ivashina
(2009) estimates the costs of asymmetric information between lead arrangers and syndicate
members by explicitly accounting for bank-level risk exposure. We complement her findings
by characterizing the role of bank scope in driving the structure of loan syndicates through
non-loan interactions. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010a) as well as Ivashina and Scharfstein
(2010b) focus on the cyclical properties of the lead arranger shares. Our paper complements
this line of work by focusing on secular trends in the lead share as a response to financial
deregulation and broader trends in the architecture of the financial system.
In particular, we conjecture that a bank’s total exposure to a borrower firm, rather than
the loan exposure alone, needs to be taken into account to determine a bank’s monitoring
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incentives. Our empirical approach relies on bank-firm-level variation in said exposure, and
for this purpose, we use the variation in bank scope generated by the stepwise repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act. Existing work considers other kinds of variations affecting bank-firm
interactions, stemming primarily from the borrower firm, such as the impact of corpo-
rate ownership structure (Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan (2012)) and shareholder rights
(Bharath, Dahiya, and Hallak (2013)) on the structure of lending syndicates. The crucial
difference between our paper and this line of research is that our variation in bank scope
affects syndicate members differentially, allowing us to dissect heterogenous effects within
lending syndicates. By focussing on borrower-level variation, existing work does not make
use of any within-syndicate heterogeneity.
On the theoretical side, our model relates to the literature through four channels. First, we
argue that the extent of asymmetric information between borrower and lender is an impor-
tant determinant of firm-level outcomes. Second, we provide a model in which asymmetric
information determines the extent to which the lender can provide incentives to overcome
the firm’s moral hazard, generating adverse selection on incentive contracts. Third, we
allow for monitoring by banks to alleviate this adverse selection. Fourth, we argue that the
scope of banking is an important determinant of lenders’ incentives to acquire information.
In the following, we link each of these features to the existing theoretical literature, and
establish how our model innovates on extant approaches.
In the sense that we vary the degree of information asymmetry between borrower and
lender, our model is related to a large literature on bank monitoring, such as Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997), and relationship banking, such as Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), and
von Thadden (2004). In these papers, lending relationships serve to reduce information
asymmetries within a relationship, with two key effects. First, there may be informational
rents captured by the lender, which expose the borrower to hold-up. Second, the lender
may be able to make flexible financial decisions that enhance the value of the firm.
Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrullie (2013) develop a model of relationship bank-
ing over the business cycle based on Bolton and Freixas (2006), and provide evidence for
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information acquisition in lending relationships. Our paper takes a similar approach in that
we are interested in the effects of reductions in informational frictions as determinants of
firm-level outcomes gains. However, our model differs in that we analyze the role of scope
rather than repeated interactions as the key driver of our results. As shown empirically by
Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), the dimension of a bank-firm relationship, as determined
by the bank’s scope, dominates the length of the relationship in characterizing the benefits
and efficiency gains. Furthermore, we link firm primitives, most notably risk and produc-
tivity, to efficiency gains from contracting with an informed lender that is well placed to
overcome the firm’s moral hazard. Conversely, Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrullie
(2013) center their attention on relationship lending over the business cycle, without linking
the state of the world (the business cycle) to any firm-level frictions (such as moral hazard
in our model).
Our paper is also related to the literature on performance monitoring by markets or investors
in the tradition of Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993), who discuss the role of outside investors’
information about managerial effort. In our model, we discuss the importance of asymmetric
information about the optimal course of action in mediating the ability of investors to
overcome asymmetric information about managerial effort. Our paper therefore discusses
a different type of information asymmetry than Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993), and leads to
predictions about the type of projects chosen by firms in response to this asymmetry.
In that we focus on the firm-level effects of changes in lender informedness, our paper is
also similar in spirit to Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010), who develop a model of
financial intermediation based on Townsend (1979) to analyze the characteristics of firms
financed in equilibrium. While Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010) scrutinize general-
equilibrium effects, we argue that changes at the level of the bank-firm relationship are
crucial in determining the ability of firms to obtain financing.
In addition, we endogenize the lender’s information-acquisition decision, and study its in-
teraction with borrower characteristics. In this regard, our model relates to previous work
that studies endogenous information acquisition in finance, such as van Nieuwerburgh and
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Veldkamp (2010) and, in particular, Yang and Zeng (2015), who scrutinize optimal security
design by a borrower that tries to provide incentives for a lender to produce information
that is valuable to the borrower.
Lastly, by providing an application to bank scope, our paper is related to a sizeable litera-
ture on universal banking that focuses on the ability of universal banks to simultaneously
offer loans and underwriting services.2 For example, Kanatas and Qi (1998) and Kanatas
and Qi (2003) argue that universal banks can save on information costs by monitoring a
firm once and for all, while stand-alone banks have to exert monitoring effort for each ser-
vice separately. As such, firms may become locked in to a universal bank due to reduced
information costs. This lock-in has adverse affects on a universal bank’s incentives: if the
bank expects to be able to sell a loan to a firm when underwriting fails, it may exert less
effort in underwriting. A trade-off thus arises between bank effort and reduced information
costs. Our model differs from these in that we consider the implications of bank scope on
syndicates, and relate it to firm-level outcomes and characteristics.
4.2 A Model of Monitoring in Syndicates
We now propose a model of lending by a syndicate of heterogenous financial intermediaries
to a firm in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). In this section, we focus on the
first step of our analysis, which is to characterize the optimal syndicate structure based on
bank characteristics, taking the value of monitoring as given. In the next section, we then
enrich the borrower side of the model to characterize the comparative statics of syndicate
structure with respect to firm characteristics.
There is a single period. There is one penniless borrower (manager, entrepreneur) and N
deep-pocketed banks, indexed by n, all of which are risk neutral. The manager has access to
an investment project that requires k units of capital and yields an expected return R > k
2In this regard, our paper is also related to recent work on the regulation of the financial sector (see Opp,
Opp, and Harris (2013), Hoffmann, Inderst, and Opp (2014), and Harris, Opp, and Opp (2014)).
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at the end of the period. The borrower is limited in his ability to borrow because of an
implicit moral-hazard problem: the borrower’s pledgeable income is strictly below R. Bank
monitoring is valuable because it increases pledgeable income by alleviating the underlying
moral-hazard problem. If a bank monitors the borrower, pledgeable income is v; if no bank
monitors the borrower, then plegeable income is v. We assume that bank monitoring is
essential for credit provision: v > k > v. In Section 4.3, we explicitly characterize v and
v as a function of the borrower’s production technology and the optimal intermediation
contract. For now, we focus on the optimal choice of lead arrangers and the associated
allocation of monitoring incentives within the syndicate, taking the benefits of monitoring
as given.
Each bank’s monitoring effort is observable but not verifiable, and banks occur a private
cost B when monitoring. Hence, there is moral hazard in monitoring. Monitoring is also
valuable: v > v+B. The financial contract between the borrower and the syndicate works
as follows. The borrower assigns loan share sn to bank n, with
∑N
n=1 sn ≤ 1. Given the loan
share, bank n provides snk units of capital, and receives sn ·v if monitoring occurs, and sn ·v
if no monitoring occurs. We refer to the N × 1 vector of loan shares as a sharing rule, and
denote it by s. Holding a loan on the balance sheet is costly to banks. In particular, each
bank occurs a holding cost c(snk), with c(·) strictly convex and increasing. The convexity
of c(·) introduces a motive for risk diversification across syndicate members. For a given
sharing rule s, the total borrowing costs are given by
C(s, k) = k +
N∑
n=1
c(snk).
Borrowing costs are thus minimized by setting sn = 1/N for all n, but doing so may not
provide sufficient monitoring incentives to banks.
Banks are heterogeneous along two dimensions: whether the bank has underwritten a cor-
porate security (such as equity or debt) for the borrower firm in the past, and whether
it expects to underwrite securities for the firm in the future. We assume that there are
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economies of scope in monitoring across corporate-securities underwriting and loan prod-
ucts: if bank n has previously underwritten a corporate security for the firm, the cost of
monitoring is reduced by b∗n · B; if the bank expects to underwrite the equity in the fu-
ture, the value of monitoring to the bank increases by v∗n · B. We model both the benefits
and reduced costs as proportional to the unconditional cost of monitoring because we view
economies of scope as coming from the ability to save on the (partial) duplication of costly
monitoring efforts. Hence, we refer to Bn ≡ v∗n + b∗n as bank n’s scope. We assume that
Bn ≤ 1 for all n, and let n∗ = argmaxnBn.
Given its loan share sn, bank n monitors the borrower only if no other bank monitors,
and
snv + v
∗
n ·B ≥ snv +B − b∗n ·B.
The latter condition can be rearranged to give
sn ≥ sn ≡
B · (1−Bn)
v − v . (M)
To make the problem interesting, we assume that sn∗ >
1
N , so that providing equal loan
shares to all lenders is inconsistent with monitoring.
The incentive compatibility constraint for monitoring (M) allows us to characterize the
borrower’s choice of syndicate structure. In particular, given that holding costs are convex,
the borrower assigns monitoring tasks to those that require the smallest loan share to do so.
We refer to banks that monitor the borrower as lead arrangers, and to borrowers that do
not monitor but hold a fraction of the loan as participants. Proposition 18 reveals that the
borrower chooses the bank with the highest bank scope as the unique lead arranger, and
provides this lead arranger with the smallest share consistent with monitoring incentives.
We omit the corresponding proof here and, instead, include it in Appendix C.2.
Proposition 18 (Syndicate Structure). n∗ is the unique lead arranger. The lead share is
sn∗; the total participant share is 1− sn∗, and each participant receives a share 1−sn∗N−1 .
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Given our explicit characterization of the lead share in (M), the comparative statics in
Corollary 9 follow directly.
Corollary 9 (Comparative Statics). 1. The lead share is decreasing in the lead arranger’s
bank scope Bn∗.
2. The lead share is increasing in the monitoring cost B.
3. ∂
2sn∗
∂Bn∗∂(v−v) > 0, i.e., an increase in Bn∗ reduces the lead share by more the smaller
the monitoring incentives, v − v.
First, we find that a bank of wide scope requires a smaller loan share to monitor than a
bank of narrower scope. This is the case either because monitoring is more valuable to the
bank, or because it has monitored the borrower in the past. Second, borrowers that are
hard to monitor, such as unrated borrowers, must provide a larger loan share to the lead
arranger, as in Sufi (2007). Third, increases in bank scope lead to greater reductions in lead
shares when monitoring incentives are weak.
Most of these predictions can be readily tested, as we will show in Section 4.4. For the com-
parative static with respect to monitoring incentives, we require a richer model that allows
us to link the latter to observable firm-level characteristics, to which we turn next.
4.3 Extended Model: Linking Monitoring to Firm
Characteristics
We extend our model to characterize the value of bank monitoring as a function of borrower
characteristics. We show how in our setting, bank monitoring increases pledgeable income
and the value of the firm by reducing asymmetric information between bank and firm.
A key result of the basic model in Section 4.2 is that the borrower optimally chooses a
syndicate with a single lead arranger. In this section, we take this result as given, and
consider a financial-contracting problem between a single risk-neutral borrower, a single
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lead arranger, and a fixed number of syndicate participants. We then focus on deriving
v, the pledgeable income when the borrower is being monitored, and v, the pledgeable
income when it is not, as a function of borrower characteristics. These quantities are
important because (i) they determine the ability of the borrower to obtain financing with
and without monitoring, and (ii) their difference determines the lead share required to
induce monitoring.
We study a contracting problem subject to moral hazard on the part of the borrower, and
asymmetric information between bank and borrower. The type of moral hazard faced by the
borrower is stochastic: in one state of the world, the borrower can misappropriate capital
for private consumption, while it can engage in risk shifting in the other state. In addition,
the borrower’s expected returns differ across states of the world. There is asymmetric
information because the borrower knows the state of the world, while the bank does not.
The bank can, however, learn the state of the world by monitoring. When the bank does
not monitor, it must overcome moral-hazard frictions without knowing which moral-hazard
problem the borrower faces, leading to adverse selection.3 When the bank monitors, it knows
which moral-hazard problem the borrower faces, and can efficiently provide incentives to
overcome the moral hazard problem at hand. Bank monitoring is, thus, valuable because
it allows for more efficient financial contracting.
To characterize pledgeable income with and without monitoring, we proceed as follows: we
begin by taking as given that the bank monitors the borrower, and derive the contract that
maximizes pledgeable income under symmetric information. We refer to this contract as the
optimal symmetric-information contract, and to the resulting pledgeable income as v. Since
the borrower’s moral-hazard problem is state contingent, the optimal symmetric-information
contract consists of two state-contingent incentive schedules. We then ask whether the
optimal symmetric-information contract does indeed provide monitoring incentives to the
lead arranger for a given loan share s. In particular, we ask what payoff the lead arranger can
3For expositional ease, we focus on a simple setting with two states of the world and three potential profit
realizations at the borrower level. This setting allows us cleanly characterize the key forces at play in our
model. Nevertheless, none of our key results depend on this structure.
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obtain by assigning one of the state-contingent incentive schedules of the optimal symmetric-
information contract to the borrower without knowing the state of the world. We refer to
this quantity as v, and to v − v as the monitoring incentives provided by the borrower. As
highlighted in the previous section, this quantity is of crucial importance in determining
the loan share that must be assigned to the lead arranger to ensure monitoring.4
Next, we ask what the borrower’s pledgeable income is if no monitoring occurs. To this end,
we characterize the optimal contract under asymmetric information, and call the resulting
pledgeable income v̂. Accordingly, we refer to v − v̂ as the value of information. This
quantity is crucial in determining whether an active monitor is important for firms to be
able to access credit.
Since our model fully specifies the firm’s production technology, we can use it to link mon-
itoring incentives and the value of information to firm characteristics. Our key result is
that both are increasing in the volatility of the firm’s production technology, as measured
by the range of the firm’s expected returns across states of the world, and productivity, as
measured by the average expected return across states. We then use this result to generate
testable predictions for syndicate structure in general, and for the lead share as a function
of observable firm characteristics in particular.
4.3.1 Basic Environment
We consider the problem of a penniless firm seeking funds for an investment project with
uncertain prospects that requires a fixed amount of start-up funding k0. Time is discrete,
and runs for three dates, t = {0, 1, 2}. At date 0, the borrower commits to an intermediation
agreement with the syndicate. At date 1, a random variable z ∈ Z is realized. We refer
4An important consideration that we neglect in our discussion is whether the firm would like to distort the
borrowing contract in order to induce information acquisition by the syndicate, in line with the arguments
in DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and Yang and Zeng (2015). While doing so may serve to increase the lead
arranger’s monitoring incentives, it is clear that any distortion of the optimal symmetric-information contract
will reduce pledgeable income relative to the symmetric-information baseline and will, thus, preserve the
key comparative statics that we test in our empirical application. In the interest of parsimony, we therefore
abstract from analyzing the firm’s security-design problem in more detail.
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to z as the state of the world, and say that it is either high (h) or low (l), i.e., Z = {h, l}.
The state of the world is high with probability γ, and low with complementary probability
(1 − γ). When talking about a generic state of the world z, the probability of that state
occurring is Pr(z). At date 2, the project outcome Xj ∈ X ≡ {X1, X2, X3} is realized, with
X3 > X2 > X1.
4.3.2 Production Technology
Fix the set of project outcomes X. The borrower’s technology is then given by the proba-
bility distribution over X. At date 0, the firm is born with a basic production technology
p = {p1, p2, p3}. At date 1, a new technology qz = {qz1 , qz2 , qz3} arrives in addition to the basic
technology p. We denote the expected output of the firm given the basic and new technology
by Π = pX and Πz = qzX, respectively. At date 1, the firm’s technology portfolio is thus
given by {p, qz}. The firm must then decide which technology to employ for production. In
deciding which technology to implement, two key properties of the new technology are its
incremental value, relative to the basic technology, and its riskiness.
Definition 9 (Value and Riskiness of the New Technology). The value of the new tech-
nology in state z is piz ≡ Πz −Π. The riskiness of the new technology is ζ ≡ Πh −Πl.
To generate testable predictions, we will be interested in the comparative statics of our
model as we vary the riskiness of the new technology. To this end, we define a mean-
preserving risk increase of the new technology as follows.
Definition 10 (Mean-preserving Risk Increase). A mean-preserving risk increase of
the new technology is an increase in ζ ≡ Πh−Πl such that (i) Πh increases, (ii) Πl decreases,
and (iii) γΠh + (1− γ)Πl remains unchanged.
Throughout the paper, we simplify language by referring to the riskiness of the new tech-
nology as firm risk, and to a mean-preserving risk increase as a risk increase. The following
remark is important for many of our results.
Remark 1. The value of the new technology pih (pil) is increasing (decreasing) in a mean-
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preserving spread.
If z = l, implementing the new technology is costless. If z = h, implementing requires an
additional capital investment of size k1. The value of the new technology q
z depends on the
state of the world: the new technology is more productive than the basic technology when
z = h, but less productive when z = l. Formally, we have that
Πh − k1 > Π > Πl,
which implies that pih − k1 > 0 and pil < 0. Because qh increases expected output, we refer
to this technology as a growth option.
In addition to the differences in expected returns, the production technologies also differ
in their volatility. In particular, ql places more probability mass on both the lowest and
highest outcomes than does p. Formally,
ql3 > p3 and q
l
1 > p1,
with ql3−p3 < ql1−p1. The new technology thus introduces a risk-shifting problem in state l:
the borrower can use ql to gamble on the best outcome, at the cost of an increased likelihood
of the worst outcome. This will be an important concern whenever an intermediation
contract offers the borrower large payments after good outcomes, but low payments after
poor outcomes. For this reason, we refer to ql as a risky gamble.
To simplify notation, we let q˜ = γqh + (1 − γ)ql denote the expected distribution over
outcomes when the new technology is chosen in every state of the world, and denote by
q̂ = γqh + (1 − γ)p the expected distribution over outcomes when the efficient technology
is chosen in every state of the world.
159
4.3.3 Information Structure and Sources of Moral Hazard
There are two potential frictions between the borrower and the bank. First, the state of the
world z is the borrower’s private information. As such, the bank’s only source of informa-
tion about z is a report ẑ ∈ {h, l} by the borrower, which need not be truthful but is fully
contractible. We call this friction asymmetric information. Second, the borrower’s technol-
ogy choice is unobservable to the bank and, thus, not contractible. In particular, we assume
that the borrower can misappropriate any capital intended for use in the implementation of
the growth option for private consumption. We denote the borrower’s unobserved decision
to implement (i) or discard (d) the new technology in state of the world z by a(z) ∈ {i, d}.
Since the fact that a is unobservable leads to an agency problem, we call this friction moral
hazard.
4.3.4 Contracts and Strategies
Contracting takes place at date 0 under full commitment. An intermediation contract is
a tuple C = {κ0, τ(ẑ), κ1(ẑ)}ẑ∈{h,l}, where κ0 denotes the initial date-0 capital transfer
from bank to borrower, τ(ẑ) = [τ1(ẑ), τ2(ẑ), τ3(ẑ)] denotes the repayment schedule from
borrower to bank conditional on ẑ and the project outcome, and κ1(ẑ) denotes an additional
date-1 capital transfer from bank to borrower conditional on ẑ. The borrower’s wages or,
equivalently, the borrower’s residual profits after repayment are given by w(ẑ) = X − τ(ẑ).
Contracts are subject to the borrower’s limited liability, i.e., τ(ẑ) ≤ X for all ẑ. We
refer to C = {τ(ẑ), κ1(ẑ)}ẑ∈(h,l) as the continuation contract detailing only the repayment
schedules and additional fund transfers for technology adoption. Whenever there is no risk
of confusion, we use the terms contract and continuation contract interchangeably.
A strategy for the bank is a contract offer C, while a strategy for the borrower is a pair of
functions ẑ : Z → Z and a : Z2 → {i, d}, consisting of an adoption decision a(z, ẑ) and a
reporting decision ẑ(z). We denote the optimal reporting strategy given a contract offer by
ẑ∗(z), and the optimal adoption decision given ẑ∗ by a∗(z, ẑ). Since the borrower has full
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discretion about the choice of technology for every z, the technology used in production is
an equilibrium outcome. We denote this technology by:
Q(a, ẑ, z) =

qh if (a, z) = (i, h) and κ1(ẑ) ≥ k1
ql if (a, z) = (i, l)
p otherwise.
Since the borrower is free to misappropriate any capital intended for implementation, choos-
ing the growth option forces him to incur a private cost in terms of foregone private con-
sumption c. This cost is given by:
c(a, z) =
 k1 if (a, z) = (i, h)0 otherwise.
Under the optimal strategy {a∗(z, ẑ∗(z)), ẑ∗(z)}, the optimal technology choice in state z is
a function of z only, and is given by:
Q∗(z) ≡ Q (a∗(z, ẑ∗(z)), ẑ∗(z), z) .
Similarly, we let κ∗1(z), c∗(z), and w∗(z) denote, respectively, the additional capital transfer,
the private cost of the adoption decision, and the borrower’s wages under the optimal strat-
egy. Given the borrower’s optimal strategy, the borrower’s total expected wages are:
W =
∑
z
Pr(z)
Q∗(z)w(ẑ∗(z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
residual profits
+ κ∗1(z)− c∗(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
misappropiated capital
 .
Accordingly, the optimal contract under asymmetric information is the solution to the
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following program:
v = max
{w(·),κ1(·)}
∑
z
Pr(z) [Q∗(z) (X − w(ẑ∗(z)))− κ1(ẑ∗(z)]
s.t (i) for every (z, ẑ)
a∗(z, ẑ) = argmax
a
Q(a, z, ẑ)w(ẑ) + κ1(ẑ)− c(a, z) (IC)
(ii) for every z
ẑ∗(z) = argmax
z′
Q(a∗(z, z′), z, z′)w(z′) + κ1(z′)− c(a∗(z, z′), z) (REV)
(iii) w(z) ≥ 0 for every z, (LL)
and v is the borrower’s pledgeable income. The incentive-compatibility constraint (IC) and
the information-revelation constraint (REV) require that the borrower choose its technology
and its reporting strategy so as to maximize its private benefit, while (LL) imposes limited
liability on the part of the borrower.
4.3.5 Maintained Assumptions
To make the contracting problem under asymmetric information interesting, we maintain
the following assumptions:
Assumption 4 (Conflicting Incentive Problems). There does not exist a j ∈ {1, 2, 3} such
that qhj > pj > q
l
j.
This assumption implies that no outcome j exists such that payments to the borrower after j
simultaneously provide incentives to (i) choose the growth option over the basic technology,
and (ii) choose the basic technology over the risky technology.
Assumption 5 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio for the Growth Option). The likelihood ratio
of qh with respect to both p and q is monotone in outcomes. That is, both
LRqh,p(X) ≡
Pr(X|qh)µ
Pr(X|qh)µ+ Pr(X|p)(1− µ)
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and
LRqh,ql(X) ≡
Pr(X|qh)µ
Pr(X|qh)µ+ Pr(X|ql)(1− µ)
are monotonically increasing in X for any prior µ ∈ (0, 1).
This assumption implies that better outcomes represent “better news” about the borrower’s
choice of the growth option over any other technology, in the sense of Milgrom (1981).
In the absence of asymmetric information, Assumption 5 implies that to provide efficient
incentives for choosing the growth option, the lender pays the borrower only after the best
outcome, as in a standard debt contract. If there is asymmetric information, however,
Assumption 4 implies that a standard debt contract also provides incentives to choose the
inefficient risky gamble over the basic technology. The optimal contract under asymmetric
information must therefore balance these two forces.
Finally, we assume that the agency problem in state h is not severe enough to deter adoption
of the growth option under symmetric information about z. As we will show in the next
section, this is guaranteed by Assumption 6.
Assumption 6 (Weak Moral Hazard under Symmetric Information). The growth option
satisfies
Πh − γk1 > γqh3
k1
qh3 − p3
.
4.3.6 Optimal Contract under Symmetric Information
We begin by analyzing the optimal contract under symmetric information. In particular,
we take as given that the lead arranger monitors, so that z is common knowledge, and
allow the syndicate to design state-contingent incentive schedules {w(h), w(l)} and transfers
{κ1(h), κ1(l)}.
Take as given that the bank wants to implement qh when z = h, and p when z = l. Then
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we can specialize (IC) to two state-contingent incentive-compatibility constraints:
pw(l) ≥ qlw(l) (DET)
qhw(h) ≥ pw(h) + κ1(h). (IMP)
The agency problem in state l is particularly simple: w = 0 satisfies (DET), and transfers
all project returns to the bank.
The incentive problem in state h is harder to overcome: since the borrower can misappro-
priate κ1(h), providing incentives to implement the growth option will generically require
the bank to cede moral-hazard rents to the borrower. What is the most efficient way for the
bank to deal with this friction? First, note that the tightness of (IMP) is strictly increasing
in κ1(h). As such, the bank will never place more than the required k1 units of additional
capital at risk of misappropriation. Second, standard results from agency theory indicate
that the bank should pay the borrower only after those project outcomes that represent the
“best news,” namely that the borrower did indeed choose qh over p. Assumption 5 then
implies that the bank minimizes the borrower’s moral-hazard rents stemming from (IMP)
by paying wages after outcome 3 only.
Lemma 6 (Optimal Contract under Symmetric Information). The optimal contract under
symmetric information is given by
κ1(l) = 0, κ1(h) = k1, w(l) = 0, w(h) =
[
0, 0,
k1
qh3 − p3
]
.
The borrower receives expected wages W = γqh3
k1
qh3−p3
, and pledgeable income is v = q̂X −
γk1 −W .
It is now clear that Assumption 6 guarantees that the bank does indeed want to provide
incentives to implement the growth option in state h: the required wages are smaller than
the gain in expected output.
Given that the symmetric-information contract can be implemented only if the lender ac-
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quires information, we now ask whether the lender’s payoffs in the optimal symmetric-
information contract are such that the lender does indeed have incentives to monitor.
4.3.7 Monitoring Incentives in the
Optimal Symmetric-information Contract
We characterize the incentives to monitor that arise in the optimal symmetric-information
contract. In particular, we ask: what is the payoff to the lead arranger when he assigns
either {κ1(l), w(l)} or {κ1(h), w(h)} to the borrower, without knowing what the actual state
of the world is? There are two important observations. First, if z = h, but the bank assigns
the contract {κ1(l), w(l)}, then the borrower does not implement the growth option. Second,
if z = l, and the bank assigns the contract {κ1(h), w(h)}, then the borrower implements
the risky gamble, because the risk-shifting properties of ql allow the borrower to gamble on
receiving wages after the best outcome. By assigning {κ1(l), w(l)}, the bank thus receives
an expected payoff of pX, while by assigning {κ1(h), w(h)}, the bank receives an expected
payoff of q˜X−γk1−W˜ , where W˜ ≡ (1−γ)k1+ q˜h3 k1qh3−p3 is the expected cost of {κ1(h), w(h)}
under asymmetric information. W˜ differs from W because the borrower no longer chooses
the efficient technology in every state of the world, and receives the additional transfer
k1 even when the growth option is not available. Hence, when not monitoring, the bank
obtains the payoff
v = max
{
pX, q˜X − γk1 − W˜
}
.
Accordingly, the monitoring incentives under the optimal symmetric-information contract
are
v − v = min
{
γ
(
pih − k1
)
−W,−(1− γ)pil + (W − W˜ )
}
.
We now show that higher firm risk, in line with Definition 10, increases monitoring incentives
in the optimal symmetric-information contract. To do so, we characterize the comparative
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statics of monitoring incentives with respect to the riskiness of the new technology ζ.5
Proposition 19 (Monitoring Incentives and Risk). Monitoring incentives v−v are strictly
increasing in a mean-preserving spread of firm risk.
The proof follows directly from Remark 1, which shows that pih is strictly increasing in firm
risk, while pil is strictly decreasing. In Section 4.4, we use this result to derive testable
predictions from our model.
4.3.8 Optimal Contract under Asymmetric Information
We now consider the situation in which z is the borrower’s private information and the
implementation decision continues to be unobservable. Thus, the bank simultaneously faces
both moral hazard and asymmetric information. To highlight the key difference relative to
the setting in which there is only moral hazard, we refer to this setting simply as asymmetric
information (AI), and take it to be understood that moral hazard is present in addition to
asymmetric information.
When the bank is uninformed about z, it must, in essence, provide incentives to overcome
the borrower’s moral-hazard problem at the technology-adoption stage without knowing
whether the borrower must decide between qh and p, or between p and ql. Formally, we
require that the contract not be explicitly conditioned on z, but rather on the borrower’s
report ẑ only. The bank’s uncertainty about the nature of the borrower’s moral-hazard
problem leads to tension between the optimal incentive provision in each state: the bank
may have to forego providing incentives in one state of the world in order to efficiently
provide them in the other state, or the bank must cede steep moral-hazard rents in order
to be able to provide incentives in both states of the world. The optimal contract under
5 There is a slight subtlety in the implementation of the mean-preserving spread in terms of model
parameters, since firm riskiness is defined in terms of expected outcomes. In particular, a change in expected
outcomes does not uniquely identify a change in the underlying parameters. To most cleanly delineate the
effects of increases in risk, we implement mean-preserving spreads such that expected wages W and W˜ do
not change. In Appendix ??, we show that wages are independent of X, and that wages are never paid in
every state of the world. Hence, we always have enough degrees of freedom to implement mean-preserving
spreads in the desired manner.
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asymmetric information will therefore fall into one of three classes: full-incentive contracts
(FI), in which the borrower chooses the efficient technology in every state of the world,
implementation contracts (I), in which the borrower chooses the new technology in every
state of the world, and deterrence contracts (D), in which the borrower keeps the basic
technology in every state of the world. We index a generic contract class by j, and refer to
the contract that maximizes pledgeable income in each class as the optimal contract within
that class. The optimal contract under asymmetric information then is the optimal class-j
contract that delivers the highest pledgeable income across all contract classes.
We relegate a full analysis of the contracting problem to Appendix ??, and only present
our key findings. In particular, Proposition 20 summarizes the properties of the optimal
contract that allow us to derive empirical predictions for syndicate structure as a function
of borrower characteristics.
Proposition 20 (Optimal Contract under Asymmetric Information). Let W j denote the
expected wage payments in the optimal class-j contract. Then we have:
1. The optimal deterrence contract consists of offering {κ1(l), w(l)} in every state of the
world. Hence, WD = 0 and pledgeable income is pX.
2. The optimal implementation contract consists of offering {κ1(h), w(h)} in every state
of the world. Hence, W I = W˜ and pledgeable income is q˜X − γk1 − W˜ .
3. Expected wages under the optimal full-incentive contract are higher than under the
optimal implementation contract and the optimal symmetric-information contract:
WFI > W I and WFI > W . Pledgeable income is q̂X − γk1 −WFI .
4. Pledgeable income in the optimal contract under asymmetric information is
v̂ = max
{
q̂X − γk1 −WFI , q˜X − γk1 − W˜ , pX
}
.
5. There exist thresholds Πl and Πh such that the optimal contract under asymmetric
information is a full-incentive contract if and only if Πl ≥ Πl and Πh ≥ Πh.
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Taking the difference between v and v̂ reveals the value of information:
Corollary 10 (Value of Information). The value of information is
v − v̂ = min
{
WFI −W,γ
(
pih − k1
)
−W,−(1− γ)pil + (W − W˜ )
}
.
The following proposition shows that the value of information is weakly increasing in firm
risk.
Proposition 21 (Value of Information and Risk). The value of information is weakly
increasing in firm risk. In particular, the value of information is strictly increasing in
firm risk if Πl < Πl or Πh < Πh, and it is independent of firm risk if Πl ≥ Πl, Πh ≥ Πh,
with at least one inequality being strict.
The proof is simple. If the optimal contract is not a full-incentive contract, the proof follows
directly from the proof of Proposition 19. In particular, as long as the optimal contract
under asymmetric information induces an inefficient action in one state of the world, the
costs of asymmetric information increase when the costs of choosing the wrong technology,
defined by the payoff differences pih and pil, increase. As highlighted in Remark 1, these
costs increase precisely when riskiness increases. If the optimal contract is a full-incentive
contract, the borrower chooses the efficient technology in every state of the world under
both symmetric and asymmetric information. Hence, increased riskiness does not impact
the value of information. Putting these pieces together, the value of information is weakly
increasing in firm risk.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we take our model’s predictions regarding the impact of bank scope on
syndicate structure and loan shares retained by universal-bank lead arrangers to the data.
We show that by enabling the realization of economies of scope across loans and non-loan
products, the deregulation of bank scope leads to universal banks (i) being more likely to
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become lead arrangers (ii) while, conditional on being chosen as lead arrangers, retaining
smaller loan shares. We begin by summarizing the empirical predictions of our model, and
then turn to describing our identification strategy and empirical implementation. Section
4.4.3 compiles our results.
4.4.1 Empirical Predictions
In this section, we derive testable predictions from our theoretical model. In doing so, we
rely on three main findings. First, recall that the bank with the widest scope is chosen as
the unique lead arranger, and its lead share is
sn∗ =
B · (1−Bn∗)
v − v .
Hence, the lead share is decreasing in bank scopeBn, and decreasing in monitoring incentives
v − v. Second, v − v is strictly increasing in firm risk. Third, as stated in Corollary 21, the
value of information is weakly increasing in risk as well.
Our first empirical prediction considers the choice of lead arranger. Since banks of wide
scope require small loan shares to monitor, they are more likely to be chosen as lead ar-
rangers.
Empirical Prediction 1 (Lead-arranger Probability). Banks of wide scope are more likely
to be chosen as lead arrangers.
Second, we consider the model’s predictions for loan shares. We have shown that the lead
share decreases when a bank of wide scope is the lead arranger.
Empirical Prediction 2 (Lead Shares). Banks of wide scope receive smaller loan shares,
conditional on becoming lead arrangers. Thus, when the syndicate includes a bank of wide
scope, the lead share decreases.
Finally, we consider the comparative statics of lead shares with respect to borrower char-
acteristics. Namely, we have that the decreases in the lead share are less pronounced for
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risky borrowers, because the value of information is higher for them.
Empirical Prediction 3 (Lead Shares: Comparative Statics). The negative effect of wider
bank scope on lead shares is weaker for risky borrowers.
4.4.2 Empirical Setup
We next discuss our identification strategy based on the bank-scope deregulation following
the stepwise repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, as already used in Neuhann and Saidi (2014).
Then, we will describe the data on syndicated loans and our sample selection.
Identification Strategy
An important prerequisite for estimating the impact of bank scope on syndicate structure
is an empirical design that provides variation in bank scope. In Neuhann and Saidi (2014),
we argue that the stepwise repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act constitutes such a setting. The
Glass- Steagall Act of 1933 imposed a separation of commercial banking (deposit taking and
lending) and investment banking (especially underwriting of corporate securities). The first
major step of the repeal took place in January and September 1989, which is when com-
mercial banks were allowed to generate a certain proportion (10% in 1989, which increased
to 25% in 1996) of their revenues through underwriting activities, including underwriting of
corporate debt and equity. Commercial banks became universal banks typically by opening
so-called Section 20 subsidiaries for these purposes. Another possibility was to acquire an
investment bank.
While this first step towards universal banking led to an increase in bank size by allowing
banks to engage in both commercial and investment banking, they did so with firewalls
in place separating the two activities. These prudential limits, or firewalls, within bank-
holding companies were, however, abolished by the Federal Reserve Board in a second
step on August 1, 1996. Most importantly, the elimination of firewalls between securities
and commercial-bank divisions enabled universal banks to cross-sell loans and non-loan
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products, which used to be severely restricted, not to say forbidden, under the Federal
Reserve Act (Sections 23A and B).
We wish to test whether banks of wide scope are more likely to be chosen as lead arrangers
and whether, conditional on becoming lead arrangers, they retain smaller shares of loans.
In our model, the underlying mechanism is based on universal banks’ ability to realize
economies of scope across financial products. Empirically, this is operationalized through
cross-selling of loans and non-loan products. Thus, we hypothesize that universal, rather
than commercial, banks are more likely to become lead arrangers and retain smaller shares
of loans granted to firms that could enter into cross-selling relationships with those universal
banks.
In an attempt to match this interpretation of our model, we make use of the 1996 dereg-
ulation to capture varying propensities to cross-sell loans and non-loan products. Namely,
we employ a difference-in-differences strategy around August 1, 1996 for treated universal
banks vs. commercial banks that were unaffected in their scope of banking activities. Only
universal banks gained the ability to actively cross-sell after the deregulation, and we will
be able to differentiate between universal banks that existed already before the deregulation
and commercial banks that became universal banks thereafter.
The validity of our identification argument rests on two key assumptions. First, the timing
of the 1996 deregulation must have been unexpected. This assumption is affirmed by the
fact that the banking industry had already proposed the elimination of firewalls in 1991, but
had been rejected by the United States House Committee on Financial Services. Hence, it is
unlikely that banks and firms were anticipating the deregulatory policy before 1996. Second,
we assume that universal-bank and commercial-bank loan shares followed parallel trends
prior to the deregulation, for which we have presented some evidence in Figure 27.
We next turn to the empirical implementation. Each syndicated loan is a package that
consists of one or multiple facilities which, in turn, consist of loan shares provided by one or
multiple syndicate lenders. As we are interested in effects on each individual bank’s share
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within a loan syndicate, our outcome variables are defined at the package-bank level. That
is, for each syndicated loan, we include multiple observations per package, and dissect all
facilities within each package into one observation per (participating or lead) bank. This
allows us to include package-level fixed effects as well. We estimate the following regression
specification:
outcomeijkt = β1UBijkt + β2UB est. before 1996ijkt
+β3UB est. before 1996ijkt × After(1996)t
+λk + ψj + ijkt, (24)
where outcomeijkt is an outcome variable associated with bank k’s share of loan (package) j
(subsuming the borrower firm i) at date t, UBijkt and UB est. before 1996ijkt are indicator
variables for whether at the time of the loan transaction the (participating or lead) bank
was a universal bank anytime or before August 1, 1996, respectively, and After(1996)t
is an indicator variable for whether the loan was issued on or after August 1, 1996. λk
denotes bank fixed effects, which we specify for all banks that were or eventually became
universal banks (whereas all remaining commercial banks are grouped together), and ψj are
package-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the package level.6
Note that we can estimate a coefficient on UBijkt even in the presence of bank fixed effects,
because we track commercial banks that may have opted to become universal banks after
their first loan transaction in the data, so that UBijkt varies within banks. In doing so,
we distinguish between universal banks established before and after 1996 to estimate a
potential bias due to commercial banks’ endogenous timing to become universal banks.
The post-1996 effect for universal banks established after the deregulation is given by β1,
whereas the post-1996 effect for universal banks established before the deregulation is given
by the sum of β1, β2, and β3. The latter is also the group, which allows us to estimate
the difference-in-differences effect in comparison to commercial banks before and after 1996,
6Standard errors for all our estimates are virtually invariant to clustering at the bank level.
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which is reflected by β3.
The difference between these two groups of universal banks is given by the sum of β2 and
β3, and indicates to what extent commercial banks timed their conversion into universal
banks in a manner that is endogenous to our outcome variables of interest. As we will
see, throughout all estimations, the post-1996 effect on lead-arranger probabilities is much
stronger for universal banks established before 1996. This implies that universal banks
that came into existence only after 1996 were unlikely to do so for considerations that were
endogenous to their acting as lead arrangers following the deregulation of bank scope.
Note that we record each bank’s loan share separately within each package (loan), so we can
include package fixed effects. These fixed effects capture many relevant loan characteristics,
most importantly the loan date, borrower characteristics at the time of loan issue, and
general characteristics of the syndicate, e.g., the number and the actual network of syndicate
lenders. Including package fixed effects also alleviates concerns that would ultimately lead
to a violation of the parallel-trends assumption between universal and commercial banks,
such as bank-firm matching based on unobserved time-varying firm-level characteristics, as
the latter are invariant within a package.
This empirical setup enables us to gauge the impact of bank scope on syndicate structure. In
doing so, we connect with Sufi (2007) and Ivashina (2009) who also scrutinize the distribu-
tion of shares retained by syndicate lenders. The most important advance that we attempt
to make is to account for heterogeneity in bank scope among syndicate lenders, differenti-
ating at the very least between universal and commercial banks. This, in turn, allows us to
exploit the variation in bank scope generated by the stepwise repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act, especially regarding the ability of universal banks to realize economies of scope through
cross-selling. In this manner, we strengthen our causal interpretation that syndicate lenders
with a wide bank scope are more likely to be chosen as lead arrangers.
When we scrutinize lead shares, however, we need to move from the package-bank (ijkt)
level to the package (ijt) level, which no longer allows us to include package-level fixed
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effects. We translate our difference-in-differences strategy to the analysis of loan shares
retained by lead arrangers, as reflected by the following regression specification:
outcomeijt = β1UBijt + β2UBijt × After(1996)t + β3Xit + θit + µj + ijt, (25)
where outcomeijt is an outcome variable associated with loan (package) j (subsuming the
borrower firm i) at date t, UBijt is an indicator variable for whether at the time of the
loan transaction any one of the (participating or lead) banks was a universal bank, and
After(1996)t is an indicator variable for whether the loan was issued on or after August 1,
1996. Xit summarizes time-varying borrower characteristics, θit denotes industry-year fixed
effects, and µj denotes syndicate fixed effects that are included for all participating and
lead banks at the package level that were or eventually became universal banks, whereas
all remaining commercial banks are grouped together in one category.
When we move from analyzing lead-arranger probabilities for all syndicate members to
explaining lead shares at the aggregate package/loan level, we face the challenge that ac-
cording to our model, universal banks are picked as lead arrangers precisely because of their
smaller required lead shares. Thus, we cannot condition on loan shares being granted by
lead-arranger universal banks. Instead, we define UBijt at the aggregate loan level, so that
its indication of whether any bank in the syndicate was a universal bank instruments for
the heightened probability that said universal bank was chosen as lead arranger.
As in specification (24), the omitted category consists of commercial banks that were unaf-
fected by the 1996 deregulation. Given that we use a package-level indicator for the presence
of any universal banks in the syndicate, UBijt, it is more difficult to differentiate between
effects being driven by universal banks established before vs. after the deregulation. How-
ever, as alluded to above, and as will become clear when we discuss the estimation results,
the endogeneity of banks’ timing to become universal banks does not appear to bias upward
at least their estimated propensity to become lead arrangers.
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Data Description
Before presenting the results, we briefly describe our data. As our main data source, we use
syndicated loans issued by publicly listed U.S. firms from 1985 to 2010 from the DealScan
database. We complement our loan data with CRSP stock prices, SDC debt- and equity-
underwriting as well as Compustat data.
We consider all completed loan transactions in the DealScan database involving publicly
listed U.S. firms, with valid data on syndicate banks’ lead-arranger status and/or loan
shares. As described above, each loan (package) consists of multiple facilities, but multiple
banks may participate in a single facility. Our observations are at the package-bank level,
i.e., we build multiple observations per package, and within each package one observation
per (participating or lead) bank. To calculate the share retained by each bank, we first
determine the unique share retained by each bank in every role it has in the syndicate by
dropping duplicate observations. We then sum up all loan shares for each bank within a
package, and keep only one observation per bank, which includes the information whether
the respective bank (also) acted as a lead arranger in the syndicate.
To identify all universal banks, we make use of our hand-collected data on all universal
banks and their establishment dates in the DealScan database. For the above-described
sample, we yield 43 universal banks, 40 of which overlap with the universal banks identified
in Neuhann and Saidi (2014).7 We provide a list of these universal banks alongside a
differentiation by their date and mode of establishment (opening of a Section 20 subsidiary
or bank-scope-expanding M&A) in Table 23.
When we consider cross-selling of loans and corporate-securities-underwriting services (mostly
debt and equity underwriting), we merge the DealScan data with the SDC underwriting
data. This enables us to determine whether a loan share was accompanied by debt or equity
issued through the same universal bank as the one in the loan syndicate.
7This is because we do not focus exclusively on lead arrangers in this paper. Furthermore, three additional
universal banks appear in this data set, namely Republic New York (which was eventually acquired by
HSBC), Swiss Bank Corp, and Union Bank of Switzerland (both of which merged in 1998).
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To characterize the ex-ante riskiness of a firm, we use six-year, leading up to the year of the
loan issue, stock-return volatilities, which are calculated using monthly CRSP data, and id-
iosyncratic volatilities estimated from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.
In the first panel of Table 24, we present summary statistics for our regression sample with
data available for all variables used in the regressions, except for the loan share. The level
of observation is the package-bank level. The banks’ lead-arranger status is more broadly
available in DealScan: our sample drops from 170,758 to 76,582 observations when we
condition on the availability of loan shares.
In the second panel of Table 24, we move to the package level, requiring data on lead
arrangers and the distribution of loan shares within each syndicated loan. This restriction
yields 11,852 packages, and implies that we have approximately 6.48 (participating or lead)
banks per package. The vast majority of loans has only one lead arranger, namely 10,301
out of 11,852 packages. We also consider the concentration of loan shares, as captured by
a Herfindahl Index, which is defined for all 11,852 packages, i.e., irrespective of the number
of lead arrangers. Our sample drops to 7,250 when we require six years of stock-return
data up to the year of loan issue for the calculation of volatilities, and drops to 7,171
when we consider bankruptcy-related reasons for being delisted within ten years. Overall,
roughly two-thirds of all loans involved at least one universal bank as participant or lead
arranger.
In addition, the first panel of Table 24 also provides information on the distribution of
universal and commercial banks in our sample, and the depth of bank-firm interactions
associated with these loan shares. 36.6% of the loan shares are given out by universal
banks, more than one quarter of which (0.099/0.366) are cross-sold. We define cross-selling
as the incidence of concurrent lending and corporate-securities underwriting by universal
banks. We label a loan share as cross-sold if the same universal bank also served as a
bookrunner in at least one underwriting mandate anytime from two years before to two
years after the respective loan issue (implying a five-year circle). For comparison, 92.0% of
all loan shares are associated with debtors that also received an equity- or debt-underwriting
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product within said five-year circle from any universal or investment bank. This attests
to the homogeneity within our sample of publicly listed firms in terms of their concurrent
demand for loans and non-loan products.
4.4.3 Results
We now turn to the regression results for lead-arranger choices. In Table 25, we estimate
regression specification (24) with an indicator for lead-arranger status as dependent vari-
able. While always including bank fixed effects, we run this specification without package
fixed effects in the first four columns, and include them in the last column. In the absence
of package fixed effects, we include, instead, syndicate fixed effects for all (lead or partici-
pating) banks in the loan syndicate, as well as (industry-)year fixed effects. As pointed out
previously, the inclusion of package fixed effects enables us to control for unobservable het-
erogeneity at the package level, ranging from loan characteristics to borrower characteristics
at the time of the loan issue.
The difference-in-differences estimate is given by the coefficient on UB est. before 1996ijkt ×
After(1996)t. It indicates to what extent universal banks established before 1996 were
more likely to become lead arrangers after 1996, as compared to commercial banks before
vs. after 1996. Across all columns of Table 25, this estimate is positive and significant at
the 1% level, irrespective of whether we cluster standard errors at the package level, as we
do in the tables shown in this paper, or at the bank level.
Overall, we find that treated universal banks were at least ten percentage points more
likely to become lead arrangers following the 1996 deregulation than were commercial banks
whose scope of banking activities was unaffected. Interestingly, the estimates suggest that
universal banks established before 1996 were just as likely to become lead arrangers as were
commercial banks before the deregulation. This is reflected by the fact that the sum of the
coefficients on UBijkt and UB est. before 1996ijkt is not different from zero after including
syndicate fixed effects in the second column.
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Furthermore, as alluded to before, the sum of the coefficients on UB est. before 1996ijkt
and UB est. before 1996ijkt × After(1996)t is always positive, thereby indicating, that
the positive effect on lead-arranger probabilities is stronger for our treatment group than
for universal banks established after the deregulation. This renders it unlikely that the
latter group’s timing to become a universal bank is endogenous to our outcome variable of
interest.
These insights remain unaltered when we limit the sample to loans for which we have addi-
tional data on loan shares, rather than just the lead-arranger status of individual syndicate
lenders, in Table 26. We view all of this as evidence in favor of our Empirical Prediction
1.
In Table 27, we re-run the same specifications as in Table 25 with actual loan shares as
dependent variable. This is not our main test of interest regarding loan shares, as our model
generates predictions regarding loan shares retained by lead arrangers, which – most of the
time – correspond to a single observation per package. However, Table 25 already hints at
the idea that treated universal banks, while, as just seen, they are more likely to be chosen
as lead arrangers, retain smaller loan shares.
This manifests itself in two ways. First, after including package-level fixed effects in the last
column, there is no difference in loan shares retained by treated universal banks, which were
established before the deregulation, and commercial banks after 1996. This is due to the fact
that the sum of the three coefficients in the last column is zero. Second, across the first four
columns without package fixed effects, the difference-in-differences estimate, while positive
and significant, does not appear to be commensurate with the treatment effects on the
lead-arranger probability in Tables 25 and 26. Instead, the positive treatment effect reflects
primarily universal banks’ increased probability to be chosen as lead arrangers.
To see this, we know from Table 24 that the average loan share retained by lead arrangers
in our regression sample is 55.2%, and that by participants is 9.5%. Using the estimated
treatment effect from the last column of Table 26 (to safeguard comparability, we use the
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same sample), the expected treatment-implied increase in the loan share is 4.7 percentage
points (= (55.2%−9.5%)×10.2%). This exceeds the actual treatment effect of 1.1 percentage
points, as implied by our difference-in-differences estimate in the last column of Table 27.
This finding, which holds qualitatively also for all remaining specifications in Tables 26 and
27, can be interpreted as reflecting our theoretical mechanism that universal banks’ non-
loan exposure to the firm – e.g., through cross-selling – allows the firm to provide relatively
small lead shares to these banks while still maintaining monitoring incentives.
The inclusion of package fixed effects in the last column of Tables 25 to 27 implies that for
the identification of our treatment effect, we can compare universal-bank and commercial-
bank loan shares within a package, but the differential impact of the 1996 deregulation only
across packages. This is because our treatment is defined at the bank-year level. As we
argue that the 1996 deregulation spurred cross-selling by universal banks, which, in turn,
enabled them to become lead arrangers at lower loan shares, this opens up an alternative
identification approach, where we compare – within packages – cross-sold and non-cross-sold
universal-bank loan shares.
To this end, we re-run the specifications from the last column of Tables 25, 26, and 27 in the
first, third, and fifth column, respectively, of Table 28. We differentiate between commercial-
bank loan shares granted to firms that concurrently received an underwriting product from
any universal or investment bank – as captured by the coefficient on Underwritingit –
universal-bank loan shares granted to firms that concurrently received such an underwriting
product (but not necessarily from the same universal bank) and, finally, cross-sold universal-
bank loan shares.
As the incidence of cross-selling is not necessarily exogenous, we have previously used the
1996 deregulation as a source of variation. In Table 28, we lack suck variation, but always
include package fixed effects, which – as argued before – control for unobserved time-varying
firm-level characteristics. This, in turn, alleviates any concerns at least with respect to bank-
firm matching based on unobserved firm characteristics. In addition, package fixed effects
control for any shocks to firm-level demand, e.g., firms’ concurrent demand for loans and
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non-loan products.
Focussing on the more comparable sample conditional on the availability of loan shares
in the third column, cross-sold universal-bank loan shares were significantly more – 47.5
percentage points – likely to be chosen as lead arrangers than non-cross-selling universal
banks within the same package. The effect is larger in size than our previous difference-in-
differences estimate of 10.2 percentage points in the last column of Table 26 because the
1996 deregulation increased only the capacity for cross-selling.
Comparing the estimates in the third and fifth columns in Table 28, we once again find
that the cross-selling-implied increase in loan shares is not commensurate with the increase
in the likelihood to become lead arranger, as (55.2% − 9.5%) × 47.5% = 21.7 percentage
points, which is at least four times as large as the estimate – 4.8 percentage points – in the
fifth column.
Finally, as cross-selling is not defined at the bank-year level, we can include bank-year
fixed effects in the second, fourth, and sixth columns, which control for bank-level supply
shocks. This yields a significantly positive (at the 1% level) effect of cross-sold universal-
bank shares on the lead-arranger probability, compared to commercial-bank shares, as can
be inferred from the sum of the four coefficients in the second and fourth column. On the
other hand, the sum of the four coefficients in the sixth column is not significantly different
from zero, implying that cross-selling universal banks were not assigned any larger shares
than commercial banks. This further attests to our hypothesis that cross-selling universal
banks were more likely to become lead arrangers because they were able to offer monitoring
in exchange for lower loan shares.
To more explicitly test our Empirical Prediction 2, we move to the package level, and
analyze the average loan share retained by lead arrangers. As the outcome variable of
interest is defined at the package level, this does not allow us to include package-level fixed
effects, which in our previous tests absorbed variation at the borrower-firm and loan-specific
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levels.8
Our model predicts the treatment effect of universal-banking deregulation on lead shares to
be negative. To investigate this, in Table 29, we run specification (25) with syndicate and
year fixed effects in the first column. At the package level, syndicate fixed effects constitute
fixed effects for each participating or lead bank in the syndicate. We find that while syndi-
cates comprising at least one universal bank generally had – 29.2 percentage points – smaller
average lead shares than pure commercial-bank syndicates, the gap widened significantly
by another 4.5 percentage points after 1996. These estimates mirror the developments in
Figure 27.
This finding is robust to including industry-year fixed effects in the second column and
borrower-firm-level explanatory variables in the third column. Finally, in the fourth column,
we limit the sample to syndicates with only one lead arranger. We do this to safeguard that
our results in the first three columns are not driven by a potential increase in the number of
lead arrangers – and, thus, in the denominator of our dependent variable – in universal-bank
syndicates after the 1996 deregulation. 86.9% of the loans in our sample had only one lead
arranger, and when limiting our sample to the latter group, the difference-in-differences
estimate remains virtually unaltered compared to that in the third column.
In Table 30, we repeat the same estimations as in Table 29, but use as dependent variable
our loan-share concentration measure, which is a Herfindahl Index between 0 and 1. Since
reduced loan shares allow for better diversification across the syndicate, the loan-share
concentration should drop as well. In line with Empirical Prediction 2, we find the loan-
share concentration to decrease in universal-bank syndicates following the 1996 deregulation.
Furthermore, the difference-in-differences estimates are quantitatively very similar to those
in Table 29.
8This weakness is in part exacerbated by both the imperfect availability of loan-share data in DealScan
and the ownership fluctuations during the run-time of loans due to secondary-market transactions. These
criticisms apply to studies using DealScan data in general. An alternative data source is the Shared National
Credit program (SNC), which provides data on loan shares over the run-time of syndicated loans. As pointed
out by Bord and Santos (2012), lead shares are relatively constant for credit lines, rather than term loans.
In an attempt to cope with the criticism of not having loan-share data over the run-time of syndicated loans,
we re-ran all regressions on the subset of credit lines, with robust results throughout.
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In Table 31, we re-run the same set of regressions, and use as dependent variable the
average participant share. Our model does not predict any changes in participant shares
due to bank-scope deregulation, which should translate into a zero difference-in-differences
estimate. This is confirmed across all four columns of Table 31. Interestingly, syndicates
with universal-bank participation were associated with up to 10 percentage points higher
average participant shares. This effect is significant at the 1% level, and sheds light on
our previously estimated negative coefficient of UBijt on average lead shares (cf. Table
29). This is important insofar as it partially rules out that said estimated coefficients were
due to extended means of information acquisition – other than cross-selling – available to
universal banks even before the 1996 deregulation.
We next consider the comparative statics of lead shares with respect to firm characteristics,
as given in Empirical Prediction 3, namely that the decrease in lead shares should be more
pronounced for firms that are less risky. The basic rationale builds on our result that the
value of information (or monitoring incentives) is higher for risky firms.
To test this, we split our sample into loans that were associated with a measure of pre-loan
firm-level riskiness in the bottom vs. top 50% of the distribution in our loans sample, and
re-run the regression from the third column of Table 29 on these subsamples. In the first
two columns of Table 32, we use as a measure of pre-loan firm-level riskiness the borrower
firm’s six-year stock-return volatility, σt−5,treturn,i. We pick stock-return volatility and the
corresponding data requirement for this test in order to achieve a relatively homogenous
distribution of the private cost of monitoring B in our sample. Keeping B constant is all
the more important in the context of our model, as the latter should have a positive effect
on the lead share (see also Sufi (2007)).
In line with our prediction, the negative treatment is significant only in the sample of low-
risk loans, and economically so at negative 6.7 percentage points (first column). This is
in stark contrast to the virtually non-existing treatment effect for high-risk loans (in the
second column). In the last two columns of Table 32, we show that these estimates hold up
to, and become even more emphasized when, using splits based on idiosyncratic volatility,
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calculated over the six years leading up to the year of the loan issue, σt−5,tidiosyncratic,i.
Finally, we provide evidence that monitoring efficiency has, indeed, not deteriorated pur-
suant to bank-scope deregulation. This is to lend support to our hypothesis that due to
richer bank-firm interactions, universal banks do not require large loan shares to have in-
centives to monitor, so falling universal-bank loan shares should not reflect any decline
in monitoring efficiency. To this end, we re-run our package-level regressions from Table
29, and use as dependent variable an indicator for whether the borrowing company went
bankrupt within ten years (our results are robust to variations in the horizon).
The results are in Table 33. We find that loans with universal-bank participants or lead ar-
rangers were, on average, less likely to be associated with eventual bankruptcy (as indicated
by the negative coefficient on UBijt). However, the difference-in-differences estimate is in-
significant, which suggests that following the 1996 deregulation, this gap in borrower-level
default risk remained unaltered between lending syndicates comprising universal banks and
pure commercial-bank syndicated loans.
Altogether, our findings yield support for all of the model’s predictions. In particular, we
have shown that bank scope is a key determinant of lead-arranger status and lead shares,
and that the comparative statics in the data line up with those in the model.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the provision of monitoring incentives in loan syndicates.
Theoretically, we argue that non-loan interactions between banks and borrower firms are a
key determinant of monitoring incentives in syndicates. In particular, non-loan interactions
increase the bank’s exposure to firm performance and, thus, reduce the loan shares required
within the syndicate to provide monitoring incentives to the bank. Since the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act led to the growth of universal banks and resulted in richer and
more complex bank-firm interactions, we provide a theory of syndicate structure that is
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consistent with decreasing lead shares and continued efficient monitoring from the mid
1990s onwards.
We use our model to explicitly characterize the link between the value of information,
monitoring incentives and firm characteristics, and show that firms are more likely to opt
for banks of wide scope as their lead arrangers, but offer them lower loan shares conditional
on becoming lead arrangers. Exploiting the gradual repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act to
generate variation in bank scope and, thus, in the extent of bank-firm interactions, we find
strong support for the model’s predictions.
Our findings speak to recent debates regarding the evolving nature of financial markets
and corporate financing. In particular, while some commentators have highlighted the
risk-sharing benefits of syndicated lending, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b) as well as
Gorton and Metrick (2012) have argued that reduced lead shares, and the movement to-
wards an originate-to-distribute business model for banks, may enhance lender moral hazard
by discouraging diligent monitoring. While far from resolving this debate, we argue that
understanding monitoring incentives may require taking a broader view of bank-firm inter-
actions.
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Chapter A
Appendix to “Macroeconomic
Effects of Secondary Market
Trading”
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Fix the financier’s outstanding debt bf and assets k = wf + Qbbf . By risk-neutrality, the
solution must be bang-bang: the financier invests all his assets in either risky claims or the
safe technology. By investing k in secondary markets at price Qa(µ
∗), the financier obtains
an expected profit of vRf = pih
(
yR(h)
Qa(µ∗)k − bb
)
+ (1 − pih)max
{
yR(l)
Qa(µ∗)k − bf , 0,
}
. Hence
vRf ≥ vRf ≡ pih
(
yR(h)
Qa(µ∗)k − bf
)
+ (1− pih)
(
yR(l)
Qa(µ∗)k − bf
)
. If the financiers invests k units in
the safe technology instead, he receives an expected profit of vSf = y¯Sk− bb. It follows from
the definitions of k and Rˆunlev(µ∗) that vRf = Rˆ
unlev(µ∗)k − bf , while vRf > vRf if and only
if bf >
yR(l)wf
Qa(µ∗)−QbyR(l) . Accordingly, v
f
R > v
f
S if at least one of the stated conditions is not
satisfied.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Fix the banker’s outstanding debt bb and assets k = wb + Qbbb. By risk-neutrality, the
solution must be bang-bang: the banker invests all his assets in either the risky technology
or the safe technology. By investing k in the risky technology, the banker obtains an expected
profit of vRb = pih (yR(h)k − bb) + (1 − pih)max{yR(l)k − bb, 0} ≥ pih (yR(h)k − bb) + (1 −
pih) (yR(l)k − bb) ≡ vRb . By investing k in the safe technology instead, the banker receives
an expected profit of vSb = y¯Sk−bb. Since EzyR(z) > y¯S , vRb > vSb for all k and bb.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the following candidate equilibrium. Bankers and depositors choose bond and
investment quantities as in there were no secondary markets. Every banker sets ab = ab = 0.
Every financier bids af (µ) = 0 and Qa(µ) = 0 for all µ and sets kS,f = wf . We want to
show that this is an equilibrium. Specifically, we want to show that there no profitable
deviations that lead to positive trade on secondary markets. Since Qa(µ) < Qa(Qb) ≤ yˆR
for all µ and all Qb ∈ [ 1yˆR , 1], no banker has an incentive to sell risky claims at the given
prices. Since ab = 0 for all bankers, a financier can induce a banker to sell assets under
limited commitment only by offering Qa = yˆR. But doing so yields no greater return than
investing in the safe technology.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Begin with the first part of the proposition, and fix a full-monitoring equilibrium with high
secondary market liquidity. Assume first that financiers are fully levered (γ = 1). The
optimal banker portfolio satisfies bb = Qaab, while the secondary market clearing condition
is ab = af . Since the financier portfolio satisfies bf = yR(l)af , the funding market clearing
condition in an interior equilibrium can be written as. Qaaf + yR(l)af =
wd
Qb
Rearranging
gives the bond price as Qb(Qa) = min
(
Qawd
(Qa+yR(l))wf+yR(l)wd
, 1y
S
)
. The secondary market
clearing condition in turn gives the secondary market price as Qa =
wf+wbm˜yR(l)Qb
m˜wb+m˜Qbwf
. Assume
first that Qb =
1
y
S
. Then Q∗a =
wf+wbm˜yR(l)
1
y
S
m˜wb+m˜
1
y
S
wf
. Differentiating yields that Q∗a is increasing
in wf if and only if wb > m˜wb
yR(l)
y
S
, which always holds because m˜ ∈ (0, 1) and yR(l) < yS .
Moreover, kR,b =
wb
1−m˜QbQa is increasing because Qa is increasing and Qb is a constant. Since
all bankers monitor, expected output also increases. Now assume that Qb <
1
y
S
. Solving the
system of two unknowns generated by the market clearing conditions gives the secondary
market price as
Q∗a =
wf − m˜yR(l)wb +
√
(wf − m˜yR(l)wb)2 + 4m˜(wb + wd)yR(l)(wf + wd)
2m˜(wb + wd)
which is clearly increasing in wf . Next, we need to show that kR,b is strictly increasing in
wf . Given the optimal banker portfolio, kR,b =
1
m˜ab. By market clearing, kR,b =
1
m˜af . Since
af is strictly increasing in wf , the result follows. Moreover, expected output is increasing
because all bankers monitor. Next, assume that financiers do not borrow (γ = 0). Then
the market clearing conditions yield Q∗b = min
(
wd
Qam˜(wb+wd)
, 1y
S
)
and Q∗a =
wf
m˜(wb+Qbwf )
.
If Q∗b =
1
y
S
, then Qa is clearly increasing in wf . If Qb <
1
y
S
, then Q∗a =
wf
m˜(wd+wb)
which
is again increasing in wf . Next, note that Q
∗
bQ
∗
a =
wd
m˜(wb+wd)
. Hence kR,b =
wb
1−QbQam˜ is
non-decreasing in wf . Next, assume that financiers are indifferent between borrowing and
lending (γ ∈ (0, 1)). Then by definition, Q∗a = yˆRQ∗b , and bf = γyR(l)af . The secondary
market clearing condition is m˜wb
1−Q2a m˜yˆR
=
wf
Qa(1− γyR(l)yˆR )
. Suppose for a contradiction that Qa is
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decreasing in wf . Then ab =
m˜wb
1−Q2a m˜yˆR
is also decreasing in wf . To maintain market clearing,
af must be decreasing in wf , and hence γ, bb = Qaab and bf = γyR(l)af must also be
decreasing. But if bb and bf are decreasing in wf , then Qb must be increasing in wf . This
is a contradiction with the fact that Qb must decreasing because Q
∗
a = yˆRQ
∗
b and Qa was
presumed to be decreasing. It then follows that kR,b =
wb
1−Q2a m˜yˆR
is increasing in wf . Because
all bankers monitor, expected output is increasing in wf also.
Now turn to the second part of the proposition, and fix a full-monitoring equilibrium with
low liquidity. By definition, Q∗a = Qa(Qb) =
yˆR−yR(l)+yˆRQbm′
Qb(yˆR−yR(l)+m′) so that Q
∗
a is decreasing in
Qb. To show that Qa is increasing in wf is therefore to show that Qb is decreasing in wf .
Note first that the proposition is trivial when financiers are indifferent toward leverage.
In that case, Qa = yˆRQb and so both prices are constants. Moreover, kR,b is strictly in-
creasing because ab = af is increasing. If the financial system is highly constrained, then
Q∗b =
1
y
S
. Hence Qa and Qb are constants, and kR,b is strictly increasing in wf . It remains
to be shown that Qa increasing in wf if the financial system is not highly constrained and
financiers are either fully levered or do not borrow. To this end, recall financier demand
is af =
wf
Q
a
(Qb)−γyR(l)Qb . Suppose for a contradiction that Qb is increasing in wf . We first
show that af must strictly increase. Suppose for a contradiction that af weakly decreases.
Then Qb must strictly decrease given that wf increased. But if af is weakly decreasing, so
is bf . Similarly, strictly lower Qb and weakly lower af imply that bb is strictly smaller. But
if bf and bb both weakly decrease, then Qb cannot fall, yielding a contradiction. Hence af
is strictly increasing in wf . But bb and bf are both strictly increasing in af . Hence Qb must
fall, and Qa must increase.
Next, consider shirking equilibria. Given the optimal portfolios of bankers, it is straightfor-
ward to show that Q∗a = Q¯a = yˆ′R when liquidity is high. The secondary market price is a
constant. If the financial system is highly constrained, then Qb is fixed at
1
y
S
, and prices are
constants. As a result, kR,b is a constant. To clear secondary markets at fixed prices, Φ must
be increasing in wf . Given that kR,b is constant, expected output must be declining. If the
financial system is not highly constrained, then the market clearing conditions are:
yˆ′Rm˜Wb
1−Qbyˆ′Rm˜
+
γ(1− φ)yR(l)Wf
yˆ′R − (1− φ)QbγyR(l)
=
Wd
Qb
and (
Φ+ (1− Φ)m˜
1−Qbyˆ′Rm˜
)
Wb =
Wf
yˆ′R − (1− φ)QbγyR(l)
.
Suppose first that financiers are indifferent toward leverage (γ ∈ (0, 1)). Then Q∗b = Q
∗
a
yˆR
is a
constant. It follows immediately that Φ is increasing in wf , while kR,b is independent of wf .
Hence expected output must decline. Next, suppose financiers do not borrow (γ = 0). In
this case, the bond market clearing condition is independent of wf , and so Qb is a constant.
Hence kR,b is a constant, and expected output must decline. Finally, assume that financiers
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are fully levered (γ = 1). Imposing bond market clearing reveals that Qb must satisfy
Q∗b,PM (Φ, wf ) =
wd
m˜
[
yˆ′R(wb + wd) + (1− Φ)yR(l)wf
] .
Note that Q∗b,PM (Φ, wf ) is strictly increasing in Φ and strictly decreasing in wf . Similarly,
the bond price that clears the secondary market is
Q∗b,SM (Φ) =
wf − wbyˆ′R(Φ + (1− Φ)m˜)
m˜ [(wb + wf )yR(l) + wbyR(l)Φ]
.
Note that Q∗b,SM (Φ, wf ) is strictly increasing in wf but strictly decreasing in Φ. It is then
straightforward to show that Φ must be strictly increasing in wf . Suppose for a contradic-
tion that is decreasing. By bond market clearing, an increase in wf and a decrease in Φ
leads to fall in Qb. But by secondary market clearing, an increase in wf and a decrease in
Φ leads to an increase in Qb. Hence both markets do not clear simultaneously, leading to
a contradiction. The result then follows.
Next consider a low-liquidity equilibrium. I will first show that whenever the financial sys-
tem is highly constrained, or financiers weakly prefer to not borrow, then Q∗b , Q
∗
a, k
H
R,b and
aHb are all invariant to wf . Suppose first that the financial system is highly constrained,
so that Q∗b =
1
y
S
. Then Q∗a = Qa(Q
∗
b) is a constant, and thus invariant to wf . Since
kHR,b =
wb+Q
∗
b (Q
∗
a−yR(l))aHb
1−yR(l)Q∗bm˜ in any shirking equilibrium, k
∗
R,b and Q
∗
a = Q¯a = yˆR −m
kHR,b
kHR,b−aHb
in any shirking equilibrium, kHR,b and a
H
b are also invariant to wf . Now suppose that fi-
nanciers do not borrow. The market-clearing condition in the bond market is then given
by bHb =
yR(l)m˜wb+(Qa−yR(l))aHb
1−yR(l)Q∗bm˜ =
wd
Qb
. Hence aHb is fixed conditional on Qb. Since Q
∗
a =
Q¯a = yˆR −m k
H
R,b
kHR,b−aHb
and kR,b is fixed once Qb is determined, the condition Qa = Qa(Qb)
suffices to pin down Qb, Qa, k
H
R,b and a
H
b independently of wf . But given that all quantities
are pinned down independently of wf , it must be the case that Φ increases in wf to en-
sure secondary market clearing. Moreover, given fixed kR,b, expected output must decline.
Now assume that financiers are fully levered and that the financial system is not highly
constrained. Then the market clearing conditions are:
yR(l)m˜wb + (Qa − yR(l))aHb
1−QbyR(l)m˜ +
yR(l)wf
Q
a
− (1− φ)QbyR(l) =
wd
Qb
and
Φ
(
wb +Qb(Qa − yR(l))aHb
1−QbyR(l)m˜
)
+ (1− Φ)aHb =
wf
Q
a
− (1− φ)QbyR(l) ,
The secondary market price must satisfy Q∗a = Qa(Qb), and is thus fixed for given Qb. The
high-type banker’s investment is given by:
kHR,b =
wb
1−QbyR(l)m˜ +
(
yˆR − yR(l)
yˆR − yR(l)m˜
)
aHb
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Hence, kHR,b is a function of a
H
b and Qb only. Given that we are in a shirking equilibrium,
Qa = Q¯a(k
H
R,b, a
H
b ), and so Qa and Qb are fixed for a given a
H
b . It is easy to verify that
Q¯a is strictly decreasing in a
H
b . We can then show that Φ must be strictly increasing in
wf . Suppose for a contradiction that Φ is weakly decreasing. For the bond market to clear,
either Qb and/or a
H
b must decrease. Since Qa = Qa, if Qb falls, then Qa must increase.
Since Qa = Q¯a and Q¯a is strictly decreasing in a
H
b , it follows that Qb and a
H
b must both
decrease. Since bb and Qb are decreasing, it follows that kR,b must decrease. Since kR,b, a
H
b ,
and Φ are all decreasing, total secondary market supply must decrease. Yet af is weakly
increasing. Hence secondary markets cannot clear, yielding a contradiction.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 4
Inspecting the optimal intermediary portfolios, it follows that aggregate investment in a full-
monitoring low-liquidity equilibrium is proportional to Wb − ∆ +
Q∗b
[
Q
a
(Q∗b )−yR(l)
][
Wf+∆
]
Q
a
(Q∗b )−Q∗byR(l) .
The coefficient on ∆ is equal to zero when Q∗b = 1 and strictly positive when Q
∗
b > 1. When
the financial sector is highly constrained, then Q∗b =
1
y
S
independent of ∆ for ∆ sufficiently
small.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Fix a full-monitoring low-liquidity equilibrium with a highly constrained financial system.
The expected return on equity earned by bankers and financiers, respectively, is
ˆROEb =
yˆR − yR(l)m˜
1−Q∗byR(l)m˜
and ˆROEf =
yˆR − yR(l)
Q
a
(Q∗b)−QbyR(l)
Moreover, ˆROEf > ˆROEb if Q
∗
b > 1 and ROEf ≤ ROEb if Q∗b ≤ 1.
Since liquidity is low, the secondary market price is given by Q∗a = Qa(Q
∗
b). Moreover,
bankers receive no rents from secondary market trading by definition. Bankers’ expected
return on equity is therefore equal to bankers’ expected return on equity in an equilibrium
without secondary markets. This gives the first result:
ˆROEb =
yˆR − yR(l)m˜
1−Q∗byR(l)m˜
Next, turn to financiers’ return on equity. Since financiers are fully levered, the expected
utility of financiers is
vf = yˆRaf − bf = yˆR − yR(l)
Q
a
(Q∗b)−Q∗byR(l)
wf
Hence ˆROEf =
yˆR−yR(l)
Q
a
(Q∗b )−QbyR(l) . To show the remaining results, I begin by showing that
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ˆROEf = ˆROEb if Qb = 1. To this, write the expected returns on equity of both intermedi-
aries at Qb = 1 and for a generic Qa as:
ˆROEb =
yˆR − yR(l)m˜
1− yR(l)m˜ and
ˆROEf =
yˆR − yR(l)
Qa − yR(l)
Algebra reveals that ˆROEb = ˆROEf at Qb = 1 if and only if
Qa =
yˆR − yR(l) + (1− m˜)yR(l)yˆR
yˆR − yR(l)m˜ = Qa(1).
To show that ˆROEf > ˆROEb when Qb > 1 and ˆROEf ≤ ˆROEb otherwise, it then suffices
to show that
∂ ˆROEf
∂Qb
> ∂
ˆROEb
∂Qb
. To this end, note first that ˆROEf = (yˆR − yR(l))λf and
ˆROEf = (yˆR−yR(l)m˜)λb, where λf = 1Q
a
−QbyR(l) and λb =
1
1−QbyR(l)m˜ denotes the leverage
of financiers and bankers, respectively. Since m˜ ∈ (0, 1), it follows immediately that λf > λb
if Qb = 1. That is, financiers have higher leverage than bankers when Qb = 1. Finally, note
that
∂ ˆROEf
∂Qb
=
(
yR(l)−
∂Q
a
(Qb)
∂Qb
)
λ2f and
∂ ˆROEb
∂Qb
= yR(l)m˜λ
2
b
Since
∂Q
a
(Qb)
∂Qb
< 0 and m˜ ∈ (0, 1), the result follows.
A.7 Proof of Corollary 5
Fix a full-monitoring equilibrium. Note that for any Qb, Qa, a
∗
f ≥ wfQa , while Q¯a(kR,b, ab) ≤
yˆR −m. Because financiers strictly prefer risky claims to the safe technology at Q¯a, it is
sufficient to show that there exists a w′f such that there is excess demand on secondary
markets at price yˆR−m, given that all bankers monitor. This is the case whenever w
′
f
yˆR−m >
m˜wb
1−Qbm˜(yˆR−m) . Since the RHS is bounded, there always exists a w
′
f large enough.
A.8 Proof of Corollary 6
Suppose first that secondary market liquidity is high. In a high-liquidity shirking equilib-
rium, Q∗a = yˆ′R, which is a constant. Furthermore, Q
∗
b must also be invariant to reductions
in wf , either because financiers do not borrow (so that wf does not impact the bond market
clearing condition, given that Q∗a is a constant), or because the financial system is highly
constrained so that Q∗b =
1
y
S
and further reductions in wf increase excess demand in the
bond market. Hence k∗R,b is invariant to wf . Since Q
∗
b is constant, so is depositor utility. By
construction, banker utility is (1 − m˜)k∗R,b, which is constant. If financiers do not borrow,
financier utility is (Φyˆ′R + (1−Φ)m˜yˆR)k∗R,b, and is strictly decreasing in wf .If financiers do
borrow, financier utility is (Φyˆ′R+(1−Φ)m˜(yˆR−yR(l))k∗R,b, which is again strictly decreas-
ing in wf .
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Now suppose that secondary market liquidity is low. I will first show that whenever the
financial system is highly constrained, or financiers do not borrow, then Q∗b , Q
∗
a, k
H
R,b and
aHb are all invariant to reductions in wf . Suppose first that the financial system is highly
constrained, so that Q∗b =
1
y
S
. Then Q∗a = Qa(Q
∗
b) is a constant, and thus invariant to
reductions in wf . Since k
H
R,b =
wb+Q
∗
b (Q
∗
a−yR(l))aHb
1−yR(l)Q∗bm˜ in any shirking equilibrium, k
∗
R,b and
Q∗a = Q¯a = yˆR − m
kHR,b
kHR,b−aHb
in any shirking equilibrium, kHR,b and a
H
b are also invari-
ant to wf . Now suppose that financiers do not borrow. The market-clearing condition
in the bond market is then given by bHb =
yR(l)m˜wb+(Qa−yR(l))aHb
1−yR(l)Q∗bm˜ =
wd
Qb
. Hence aHb is
fixed conditional on Qb. Since Q
∗
a = Q¯a = yˆR − m
kHR,b
kHR,b−aHb
and kR,b is fixed once Qb is
determined, the condition Qa = Qa(Qb) suffices to pin down Qb, Qa, k
H
R,b and a
H
b in-
dependently of wf . Given these preliminaries, we can now show that reductions in wf
are Pareto-improving. First, note that the utility of depositors is given by vd =
wb
Q∗b
if
Q∗b >
1
y
S
and vd = ySwd otherwise. Since high-type bankers are indifferent towards sell-
ing assets on secondary markets in a low-liquidity equilibrium, their utility is unchanged
by the presence of secondary markets: vHb =
yˆR−m˜yR(l)
1−Q∗byR(l)m˜ . By construction, the utility
of the low-type banker satisfies vLb = v
H
b = vb. Since Q
∗
b is invariant to wf , so are vb
and vd. Next, turn to the equilibrium utility of financiers. When financiers borrow, it is
vf = (φyˆ
′
R+(1−φ)(yˆR−yR(l)))a∗f . When they do not borrow, it is vf = (φyˆ′R+(1−φ)yˆR)a∗f .
Market clearing requires that ΦaH∗b + (1 − Φ)kH∗R,b = af = wfQ∗a−(1−φ)yR(l)Qb , where we have
established that Q∗b , Q
∗
a, k
H∗
R,b and a
H∗
b are all constant. By the definition of φ, the util-
ity of financiers then is vf = Φyˆ
′
Rk
H∗
R,b + (1 − Φ)yˆRaH∗b when they do not borrow, and
vf = Φyˆ
′
Rk
H∗
R,b + (1 − Φ)(yˆR − yR(l))aH∗b when they do. Since kH∗R,b and aH∗b are constants
and Φ is strictly increasing in wf , vf is strictly decreasing in Wf in equilibrium.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 8
Fix an equilibrium with high secondary market liquidity. The bond market clearing con-
dition uniquely determines Qb as a function of the wealth distribution w = (wd, wb, wf ),
the secondary market price Qa and the fraction of shirking bankers Φ. Hence we can write
Qb = Q
∗
b(w, Qa,Φ). The first step is to show that Qa (in a full-monitoring equilibrium) and
Φ (in a shirking equilibrium) are increasing in the wealth shock ξ if and only if
λf
∂Wf
∂ξ
+Wf
(
∂λf
∂Qb
)(
Q∗b
∂ξ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Financier Secondary Market Demand
≥ λb∂Wb
∂ξ
+Wb
(
∂λb
∂Qb
)(
Q∗b
∂ξ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Banker Secondary Market Supply
(26)
To this end, define the leverage of bankers and financiers as λb(Qa, Qb) =
Φ+(1−Φ)m˜
1−QbQam˜ and
λf (Qa, Qb) =
1
Qa−γ(1−φ)QbyR(l) , respectively. Then the secondary market clearing condition
is λb(Qb, Qa)wb = λf (Qa, Qb)wf . Start by fixing a full-monitoring equilibrium. Then Φ =
∂Φ
∂ξ = 0. Totally differentiating the secondary market clearing condition and rearranging
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yields
∂Qa
∂ξ
·
[
∂λb
∂Qa
wb +
∂λb
∂Qb
∂Q∗b
∂Qa
wb −
(
∂λf
∂Qa
wf +
∂λf
∂Qb
∂Q∗b
∂Qa
wf
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
=
[
λfwf +
∂λf
∂Qb
∂Q∗b
∂ξ
wf −
(
λbwb +
∂λb
∂Qb
∂Q∗b
∂ξ
wb
)]
.
where A is the excess supply on secondary markets induced by a marginal increase in
Qa. Since banker supply is increasing in Qa and financier supply is decreasing in Qa,
A > 0 and the result follows. Next, consider a shirking equilibrium. Now Qa = yˆ
′
R and so
∂Qa
∂ξ = 0. Totally differentiating the secondary market clearing condition and rearranging
now yields
∂Φ
∂ξ
·
[
∂λb
∂Φ
wb +
∂λb
∂Qb
∂Q∗b
∂Φ
wb −
(
∂λf
∂Φ
wf +
∂λf
∂Qb
∂Q∗b
∂Φ
wf
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B
=
[
λfwf +
∂λf
∂Qb
∂Q∗b
∂ξ
wf −
(
λbwb +
∂λb
∂Qb
∂Q∗b
∂ξ
wb
)]
.
where B is the excess supply on secondary markets induced by a marginal increase in Φ.
Since banker supply is increasing in Φ and financier supply is decreasing in Φ, B > 0
and the result follows. The next step is to show that condition (26) is equivalent to the
condition stated in the text. To this end, divide (26) through by wf and impose the market
clearing condition λbwb = λfwf . This yields the condition λf
∂
wf
wb
∂ξ +
∂λf
∂Qb
∂Qb
∂ξ
wf
wb
≥ ∂λb∂Qb
∂Qb
∂ξ .
Now suppose that the financier is fully leveraged. Then, by definition, ∂λb∂Qb = Qaλ
2
b , and
∂λf
∂Qb
= yR(l)λ
2
f . Moreover, secondary market clearing implies that λb = λf
wf
wb
. Imposing
these conditions gives the first part of the corollary. Next, suppose that the financier does
not borrow. Then λf =
1
Qa
and thus
∂λf
∂Qb
= 0. Canceling out Qa and rearranging gives the
second part of the corollary.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 9
By construction. Consider a low-liquidity equilibrium in which the financial system is highly
constrained. Such an equilibrium always exists for wd large enough and wf small enough. In
such an equilibrium, Q∗b =
1
y
S
and Q∗a = Qa(Q
∗
b). Let λf =
1
Q∗a−Q∗byR(l) and λb =
1
1−Q∗byR(l)m˜
denotes the equilibrium leverage of financiers and bankers in a full-monitoring equilibrium,
respectively. From the optimal banker portfolio and the definition of Q
a
(Qb), it follows
that
k∗R,b = λbwb + χa
∗
f
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where χ =
(
yˆR−yR(l)
yˆR−yR(l)m˜
)
∈ (0, 1) and a∗f = λfwf . Hence, the upper bound on the secondary
market price stemming from the implementability constraint (IMP) is
Q¯a = yˆR − m˜
(
λbwb + χλfwf
λbwb − (1− χ)λfwf
)
= yˆR − m˜
(
λb + χλf w˜
λb − (1− χ)λf w˜
)
Note that Q¯a = yˆR −m if w˜ = 0 and that Q¯a is strictly decreasing in w˜. It follows that
as long as Q∗a < yˆR −m there exists, for small enough wf , a full-monitoring low-liquidity
equilibrium in which the financial system is highly constrained. This parametric condition
is equivalent to
y
S
<
1
χ
(yˆR −m)− (1− m˜)yR(l)yˆR
yˆR − yR(l) (27)
Next, note that Q¯a ≥ yˆ′R because ab ≤ m˜kR,b. For a shirking equilibrium to exist for
sufficiently large wf , we therefore require that Q
∗
a ≥ yˆ′R. This parametric condition is
equivalent to
y
S
>
1
χ
yˆ′ − (1− m˜)yR(l)yˆR
yˆR − yR(l) (28)
It is easy to see that there exist parameters such conditions (27) and (28) are jointly satisfied.
For example, set yˆ′R = yS −  for  and m sufficiently small. Hence there exist parameters
such that Qa ∈ [yˆ′R, yˆR −m). Assume a set of such parameters from now on, and choose
initial financier net worth w0f such that the economy is initially in a full-monitoring equilib-
rium. We now want to show that the economy may transition into a shirking equilibrium
after a sufficiently long sequence of large shocks. Note first that because intermediary net
worth is bounded after any finite sequence of good aggregate shocks, there always exists a
level of depositor net worth such that the financial system is highly constrained after any
such sequence. Hence, we can construct a destabilizing secondary market boom under the
presumption that the financial system is highly constrained throughout. As a result, prices
are fixed throughout and Q∗b ≥ 1 because yS ≤ y¯S = 1. By Proposition 7, relative financier
net worth w˜ thus grows after a good shock for any w˜. By the parametric condition (28),
a sufficiently long sequence of good aggregate shocks therefore triggers a shirking equilib-
rium. We then only need to show that there exist parameters such that expected return
on equity is higher for financiers than for bankers throughout. Recall from Proposition (6)
that, in a full-monitoring equilibrium, ˆROEf > ˆROEb for Qb > 1. Hence ˆROEf > ˆROEb
in a full-monitoring equilibrium when the financial system is highly constrained if y
S
< 1.
Next, turn to a shirking equilibrium. By construction, the return on equity of bankers is
independent of the fraction of shirking bankers Φ, while the return on equity of financiers
is strictly decreasing in Φ. As long as the return-on-equity for financiers is strictly higher
in a full-monitoring equilibrium, there exists a Φ∗ such that the return on equity is also
strictly higher in a shirking equilibrium in which Φ∗ bankers shirk. This is the case when
y
S
< 1.
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A.11 Proof of Proposition 10
Begin with the growth rate of relative financier net worth after a good shock. In the given
equilibrium, it is given by:
w˜′
w˜
=
yR(h)−yR(l)
Q
a
(Q∗b )−Q∗byR(l)
yR(h)−m˜yR(l)
1−Qbm˜yR(l) −
m′(yR(h)−yˆR)
yˆR−m˜yR(l)
w˜
Q
a
(Q∗b )−Q∗byR(l)
.
Let the relative levered return L˜R ≡
[
yR(h)−yR(l)]
yR(h)−m˜yR(l)
] [
1−Qbm˜yR(l)
Q
a
(Qb)−QbyR(l)
]
denote the ratio of
financier and banker levered returns on equity. Let RT ≡ m′(yR(h)−yˆR)yˆR−m˜yR(l)
w˜
Q
a
(Q∗b )−Q∗byR(l) denote
the degree of risk transfer from bankers to financiers. RT is increasing in Qb and thus
decreasing in ρ: lower bond prices allow financiers to expand borrowing and purchase more
risky claims. Hence, the growth rate of relative financier net worth after a good shock is
increasing in risk transfer. For w˜
′
w˜ to be decreasing in ρ for all w˜ > 0, we thus require that
it to be decreasing in ρ even when risk transfer RT is close to zero (i.e. when w˜ is close to
zero). Hence, we require L˜R to be increasing in Qb. Differentiating L˜R w.r.t to Qb reveals
that ∂QbL˜R∂Qb ≥ 0 if and only if
m˜yR(l)
−Q′a+yR(l) ≤ L˜R where Q
′
a denotes the derivative of Qa(Qb)
w.r.t. Qb. Since Q
′
a < 0 and m˜ < 1, the LHS is strictly less than unity. It remains to be
shown that L˜R ≥ 1, i.e. financiers lever more than bankers in a low-liquidity equilibrium
in which the financial system is highly constrained. Rearranging L˜R implies that L˜R ≥ 1
if and only if QbyR(l)(1 − m˜) ≥ Qa(Qb) − 1. The LHS is strictly increasing in Qb, while
the RHS is strictly decreasing in Qb. Since Qb ≥ 1 when the financial system is highly
constrained, the result follows if yR(l)(1 − m˜) ≥ Qa(1) − 1. This always holds under the
assumption yR(l) < y¯S < 1.
Next, turn to investment. In a low-liquidity full-monitoring equilibrium with low liquidity,
it is given by KR,b =
[
Wb +
Q∗b
[
Q
a
(Q∗b )−yR(l)
]
Wf
Q
a
(Q∗b )−Q∗byR(l)
]
[1−Q∗byR(l)m˜]−1. Since Q∗b is decreasing
in ρ, a sufficient condition for the desired result is that χ0 ≡ QbQa(Qb)−QbyR(l)Q
a
(Qb)−QbyR(l) is decreas-
ing in Qb. Differentiating χ0 with respect to Qb implies that χ0 is increasing in Qb if
(Qa +QbQ
′
a − yR(l)) (Qa −QbyR(l)) > (Q′a − yR(l)) (QbQa −QbyR(l)), where it is under-
stood that Qa = Qa(Qb) and Q
′
a denotes the derivative w.r.t. Qb. By definition of Qa, it
follows that 0 > Qa+QbQ
′
a−yR(l) > Q′a−yR(l) while QbQa−QbyR(l) ≥ Qa−QbyR(l) > 0
for Qb ≥ 1. Since yS ≤ 1, Qb ≥ 1 and the result follows.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 11
Assume for a contradiction that all bankers monitor. Let Q∗a denote the equilibrium sec-
ondary market price. Since all bankers monitor, Q∗a < yˆR. Since the financial system is
highly constrained, Q∗b = 1 with and without leverage constraints.. As a result, financiers
are fully levered, and the demand for risky claims is af =
wf
Q∗a−yR(l) . From the optimal banker
portfolios, the supply of risky assets is ab =
wb
(
L¯b(1−yR(l)m˜)
)
Q∗a−yR(l) . Since secondary markets clear
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in the absence of capital requirements, af > ab for any Q
∗
a if L¯b < L
∗
b . Hence, there is excess
demand for risky claims. To restore market clearing, financiers must be indifferent between
risky claims the safe technology. But this requires Qa = yˆR.
A.13 Ruling out Separating Equilibria with Active Secondary
Markets
I now state and prove a claim from Section 1.2.5 regarding separating equilibria.
Proposition (No Separation). If financier bids satisfy bid consistency, then there does not
exist a separating equilibrium in which the high-type banker sells a strictly positive amount
of risky claims on secondary markets.
Proof. Begin with the first claim. Suppose for a contradiction that both low-type and high-
type bankers sell assets on secondary markets (aHb , a
L
b > 0) but issue different bond quanti-
ties. As a result, the two types of bankers trade on separate secondary sub-markets - muH
and µL, say. Let QHa and Q
L
a denote asset prices on the respective sub-markets. Because
low-quality assets cannot be levered against by financiers (their low-state payoff is zero),
financiers receive rate of return RL =
yˆ′R
QLa
when they buy claims from the low type. When
they buy assets from the high type, they receive a return of RH = max
{
yˆR
QHa
, yˆR−yR(l)
QHa −QbyR(l)
}
.
No arbitrage requires that RH = RL. The implementability condition IMP implies that
QHa < yˆR – else, the high-type banker would prefer to sell and shirk. It follows thatQ
L
a < yˆ
′
R.
If this is the case, ex-post optimality in asset sales requires that the low-type banker sells
exactly aLb in risky assets – i.e. he sells no more than he needs to do because asset prices
are below the expected value of claims. When setting the asset sale commitment aLb , he
thus promises to sell no more than is required to guarantee that he shirks in equilibrium.
As a result, the incentive constraint for shirking must hold with equality, and the low-type
banker is exactly indifferent between shirking and monitoring at aLb . Now consider a de-
viation by the low-type banker to an asset sale commitment aL
′
b = a
L
b −  for small but
positive . Conditional on this deviation, the low-type banker strictly prefers to monitor,
and trades on sub-market µ′. Since all bankers on sub-market µ′ have incentives to monitor,
bid consistency implies that the secondary market price must satisfy Q′a = QHa . Because
aL
′
b is an arbitrarily small deviation from a
L
b , the deviating banker must only scale back
borrowing and investment by an arbitrarily small amount. Yet the secondary market price
he obtains after a deviation is strictly higher for any , and it applies to all infra-marginal
asset sales. Since yR(l) > y
′
R(l), he also maintains solvency in all states of the world. Hence,
there always exists a profitable deviation for a low-type banker.
A.14 A Dynamic Model with Endogenous Risk Aversion
In this section, I study a variant of the dynamic model in Section 1.3 in which old interme-
diaries have full bargaining power (θ = 1). This choice of parameters implies that the old
appropriate the entire value of their end-of-life stock of net worth. Generically, this value
of net worth is state-contingent, with intermediaries valuing a dollar of equity more highly
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in states of the world where intermediation rents are large. Intermediation rents are large
when intermediaries are not well-capitalized in the aggregate. The health of intermediary
balance sheets will in turn depend on the realization of aggregate risk. Forward-looking
behavior thus leads to endogenous risk preferences.
The main goal of this section is to show that the forces that drove secondary market booms
in the baseline dynamic model are not overturned by considerations of endogenous risk
aversion. To do so, I construct examples in which financiers grow even in the presence
of endogenous risk aversion. For simplicity, I focus on the special case T = 3. The key
simplification inherent in this assumption is that intermediaries face a finite horizon. This
allows me to characterize the value of equity capital in the final period in closed form. Since
intermediaries appropriate the entire value of their end-of-life net worth, I can then analyze
the problem as if the initial generation of intermediaries lived for three periods rather than
two, and intermediates capital in the latter two periods. I denote the final-period value of
w units of equity capital to an intermediary of type τ when the net worth distribution is
w by vτ (w,w). Since all intermediaries are risk-neutral, the following proposition follows
immediately:
Proposition (The Value of Equity Capital). The final-period value of w units of equity
capital to an intermediary of type τ when the net worth distribution is w is linear in w:
vτ (w,w) = ατ (w)w
Proof. Follows directly from all policy functions in the static game being linear in net
worth.
Since there are only three periods, there are only two generations of intermediaries and
one intergenerational equity market. The second (and final) generation of intermediaries
chooses the same portfolios as in the static model. The key stage of analysis is thus the initial
generation’s portfolio choice, taking into account that they maximize the market value of
equity capital. I suppress time subscripts for simplicity. Since financiers and bankers have
endogenous risk preferences, they may value a risky claim differentially even in the absence
of borrowing constraints. Specifically, a risky claim is of little value to an intermediary
that highly values net worth conditional on a negative aggregate shock. This gives rise to
a trading motive separate from selling assets to relax borrowing constraints.
Disregarding borrowing constraints, the banker weakly prefers to sell the asset at price Qa
if and only if
αb(l)
αb(h)
≥ pi(yR(h)−Qa)
pil(Qa − yR(l))
A financier strictly prefers to purchase the risky asset at price Qa rather than hold the safe
asset if and only
αf (l)
αf (h)
<
pi(yR(h)−Qa)
pil(Qa − yR(l)) .
I say that a given intermediary is the natural bearer of risk when his valuation of a risky
claim is the highest among all intermediaries.
196
Lemma (Natural Bearer of Risk). Intermediary τ is the natural bearer of risk if and only
if
τ = argmin
τ ′
ατ ′(l)
ατ ′(h)
Going forward, I will use στ ≡ ατ (l)ατ (h) to summarize the risk attitude of the type-τ interme-
diary. As long as σf < σb, there exists a Qa such that financiers are willing to purchase the
risky asset and bankers are willing to sell. When instead σf = σb, there are no endogenous
differences in risk-preference and intermediaries trade assets as in the static model. To show
that the results from the baseline model are robust, I now construct an example in which
the economy with endogenous risk aversion admits secondary market booms as in Section
1.3.
Proposition. If, after any shock, the competitive equilibrium in the final period is a full-
monitoring equilibrium with low secondary market liquidity and a highly constrained finan-
cial system then σf = σb = 1.
Proof. In a low-liquidity equilibrium in which the financial system is highly constrained
we have Q∗b =
1
y
S
and Q∗aQa(Q
∗
b). By Proposition 6,
ˆROEf =
yˆR−yR(l)
Q
a
(Q∗b )−Q∗byR(l) and
ˆROEf =
yˆR−yR(l)m˜
1−Q∗byR(l)m˜ . Given that the financial system is highly constrained after any shock, the result
follows.
Proposition 9 provides an example of destabilizing secondary market booms when the fi-
nancial system is highly constrained and secondary market liquidity is low. The above
proposition implies that the evolution of the economy under endogenous risk aversion is
identical to that example as long as the economy is in a full-monitoring equilibrium. What
remains to be shown is that the economy also transitions into a shirking equilibrium after
a sequence of good shocks.
Proposition. If the competitive equilibrium in the final period is a full-monitoring equi-
librium with low secondary market liquidity and a highly constrained financial system after
a bad shock, and a shirking equilibrium with low secondary market liquidity and a highly
constrained financial system after a good shock, then
σb = 1 and σf =
φyˆ′R+(1−φ)(yˆR−yR(l))
Q∗a−(1−φ)Q∗byR(l)
yˆR−yR(l)
Q∗a−Q∗byR(l)
≤ 1
where Q∗b =
1
y
S
and Q∗a = Qa(Q
∗
b).
Proof. For bankers, the result follows from the fact that return on equity is independent of
Φ by construction. For financiers, the result follows from a straightforward computation of
expected utility in the shirking equilibrium.
It follows that the economy with endogenous risk aversion must also transition into a shirk-
ing equilibrium. To see this, suppose first that the economy with endogenous risk aversion
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does not transition into a shirking equilibrium after a good shock, while the economy with-
out endogenous risk aversion does. Then Φ = 0 after a good shock. But then the above
proposition implies that σf = σb = 1, and there is no endogenous risk aversion. As a result,
the economy must transition into a shirking equilibrium, yielding a contradiction. Note that
Q
a
is the same in the presence of endogenous risk aversion as in its absence because σb = 1
throughout. Moreover, financiers are willing to buy risky assets when Φ is sufficiently small
tomorrow because they receive strictly positive rents from doing so when σf = 1.
More generally of course, endogenous risk aversion contributes to a slower build-up of risk
and fragility. Intermediaries’ endogenous preference to preserve capital for downturns makes
them less willing to hold risk exposure. Accounting for the channel is thus important in a
quantitative sense. In a qualitative sense, however, the previous proposition shows that the
model admits the same dynamics as without endogenous risk aversion.
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Chapter B
Appendix to “Does Universal
Banking Affect the Risk and
Productivity of Firms?”
B.1 Figures
Figure 28
Loan-weighted Average Six-year [t,t+5] Sales-growth Volatility associated
with Loans granted to Public Firms by Universal Banks (1991-2005).
Notes: Loans by universal banks are split into cross-sold and non-cross-sold loans, where cross-sold
loans are defined as loans whose debtor firms also received an underwriting product from the same
universal bank anytime within the last three years. Source: own analysis based on CRSP/Compus-
tat, DealScan loan data, and SDC underwriting data.
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Figure 29
Loan-weighted Average Six-year [t,t+5] Sales-growth Volatility
associated with Loans granted to Public Firms by Universal and
Commercial Banks (1991-2005).
Source: own analysis based on CRSP/Compustat, DealScan loan data, and SDC underwriting data.
Figure 30
Market-value-weighted Average Age of Firm at IPO vs. Fraction of IPOs
run by Universal Banks (1976-2006).
Notes: Source: own analysis based on SDC IPOs and firm-age data from Loughran and Ritter
(2004).
B.2 Tables
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Table 2
Timeline of Universal Banks
Section 20 M&A
Established before August 1, 1996
BankBoston (later acquired by Fleet) Cre´dit Suisse (First Boston)
Bankers Trust (later acquired by Bank of America) Deutsche Bank USA
Bank of America Equitable (later acquired by SunTrust)
Bank of New England (defunct since 1991) HSBC Bank USA
Bank One (later acquired by J.P. Morgan) Sovran Bank
BankSouth (later acquired by NationsBank)
Barnett Bank (later acquired by NationsBank) Travelers Group∗
Chase Manhattan (later acquired by J.P. Morgan)
Chemical Bank (later acquired by Chase Manhattan)
Citicorp∗
Dauphin Deposit Corp.
First Chicago NBD
First Union
Fleet (later acquired by Bank of America)
Huntington Bancshares
J.P. Morgan
Liberty National Bank
Marine Midland Bank (later acquired by HSBC Bank USA)
Mellon (later acquired by BNY)
National City (later acquired by PNC)
National Westminster Bank USA (later acquired by Fleet)
NationsBank (later acquired by Bank of America)
Norstar (later acquired by Fleet)
Norwest (later acquired by Wells Fargo)
PNC
Security Pacific Bank (later acquired by Bank of America)
SouthTrust (later acquired by Wachovia/First Union)
SunTrust
Established on or after August 1, 1996
BB&T Citigroup∗
BNY Wells Fargo
Commerce Bancshares
CoreStates/Philadelphia National Bank
(later acquired by First Union)
Crestar Bank
First Tennessee
KeyBank
U.S. Bancorp
Wachovia (first acquired by First Union
and later by Wells Fargo)
∗ Citigroup emerged as a result of the merger of Travelers Group and Citicorp on October 8, 1998.
Before, Travelers Group became a universal bank by our definition through a series of mergers, most
notably with investment banks Smith Barney and Salomon Brothers, and Citicorp had registered
a Section 20 subsidiary. Given the size of this merger of equals, we do not treat either one as the
surviving entity and, instead, label Citigroup as a separate universal bank established through M&A
in 1998.
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Table 3
Summary Statistics
Loans sample (1987− 2010) Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
Universal-bank (UB) loan 0.641 0.480 0 1 19,053
Investment-bank (IB) loan 0.108 0.311 0 1 19,053
Deal size/assets 0.275 0.475 0.000 39.604 19,053
Refinancing 0.501 0.500 0 1 19,053
No. of lead arrangers 1.122 0.343 1 6 19,053
All-in-drawn spread in bps 186.879 137.681 0.700 1490.020 16,967
Loan cross-sold by UB or IB 0.791 0.407 0 1 12,061
Cross-sold with debt underwriting 0.851 0.357 0 1 11,863
Cross-sold with equity underwriting 0.190 0.392 0 1 4,008
(all conditional on loan & underwriting)
No. of UBs M&A 8
No. of UBs M&A before Aug. 1, 1996 6
No. of UBs Section 20 37
No. of UBs Section 20 before Aug. 1, 1996 28
No. of IBs 95
No. of CBs 449
Firm-loan-years sample (1987− 2006) Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
∆tln(σ(ŝalesi)
6y) -0.020 0.850 -3.586 2.656 3,362
∆tln(σ(returni)
6y) 0.006 0.390 -2.234 1.759 3,556
∆tln(σ
6y
idiosyncratic,i) 0.006 0.404 -2.374 1.754 3,556
Bankruptcy in the next ten years 0.234 0.423 0 1 6,393
Compustat sample (1987− 2010) Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
TFPi,t+1 0.664 0.344 0.006 9.957 52,435
CapExit (in 2010 $bn) 0.173 1.026 0.000 59.283 91,686
MarketCapit (in 2010 $bn) 2.398 13.842 0.000 780.502 92,665
σimpliedit 0.572 0.384 0.023 5.447 24,779
Sales in 2010 $bn 1.941 9.655 0.000 430.402 93,181
No. employees in thousands 7.510 34.640 0.001 2100.001 93,181
Loan from CB, underwriting from IB, 0.035 0.184 0 1 93,181
both merged
Loan from CB that merged 0.318 0.466 0 1 93,181
Underwriting from IB that merged 0.205 0.404 0 1 93,181
IPO sample (1976− 2006) Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
IPO age in years 14.371 20.230 0.000 165.000 3,835
UB 0.166 0.372 0 1 3,835
Eventually UB M&A 0.311 0.463 0 1 3,835
Sales in 2010 $bn 0.309 1.395 0.000 41.698 3,835
No. of employees in thousands 1.461 6.204 0.001 203.001 3,835
Book-value leverage 0.192 0.209 0.000 0.890 3,835
Gross spread in % 7.484 1.336 0.700 20.250 3,835
IPO count 69.154 100.402 1 582 3,835
No. of UBs M&A 5
No. of UBs M&A before Aug. 1, 1996 5
No. of UBs Section 20 15
No. of UBs Section 20 before Aug. 1, 1996 12
No. of IBs 460
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Table 4
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Sales-growth Volatility –
Firm-loan-years Sample
∆tln(σ(ŝalesi)
6y)
Universal-bank loan × After(1996) 0.153*** 0.138*** 0.179** 0.236*** 0.237**
(0.045) (0.048) (0.076) (0.087) (0.099)
Universal-bank loan -0.049 -0.054 -0.043 -0.069 -0.069
(0.050) (0.057) (0.072) (0.099) (0.099)
Investment-bank loan × After(1996) 0.004
(0.157)
Controls N Y Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N N
State-year FE N N Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y Y N N
Firm FE N N N Y Y
N 3,362 3,362 3,362 3,362 3,362
Notes: All regressions are run at the firm-year level it, limited to years in which firm i received at
least one loan from bank(s) j, where the loans sample consists of all completed syndicated loans of
publicly listed firms. For firm-loan year t, ∆tln(σ(ŝalesi)
6y) is the difference between the logged
six-year standard deviation of firm i’s sales growth from t to t + 5 and that from t − 6 to t − 1.
Universal-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether at the time of any loan transaction in
year t any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal bank. Investment-bank loanjt is an indicator
variable for whether at the time of any loan transaction in year t any one of the lead arrangers j was
an investment bank. After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the firm’s loan year in question was in
1997 or later. Control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log
of its number of employees, the log of the ratio of the average deal size across all loans in a given
year over firm i’s assets, and the average value of the refinancing indicator. Bank fixed effects are
included for all lead arrangers – i.e., all commercial, universal, and investment banks – of all loans
in a given year. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry fixed
effects are based on SIC2 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are in parentheses.
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Table 5
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Stock-return Volatility –
Firm-loan-years Sample
∆tln(σ(returni)
6y)
Universal-bank loan × After(1996) 0.124*** 0.110*** 0.142*** 0.115*** 0.104**
(0.028) (0.027) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041)
Universal-bank loan -0.055** -0.053** -0.054 -0.020 -0.016
(0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.043) (0.044)
Investment-bank loan × After(1996) -0.055
(0.065)
Controls N Y Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N N
State-year FE N N Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y Y N N
Firm FE N N N Y Y
N 3,556 3,556 3,556 3,556 3,556
Notes: All regressions are run at the firm-year level it, limited to years in which firm i received at
least one loan from bank(s) j, where the loans sample consists of all completed syndicated loans of
publicly listed firms. For firm-loan year t, ∆tln(σ(returni)
6y) is the difference between the logged
six-year standard deviation of firm i’s stock returns from t to t + 5 and that from t − 6 to t − 1.
Universal-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether at the time of any loan transaction in
year t any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal bank. Investment-bank loanjt is an indicator
variable for whether at the time of any loan transaction in year t any one of the lead arrangers j was
an investment bank. After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the firm’s loan year in question was in
1997 or later. Control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log
of its number of employees, the log of the ratio of the average deal size across all loans in a given
year over firm i’s assets, and the average value of the refinancing indicator. Bank fixed effects are
included for all lead arrangers – i.e., all commercial, universal, and investment banks – of all loans
in a given year. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry fixed
effects are based on SIC2 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are in parentheses.
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Table 6
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Idiosyncratic Volatility –
Firm-loan-years Sample
∆tln(σ
6y
idiosyncratic,i)
Universal-bank loan × After(1996) 0.077*** 0.062** 0.078** 0.095*** 0.090**
(0.029) (0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.042)
Universal-bank loan -0.039 -0.039 -0.031 -0.044 -0.042
(0.035) (0.034) (0.038) (0.045) (0.047)
Investment-bank loan × After(1996) -0.029
(0.063)
Controls N Y Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N N
State-year FE N N Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y Y N N
Firm FE N N N Y Y
N 3,556 3,556 3,556 3,556 3,556
Notes: All regressions are run at the firm-year level it, limited to years in which firm i received at
least one loan from bank(s) j, where the loans sample consists of all completed syndicated loans of
publicly listed firms. For firm-loan year t, ∆tln(σ
6y
idiosyncratic,i) is the difference between the logged
six-year idiosyncratic volatility of firm i’s stock returns from t to t+ 5 and that from t− 6 to t− 1,
estimated from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and expressed in annualized terms.
Universal-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether at the time of any loan transaction in
year t any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal bank. Investment-bank loanjt is an indicator
variable for whether at the time of any loan transaction in year t any one of the lead arrangers j was
an investment bank. After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the firm’s loan year in question was in
1997 or later. Control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log
of its number of employees, the log of the ratio of the average deal size across all loans in a given
year over firm i’s assets, and the average value of the refinancing indicator. Bank fixed effects are
included for all lead arrangers – i.e., all commercial, universal, and investment banks – of all loans
in a given year. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry fixed
effects are based on SIC2 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped.
Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are in parentheses.
205
Table 7
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Bankruptcy – Firm-loan-years
Sample
Bankruptcy in the next ten years ∈ {0, 1}
Universal-bank loan × After(1996) 0.014 0.031 0.031 -0.038** -0.016
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017)
Universal-bank loan -0.045* -0.029 -0.045* 0.004 -0.003
(0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015)
Investment-bank loan × After(1996) 0.102***
(0.023)
Controls N Y Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N N
State-year FE N N Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y Y N N
Firm FE N N N Y Y
N 6,393 6,393 6,393 6,393 6,393
Notes: All regressions are run at the firm-year level it, limited to years in which firm i received at
least one loan from bank(s) j, where the loans sample consists of all completed syndicated loans
of publicly listed firms. For firm-loan year t, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for
whether the borrowing company went bankrupt (according to CRSP delisting codes) in the ten
years following the loan issue (i.e., t+1 to t+10). Universal-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for
whether at the time of any loan transaction in year t any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal
bank. Investment-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether at the time of any loan transaction
in year t any one of the lead arrangers j was an investment bank. After(1996)t is an indicator for
whether the firm’s loan year in question was in 1997 or later. Control variables are measured in year
t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees, the log of the ratio of the
average deal size across all loans in a given year over firm i’s assets, and the average value of the
refinancing indicator. Bank fixed effects are included for all lead arrangers – i.e., all commercial,
universal, and investment banks – of all loans in a given year. State-year fixed effects are based on
firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry fixed effects are based on SIC2 codes. Public-service, energy,
and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are in
parentheses.
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Table 8
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Total Factor Productivity –
Compustat Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(TFPi,t+1)
Universal-bank loan × After(1996) 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Universal-bank loan -0.013* -0.012* -0.013* -0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Investment-bank loan × After(1996) -0.018
(0.012)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
N 52,435 52,435 52,435 52,435
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. TFP i,t+1 is firm i’s total factor productivity in year t+ 1 from
Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014). Universal-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether, given any
loans received by firm i from year t − 4 to t, at the time of any loan transaction any one of the
lead arrangers j was a universal bank. Investment-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether,
given any loans received by firm i from year t− 4 to t, at the time of any loan transaction any one
of the lead arrangers j was an investment bank. After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the year
in question was in 1997 or later. Control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of
firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees, the log of the average ratio of deal size across all
loans over firm i’s assets from t − 4 to t, and the proportion of refinancing loans from t − 4 to t.
Bank fixed effects are included for all lead arrangers – i.e., all commercial, universal, and investment
banks – of all loans granted to firm i from year t− 4 to t. State-year fixed effects are based on firm
i’s headquarter in year t. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the firm-year level) are in parentheses.
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Table 9
Impact of Bank Information Acquisition on Total Factor Productivity –
Compustat Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(TFPi,t+1)
Loan from CB, underwriting from IB, 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.021**
both merged (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Loan from CB that merged 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007
× Underwriting from IB that merged (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Loan from CB that merged -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Underwriting from IB that merged 0.001 -0.008 -0.013 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Any loan × Any underwriting 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Any loan -0.021** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.030***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Any underwriting -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.042***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
Industry-year FE N N N Y
N 52,435 52,435 52,435 52,435
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. TFP i,t+1 is firm i’s total factor productivity in year t+ 1 from
Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014). Loan from CB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether
anytime from t−10 to t−1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or universal bank that merged
with an investment bank thereafter. Underwriting from IB that merged jt is an indicator variable for
whether anytime from t − 10 to t − 1, firm i received an underwriting product from an investment
bank that merged with a commercial or universal bank thereafter. The interaction of the latter two
indicator variables is to be distinguished from the explanatory variable of interest in the first row,
which indicates whether anytime from t − 10 to t − 1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or
universal bank, an underwriting product from an investment bank, and both banks merged with
each other until year t. Any loanit and Any underwriting it are indicator variables for whether firm
i received any loan or any underwriting product, respectively, from any commercial, universal, or
investment bank anytime from t − 10 to t − 1. Unless mentioned otherwise, control variables are
measured in year t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees, the log
of the average ratio of deal size across all loans over firm i’s assets from t − 10 to t − 1, and the
proportion of refinancing loans from t − 10 to t − 1. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s
headquarter in year t. Industry-year fixed effects are based on SIC1 codes. Public-service, energy,
and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm-year level)
are in parentheses.
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Table 10
Impact of Universal-bank Underwriting on Age of Firms at their IPOs
IPO age in years
UB × Est.(1996) × After(1996) -8.659*** -6.094*** -6.629**
(3.156) (1.742) (2.686)
UB × Est.(1996) 12.164***
(3.619)
UB -3.910*
(2.291)
Eventually UB through M&A 2.450**
(1.207)
UB M&A × After(1996) -10.435*** -10.178***
(2.564) (3.878)
UB M&A × IPO count -0.003
(0.024)
UB Section 20 × After(1996) -2.095 -5.624*
(2.455) (2.990)
UB Section 20 × IPO count 0.017
(0.013)
After(Aug. 1, 1996) 1.287 1.087 -0.147 0.016 0.144
(1.361) (1.746) (2.676) (2.646) (2.867)
IPO count -0.004
(0.026)
Log of sales in 2010 $ 2.090*** 1.917*** 1.868*** 1.901***
(0.398) (0.504) (0.519) (0.530)
Log of no. employees 2.597*** 2.209*** 2.276*** 2.265***
(0.646) (0.518) (0.535) (0.531)
Book-value leverage 5.826*** 4.635 4.528 4.578
(2.017) (3.613) (3.625) (3.630)
Gross spread in % -1.559** -2.998*** -3.022*** -3.010***
(0.692) (0.923) (0.922) (0.901)
Bank FE N Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N N
State-year FE N N Y Y Y
N 3,835 3,835 2,471 2,471 2,471
Notes: The unit of observation is a firm’s IPO. The dependent variable is firm i’s age in years at
the time t of its IPO with bank j as bookrunner. UB j (M&A or Section 20 ) is an indicator variable
for whether the bookrunner was a universal bank (formed through a merger or through opening a
Section 20 subsidiary). Est.(1996)j indicates whether a universal bank (through M&A or Section
20) was established prior to August 1, 1996. After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the IPO date
was on or after August 1, 1996. Eventually UB through M&Aj is an indicator variable for whether
the bookrunner, which was still an investment bank, eventually becomes a universal bank through
M&A. IPO countjt denotes the number of IPOs accompanied by universal or investment bank j, up
to and including the current IPO. Book-value leverage is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
All firm-level explanatory variables are measured at the end of the IPO year. Industry fixed effects
are based on two-digit SIC codes. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t.
Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered
at the bookrunner level) are in parentheses.
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B.3 Supplementary Figures
Figure 31
Pre-trends among Treatment and Control Firms Contracting with
Universal Banks.
Notes: The graphs in the top, middle, and bottom panel plot, respectively, the average TFP, capital
expenditure in 2010 $bn, and market capitalization in 2010 $bn by firms in the treatment and the
control group over five years prior to the respective universal-bank mergers in year 0.
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B.4 Supplementary Tables
Table 11
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Sales-growth Volatility – Placebo,
Firm-loan-years Sample
∆tln(σ(ŝalesi)
6y)
Universal-bank loan × After(1993) 0.047 0.034 0.116 -0.028 -0.042
(0.060) (0.059) (0.080) (0.104) (0.112)
Universal-bank loan -0.006 -0.010 -0.034 0.056 0.064
(0.054) (0.058) (0.079) (0.127) (0.128)
Investment-bank loan × After(1993) -0.084
(0.139)
Controls N Y Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N N
State-year FE N N Y Y Y
Industry FE N Y Y N N
Firm FE N N N Y Y
N 3,362 3,362 3,362 3,362 3,362
Notes: All regressions are run at the firm-year level it, limited to years in which firm i received at
least one loan from bank(s) j, where the loans sample consists of all completed syndicated loans of
publicly listed firms. For firm-loan year t, ∆tln(σ(ŝalesi)
6y) is the difference between the six-year
standard deviation of firm i’s sales growth from t to t+5 and that from t−6 to t−1. Universal-bank
loanjt is an indicator variable for whether at the time of any loan transaction in year t any one of the
lead arrangers j was a universal bank. Investment-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether
at the time of any loan transaction in year t any one of the lead arrangers j was an investment
bank. After t(1993) is an indicator for whether the firm’s loan year in question was in 1994 or later.
Control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log of its number
of employees, the log of the ratio of the average deal size across all loans in a given year over firm
i’s assets, and the average value of the refinancing indicator. Bank fixed effects are included for all
lead arrangers – i.e., all commercial, universal, and investment banks – of all loans in a given year.
State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry fixed effects are based
on SIC2 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust standard
errors (clustered at the bank level) are in parentheses.
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Table 12
Universal Banking and Likelihood of Cross-selling – Loans Sample
Cross-sold loan conditional on loan & underwriting ∈ {0, 1}
UB × After(1996) 0.059* 0.061** 0.064***
(0.031) (0.027) (0.022)
UB Section 20 × After(1996) 0.074** 0.073** 0.067***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.022)
Log of sales at close 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.003 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Log of no. employees 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.045*** 0.016** 0.017** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Log of deal size/assets 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.038*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.039***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Refinancing ∈ {0, 1} 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.006
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y N N Y N N
State-year FE N Y Y N Y Y
Industry FE Y Y N Y Y N
Firm FE N N Y N N Y
Sample Universal and investment banks Universal banks only
N 12,061 12,061 12,061 10,773 10,773 10,773
Notes: The sample consists of all completed syndicated loans (package level) of publicly listed
firms, conditional on the borrower firm i of the respective loan granted in year t also receiving an
underwriting product from any universal or investment bank (in the first three columns) or from
any universal bank only (in the last three columns) anytime from the beginning of year t− 2 to the
end of year t + 2. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a given loan in year t was
associated with a cross-sold underwriting product by the same bank from t− 2 to t+ 2. UB jt is an
indicator variable for whether at date t of the respective loan any one of the lead arrangers j was a
universal bank. UB Section 20 jt is an indicator variable for whether at date t of the respective loan
any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal bank established through a Section 20 subsidiary,
rather than through mergers and acquisitions. After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the loan in
question was issued on or after August 1, 1996. Bank fixed effects are included for all lead arrangers,
i.e., all commercial, universal, and investment banks. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s
headquarter in year t. Industry fixed effects are based on SIC2 codes. Public-service, energy, and
financial-services firms are dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) are in
parentheses.
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Table 13
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Loan Rates – Loans Sample
ln(All-in-drawn spread)
Universal-bank loan × After(1996) 0.016 0.006 -0.044
(0.045) (0.043) (0.042)
Universal-bank loan -0.019 -0.005 0.018
(0.067) (0.064) (0.039)
Log of sales at close -0.196*** -0.189*** -0.102***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Log of no. employees -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.096***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Log of deal size/assets 0.037*** 0.036*** -0.016*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Refinancing indicator ∈ {0, 1} 0.054*** 0.051*** -0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Bank FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y N N
State-year FE N Y Y
Industry FE Y Y N
Firm FE N N Y
N 16,967 16,967 16,967
Notes: The sample consists of all completed syndicated loans (package level) of publicly listed firms,
subject to availability of the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of the all-in-drawn spread (in bps), which is the sum of the spread over LIBOR and any annual
fees paid to the lender syndicate. Universal-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether at date
t of the respective loan any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal bank. After(1996)t is an
indicator for whether the loan in question was issued on or after August 1, 1996. Bank fixed effects
are included for all lead arrangers, i.e., all commercial, universal, and investment banks. State-
year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry fixed effects are based on
SIC2 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust standard errors
(clustered at the bank level) are in parentheses.
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Table 14
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Capital Expenditure – Compustat
Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(CapExit)
Universal-bank loan × After(1996) 0.037** 0.017 0.023(∗) 0.023(∗)
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Universal-bank loan 0.106*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Investment-bank loan × After(1996) 0.013
(0.019)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
N 91,686 91,686 91,686 91,686
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. CapEx it is firm i’s capital expenditure in year t. Universal-bank
loanjt is an indicator variable for whether, given any loans received by firm i from year t− 4 to t, at
the time of any loan transaction any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal bank. Investment-
bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether, given any loans received by firm i from year t − 4
to t, at the time of any loan transaction any one of the lead arrangers j was an investment bank.
After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the year in question was in 1997 or later. Control variables
are measured in year t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees,
the log of the average ratio of deal size across all loans over firm i’s assets from t− 4 to t, and the
proportion of refinancing loans from t− 4 to t. Bank fixed effects are included for all lead arrangers
– i.e., all commercial, universal, and investment banks – of all loans granted to firm i from year t−4
to t. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Public-service, energy, and
financial-services firms are dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm-year level) are in
parentheses.
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Table 15
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Market Capitalization – Compustat
Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(MarketCapit)
Universal-bank loan × After(1996) 0.098*** 0.092*** 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Universal-bank loan 0.060*** 0.016 0.007 0.007
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Investment-bank loan × After(1996) -0.017
(0.020)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
N 92,665 92,665 92,665 92,665
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. MarketCapit is firm i’s market value of equity in year t.
Universal-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether, given any loans received by firm i from
year t − 4 to t, at the time of any loan transaction any one of the lead arrangers j was a universal
bank. Investment-bank loanjt is an indicator variable for whether, given any loans received by firm
i from year t − 4 to t, at the time of any loan transaction any one of the lead arrangers j was an
investment bank. After(1996)t is an indicator for whether the year in question was in 1997 or later.
Control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log of its number
of employees, the log of the average ratio of deal size across all loans over firm i’s assets from t−4 to
t, and the proportion of refinancing loans from t− 4 to t. Bank fixed effects are included for all lead
arrangers – i.e., all commercial, universal, and investment banks – of all loans granted to firm i from
year t − 4 to t. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Public-service,
energy, and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm-year
level) are in parentheses.
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Table 16
Impact of Bank Information Acquisition on Capital Expenditure –
Compustat Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(CapExit)
Loan from CB, underwriting from IB, 0.114*** 0.082*** 0.057*** 0.043***
both merged (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Loan from CB that merged -0.091*** -0.040** -0.047*** -0.047***
× Underwriting from IB that merged (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Loan from CB that merged 0.144*** 0.063*** 0.054*** 0.055***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Underwriting from IB that merged 0.186*** 0.032** 0.036** 0.031**
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any loan × Any underwriting -0.003 0.030* 0.029* 0.027*
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Any loan -0.041** -0.119*** -0.111*** -0.098***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Any underwriting 0.207*** 0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
Industry-year FE N N N Y
N 91,686 91,686 91,686 91,686
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. CapEx it is firm i’s capital expenditure in year t. Loan from CB
that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t−10 to t−1, firm i received a loan
from a commercial or universal bank that merged with an investment bank thereafter. Underwriting
from IB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t − 10 to t − 1, firm
i received an underwriting product from an investment bank that merged with a commercial or
universal bank thereafter. The interaction of the latter two indicator variables is to be distinguished
from the explanatory variable of interest in the first row, which indicates whether anytime from
t− 10 to t− 1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or universal bank, an underwriting product
from an investment bank, and both banks merged with each other until year t. Any loanit and
Any underwriting it are indicator variables for whether firm i received any loan or any underwriting
product, respectively, from any commercial, universal, or investment bank anytime from t − 10 to
t − 1. Unless mentioned otherwise, control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of
firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees, the log of the average ratio of deal size across all
loans over firm i’s assets from t− 10 to t− 1, and the proportion of refinancing loans from t− 10 to
t− 1. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry-year fixed effects
are based on SIC1 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the firm-year level) are in parentheses.
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Table 17
Impact of Bank Information Acquisition on Market Capitalization –
Compustat Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(MarketCapit)
Loan from CB, underwriting from IB, 0.067*** 0.042*** 0.016 0.011
both merged (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Loan from CB that merged -0.037* -0.007 -0.002 -0.004
× Underwriting from IB that merged (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Loan from CB that merged 0.078*** 0.021 0.023* 0.029**
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Underwriting from IB that merged 0.116*** 0.012 0.014 0.015
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any loan × Any underwriting 0.118*** 0.142*** 0.135*** 0.136***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any loan -0.184*** -0.238*** -0.233*** -0.224***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Any underwriting -0.040*** -0.181*** -0.176*** -0.170***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
Industry-year FE N N N Y
N 92,665 92,665 92,665 92,665
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. MarketCapit is firm i’s market value of equity in year t.
Loan from CB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t− 10 to t− 1, firm i
received a loan from a commercial or universal bank that merged with an investment bank thereafter.
Underwriting from IB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t−10 to t−1,
firm i received an underwriting product from an investment bank that merged with a commercial or
universal bank thereafter. The interaction of the latter two indicator variables is to be distinguished
from the explanatory variable of interest in the first row, which indicates whether anytime from
t− 10 to t− 1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or universal bank, an underwriting product
from an investment bank, and both banks merged with each other until year t. Any loanit and
Any underwriting it are indicator variables for whether firm i received any loan or any underwriting
product, respectively, from any commercial, universal, or investment bank anytime from t − 10 to
t − 1. Unless mentioned otherwise, control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of
firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees, the log of the average ratio of deal size across all
loans over firm i’s assets from t− 10 to t− 1, and the proportion of refinancing loans from t− 10 to
t− 1. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry-year fixed effects
are based on SIC1 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the firm-year level) are in parentheses.
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Table 18
Impact of Bank Information Acquisition on Total Factor Productivity:
Robustness – Compustat Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(TFPi,t+1)
Loan from CB, underwriting from IB, 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.016* 0.017*
both merged (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Loan from CB that merged -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
× Underwriting from IB that merged (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Loan from CB that merged -0.012 -0.013* -0.019*** -0.020***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Underwriting from IB that merged 0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Any loan × Any underwriting 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.022** 0.022**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Any loan -0.024*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.032***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Any underwriting -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.035***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
Industry-year FE N N N Y
N 52,435 52,435 52,435 52,435
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. TFP i,t+1 is firm i’s total factor productivity in year t+ 1 from
Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014). Loan from CB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether
anytime from t− 8 to t− 1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or universal bank that merged
with an investment bank thereafter. Underwriting from IB that merged jt is an indicator variable for
whether anytime from t − 8 to t − 1, firm i received an underwriting product from an investment
bank that merged with a commercial or universal bank thereafter. The interaction of the latter two
indicator variables is to be distinguished from the explanatory variable of interest in the first row,
which indicates whether anytime from t − 8 to t − 1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or
universal bank, an underwriting product from an investment bank, and both banks merged with
each other until year t. Any loanit and Any underwriting it are indicator variables for whether firm
i received any loan or any underwriting product, respectively, from any commercial, universal, or
investment bank anytime from t − 8 to t − 1. Unless mentioned otherwise, control variables are
measured in year t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees, the
log of the average ratio of deal size across all loans over firm i’s assets from t− 8 to t− 1, and the
proportion of refinancing loans from t − 8 to t − 1. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s
headquarter in year t. Industry-year fixed effects are based on SIC1 codes. Public-service, energy,
and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm-year level)
are in parentheses.
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Table 19
Impact of Bank Information Acquisition on Capital Expenditure:
Robustness – Compustat Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(CapExit)
Loan from CB, underwriting from IB, 0.108*** 0.073*** 0.052*** 0.039***
both merged (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Loan from CB that merged -0.100*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.053***
× Underwriting from IB that merged (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Loan from CB that merged 0.146*** 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Underwriting from IB that merged 0.195*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.038***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any loan × Any underwriting -0.020 0.017 0.016 0.014
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any loan -0.030* -0.106*** -0.099*** -0.086***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any underwriting 0.196*** 0.010 0.008 0.007
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
Industry-year FE N N N Y
N 91,686 91,686 91,686 91,686
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. CapEx it is firm i’s capital expenditure in year t. Loan from CB
that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t− 8 to t− 1, firm i received a loan
from a commercial or universal bank that merged with an investment bank thereafter. Underwriting
from IB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t−8 to t−1, firm i received
an underwriting product from an investment bank that merged with a commercial or universal
bank thereafter. The interaction of the latter two indicator variables is to be distinguished from
the explanatory variable of interest in the first row, which indicates whether anytime from t − 8
to t − 1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or universal bank, an underwriting product
from an investment bank, and both banks merged with each other until year t. Any loanit and
Any underwriting it are indicator variables for whether firm i received any loan or any underwriting
product, respectively, from any commercial, universal, or investment bank anytime from t − 8 to
t − 1. Unless mentioned otherwise, control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of
firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees, the log of the average ratio of deal size across all
loans over firm i’s assets from t − 8 to t − 1, and the proportion of refinancing loans from t − 8 to
t− 1. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry-year fixed effects
are based on SIC1 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the firm-year level) are in parentheses.
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Table 20
Impact of Bank Information Acquisition on Market Capitalization:
Robustness – Compustat Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(MarketCapit)
Loan from CB, underwriting from IB, 0.061*** 0.034** 0.008 0.001
both merged (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Loan from CB that merged -0.069*** -0.042** -0.028 -0.026
× Underwriting from IB that merged (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Loan from CB that merged 0.091*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.039***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Underwriting from IB that merged 0.156*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.049***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any loan × Any underwriting 0.099*** 0.124*** 0.116*** 0.118***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any loan -0.177*** -0.232*** -0.225*** -0.215***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Any underwriting -0.032*** -0.162*** -0.158*** -0.154***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
Industry-year FE N N N Y
N 92,665 92,665 92,665 92,665
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. MarketCapit is firm i’s market value of equity in year t.
Loan from CB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t− 8 to t− 1, firm i
received a loan from a commercial or universal bank that merged with an investment bank thereafter.
Underwriting from IB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from t− 8 to t− 1,
firm i received an underwriting product from an investment bank that merged with a commercial or
universal bank thereafter. The interaction of the latter two indicator variables is to be distinguished
from the explanatory variable of interest in the first row, which indicates whether anytime from
t− 8 to t− 1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or universal bank, an underwriting product
from an investment bank, and both banks merged with each other until year t. Any loanit and
Any underwriting it are indicator variables for whether firm i received any loan or any underwriting
product, respectively, from any commercial, universal, or investment bank anytime from t − 8 to
t − 1. Unless mentioned otherwise, control variables are measured in year t, and include the log of
firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees, the log of the average ratio of deal size across all
loans over firm i’s assets from t − 8 to t − 1, and the proportion of refinancing loans from t − 8 to
t− 1. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry-year fixed effects
are based on SIC1 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are dropped. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the firm-year level) are in parentheses.
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Table 21
Impact of Bank Information Acquisition on Option-implied Volatility –
Compustat Sample, Long-run Within-firm Effects
ln(σimpliedit )
Loan from CB, underwriting from IB, 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.027** 0.023**
both merged (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Loan from CB that merged -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.034** -0.031**
× Underwriting from IB that merged (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Loan from CB that merged -0.005 -0.011 -0.023* -0.024*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Underwriting from IB that merged 0.028** 0.032*** 0.018 0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Any loan × Any underwriting 0.072*** 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.057***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Any loan -0.046** -0.057*** -0.036* -0.037*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Any underwriting -0.033*** -0.023** -0.018* -0.016
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Controls N Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N N
State-year FE N N Y Y
Industry-year FE N N N Y
N 24,779 24,779 24,779 24,779
Notes: The sample consists of all available firm-year observations from Compustat, the unit of
observation is the firm-year level it. σimpliedit is firm i’s three-month implied volatility in year t,
calculated using the volatility surface from option prices (source: Option Metrics), which is available
only starting in 1996. Loan from CB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether anytime from
t − 10 to t − 1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or universal bank that merged with an
investment bank thereafter. Underwriting from IB that merged jt is an indicator variable for whether
anytime from t− 10 to t− 1, firm i received an underwriting product from an investment bank that
merged with a commercial or universal bank thereafter. The interaction of the latter two indicator
variables is to be distinguished from the explanatory variable of interest in the first row, which
indicates whether anytime from t−10 to t−1, firm i received a loan from a commercial or universal
bank, an underwriting product from an investment bank, and both banks merged with each other
until year t. Any loanit and Any underwriting it are indicator variables for whether firm i received
any loan or any underwriting product, respectively, from any commercial, universal, or investment
bank anytime from t−10 to t−1. Unless mentioned otherwise, control variables are measured in year
t, and include the log of firm i’s sales, the log of its number of employees, the log of the average ratio
of deal size across all loans over firm i’s assets from t− 10 to t− 1, and the proportion of refinancing
loans from t−10 to t−1. State-year fixed effects are based on firm i’s headquarter in year t. Industry-
year fixed effects are based on SIC1 codes. Public-service, energy, and financial-services firms are
dropped. Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm-year level) are in parentheses.
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Table 22
Summary Statistics for Universal Banks established through M&A and
Section 20 Subsidiaries
M&A Section 20
t = −1 t = 0 t = 1 t = −1 t = 0 t = 1
Total assets in 2010 $bn 513.7 1,110.2 1,101.0 47.82 51.54 52.33
(129.3) (305.3) (230.4) (33.11) (35.26) (36.22)
Total equity/assets in % 7.547 6.977 7.959 8.670 8.648 8.903
(1.032) (0.833) (1.455) (1.994) (1.772) (2.659)
Cash balance/assets in % 4.944 5.177 4.776 5.484 5.768 5.338
(2.571) (2.764) (2.040) (1.663) (2.320) (2.027)
Total loans/assets in % 65.78 51.77 51.86 66.95 67.03 67.96
(7.724) (23.02) (20.76) (6.654) (6.744) (6.349)
Net income in 2010 $bn 6.675 5.227 12.69 0.330 0.333 0.350
(2.542) (3.591) (0.308) (0.275) (0.285) (0.375)
EBIT in 2010 $bn 10.17 8.415 20.15 0.525 0.544 0.560
(3.248) (6.264) (1.618) (0.458) (0.482) (0.607)
No. of employees in thousands 132.2 227.9 228.2 14.20 15.44 15.34
(39.06) (60.74) (55.33) (9.815) (10.13) (10.18)
N 5 30
Notes: This table reports means with standard deviations in parentheses, for universal banks es-
tablished through M&A in the first three columns and for Section 20 subsidiaries in the last three
columns. The data are taken from the respective banks’ call reports. t indicates the year of the
respective call report, and t = 0 denotes the first call report after the bank becomes a universal
bank, and t = −1 and t = 1 correspond to the call reports one year before and after the call report
used for t = 0, respectively. Cash balance is the sum of non-interest-bearing balances and currency
and coin, and interest-bearing balances in U.S. offices. EBIT is net income before income taxes,
extraordinary items, and other adjustments on a fully taxable equivalent basis.
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Section 20 M&A
Established before August 1, 1996
BankBoston (later acquired by Fleet) Credit Suisse (First Boston)
Bankers Trust (later acquired by Bank of America) Deutsche Bank USA
Bank of America Equitable (later acquired by SunTrust)
Bank One (later acquired by J.P. Morgan) HSBC Bank USA
Barnett Bank (later acquired by NationsBank) Travelers Group∗
Chase Manhattan (later acquired by J.P. Morgan)
Chemical Bank (later acquired by Chase Manhattan)
Citicorp∗
Dauphin Deposit Corp.
First Chicago NBD
First Union
Fleet (later acquired by Bank of America)
Huntington Bancshares
J.P. Morgan
KeyBank
Marine Midland Bank (later acquired by HSBC Bank USA)
Mellon (later acquired by BNY)
National City (later acquired by PNC)
National Westminster Bank USA (later acquired by Fleet)
NationsBank (later acquired by Bank of America)
Norstar (later acquired by Fleet)
Norwest (later acquired by Wells Fargo)
PNC
Republic New York (later acquired by HSBC Bank USA)
SouthTrust (later acquired by Wachovia/First Union)
SunTrust
Union Bank of Switzerland
Established on or after August 1, 1996
BB&T Citigroup∗
BNY Swiss Bank Corp (later acquired by
Union Bank of Switzerland)
Commerce Bancshares Wells Fargo
CoreStates/Philadelphia National Bank
(later acquired by First Union)
Crestar Bank
First Tennessee
U.S. Bancorp
Wachovia (first acquired by First Union
and later by Wells Fargo
∗ Citigroup emerged as a result of the merger of Travelers Group and Citicorp on October 8, 1998. Before,
Travelers Group became a universal bank through M&A (e.g., with Smith Barney), and Citicorp had regis-
tered a Section 20 subsidiary. Given this merger of equals, we do not treat either one as the surviving entity
and, instead, label Citigroup as a separate universal bank established through M&A in 1998.
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Table 24
Summary Statistics
Package-bank level Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
Lead arranger ∈ {0, 1} 0.180 0.384 0 1 170,578
Loan share ∈ [0, 1] 0.159 0.239 0.000 1 76,852
UB ∈ {0, 1} 0.366 0.482 0 1 170,578
UB × Cross-selling ∈ {0, 1} 0.099 0.299 0 1 170,578
Underwriting ∈ {0, 1} 0.920 0.271 0 1 170,578
Package/loan level Mean Std. dev. Min Max N
No. of unique package-bank observations 6.484 8.333 1 174 11,852
Average lead share ∈ [0, 1] 0.552 0.378 0.002 1 11,852
Loan share of single lead arranger ∈ [0, 1] 0.604 0.373 0.012 1 10,301
No. of lead arrangers 1.143 0.395 1 6 11,852
Concentration of loan shares ∈ [0, 1] 0.514 0.397 0.013 1 11,852
Average participant share ∈ [0, 1] 0.095 0.123 0.000 0.920 11,852
Bankruptcy within ten years ∈ {0, 1} 0.222 0.416 0 1 7,171
UB ∈ {0, 1} 0.672 0.470 0 1 11,852
Sales at close in 2010 $ 3.011 10.634 0 377.110 11,852
No. of employees in thousands 10.195 29.993 0.001 487.901 11,852
σt−5,treturn,i 0.428 0.207 0.114 3.886 7,250
σt−5,tidiosyncratic,i 0.384 0.201 0.104 3.928 7,250
Notes: The sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. In the first panel,
observations are at the package-bank level, i.e., each package comprises multiple observations, but only
one observation per (participating or lead) bank. In the second panel, observations are at the (aggregate)
package/loan level. In general, summary statistics are shown for our regression sample with data available on
participating and lead-arranger banks, excluding the availability of data for sales, no. of employees, and deal
size/assets. Only in the second panel, the regression sample is furthermore conditioned on the availability of
data for Loan share, which is the share (between 0 and 1) of the loan retained by a bank. Lead arranger
is an indicator variable for whether the bank in question is a lead arranger. UB is an indicator variable
for whether at the time of the loan transaction the (participating or lead) bank was a universal bank.
Cross− selling is an indicator for whether the universal bank’s loan share in year t was associated with a
cross-sold underwriting product by the same universal bank from t − 2 to t + 2. Underwriting indicates
whether the borrower firm received an underwriting product from any universal or investment bank from
t− 2 to t+ 2. At the package level, Concentration of loan shares is a Herfindahl index which is equal to
the sum of the squared loan shares of all (participating or lead) banks in the syndicate, and varies from zero
to one (maximal concentration). Bankruptcy within ten years ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator variable for whether
the borrowing company was delisted for bankruptcy-related reasons in the ten years following the loan-issue
year. Bankruptcy is identified using the following CRSP delisting codes: any type of liquidation (400-490);
price fell below acceptable level; insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity; insufficient (or non-compliance
with rules of) float or assets; company request, liquidation; bankruptcy, declared insolvent; delinquent in
filing; non-payment of fees; does not meet exchange’s financial guidelines for continued listing; protection of
investors and the public interest; corporate governance violation; and delist required by Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC). σt−5,treturn,i is the six-year standard deviation of borrower firm i’s stock return from year
t − 5 to year t, and is expressed in annualized terms. σt−5,tidiosyncratic,i is firm i’s corresponding idiosyncratic
volatility, estimated from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model using monthly CRSP data, and is
also expressed in annualized terms.
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Table 25
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Lead-arranger Status –
Package-bank Level
Lead arranger ∈ {0, 1}
UB 0.020** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.022**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
UB est. before 1996 -0.002 -0.050*** -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.022*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
UB est. before 1996 × After(1996) 0.097*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Log of sales at close in 2010 $ -0.029***
(0.001)
Log of no. employees 0.000
(0.001)
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Package FE N N N N Y
Industry-year FE N N Y Y N
Syndicate FE N Y Y Y N
Year FE Y Y N N N
N 170,578 170,578 170,578 170,578 170,578
Notes: The sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. Observations
are at the package-bank level, i.e., each package comprises multiple observations, but only one
observation per (participating or lead) bank. Lead arranger is an indicator variable for whether the
bank in question is a lead arranger. UB and UB est. before 1996 are indicator variables for whether
at the time of the loan transaction the (participating or lead) bank was a universal bank anytime or
before August 1, 1996, respectively. After(1996) is an indicator variable for whether the loan was
issued on or after August 1, 1996. Bank fixed effects, which are defined at the package-bank level,
and syndicate fixed effects for all participating and lead banks at the package level are included for
all banks that were or eventually became universal banks, whereas all remaining commercial banks
are grouped together in one category. Industry-year fixed effects are based on two-digit SIC codes
of borrower firms. Robust standard errors (clustered at the package level) are in parentheses.
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Table 26
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Lead-arranger Status –
Package-bank Level, Robustness
Lead arranger ∈ {0, 1}
UB 0.042*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.007
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
UB est. before 1996 -0.053*** -0.069*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.009
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
UB est. before 1996 × After(1996) 0.100*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.102***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Log of sales at close in 2010 $ -0.041***
(0.003)
Log of no. employees -0.000
(0.002)
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Package FE N N N N Y
Industry-year FE N N Y Y N
Syndicate FE N Y Y Y N
Year FE Y Y N N N
N 76,852 76,852 76,852 76,852 76,852
Notes: The sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. Observations
are at the package-bank level, i.e., each package comprises multiple observations, but only one
observation per (participating or lead) bank. Only observations with valid loan-share data are
included, as in Table 27. Lead arranger is an indicator variable for whether the bank in question
is a lead arranger. UB and UB est. before 1996 are indicator variables for whether at the time of
the loan transaction the (participating or lead) bank was a universal bank anytime or before August
1, 1996, respectively. After(1996) is an indicator variable for whether the loan was issued on or
after August 1, 1996. Bank fixed effects, which are defined at the package-bank level, and syndicate
fixed effects for all participating and lead banks at the package level are included for all banks that
were or eventually became universal banks, whereas all remaining commercial banks are grouped
together in one category. Industry-year fixed effects are based on two-digit SIC codes of borrower
firms. Robust standard errors (clustered at the package level) are in parentheses.
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Table 27
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Loan Shares – Package-bank Level
Loan share ∈ [0, 1]
UB 0.009 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.027*** -0.011***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
UB est. before 1996 -0.022*** -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 0.003
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
UB est. before 1996 × After(1996) 0.010* 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.011***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Log of sales at close in 2010 $ -0.048***
(0.003)
Log of no. employees 0.001
(0.002)
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Package FE N N N N Y
Industry-year FE N N Y Y N
Syndicate FE N Y Y Y N
Year FE Y Y N N N
N 76,852 76,852 76,852 76,852 76,852
Notes: The sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. Observations
are at the package-bank level, i.e., each package comprises multiple observations, but only one
observation per (participating or lead) bank. Lead arranger is an indicator variable for whether
the bank in question is a lead arranger. Loan share is the share (between 0 and 1) of the loan
retained by a bank. UB and UB est. before 1996 are indicator variables for whether at the time of
the loan transaction the (participating or lead) bank was a universal bank anytime or before August
1, 1996, respectively. After(1996) is an indicator variable for whether the loan was issued on or
after August 1, 1996. Bank fixed effects, which are defined at the package-bank level, and syndicate
fixed effects for all participating and lead banks at the package level are included for all banks that
were or eventually became universal banks, whereas all remaining commercial banks are grouped
together in one category. Industry-year fixed effects are based on two-digit SIC codes of borrower
firms. Robust standard errors (clustered at the package level) are in parentheses.
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Table 28
Impact of Cross-selling by Universal Banks on Syndicate Structure –
Package-bank Level
Lead arranger ∈ {0, 1} Lead arranger ∈ {0, 1} Loan share ∈ [0, 1]
Sample All All Availability of loan shares
UB 0.094*** 0.029 0.081*** 0.052 0.001 0.013**
(0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.033) (0.004) (0.007)
UB × Cross-selling 0.470*** 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.488*** 0.048*** 0.049***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
UB × Underwriting -0.134*** -0.141*** -0.128*** -0.136*** -0.015*** -0.017***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003)
Underwriting -0.002 0.025 0.045 -0.007 -0.068*** -0.041
(0.040) (0.040) (0.135) (0.146) (0.024) (0.042)
Bank FE Y N Y N Y N
Bank-year FE N Y N Y N Y
Package FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 170,578 170,578 76,852 76,852 76,852 76,852
Notes: The sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. Observations
are at the package-bank level, i.e., each package comprises multiple observations, but only one
observation per (participating or lead) bank. In the last four columns, only observations with valid
loan-share data are included, as in Tables 26 and 27. Loan share is the share (between 0 and 1)
of the loan retained by a bank. UB is an indicator variable for whether at the time of the loan
transaction the (participating or lead) bank was a universal bank. Cross − selling is an indicator
for whether the universal bank’s loan share in year t was associated with a cross-sold underwriting
product by the same universal bank from t−2 to t+2. Underwriting indicates whether the borrower
firm received an underwriting product from any universal or investment bank from t − 2 to t + 2.
Bank(-year) fixed effects are included for all banks that were or eventually became universal banks,
whereas all remaining commercial banks are grouped together in one category. Robust standard
errors (clustered at the package level) are in parentheses.
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Table 29
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Lead Shares – Package Level
Average lead share ∈ [0, 1]
Sample All All All One LA
UB -0.292*** -0.284*** -0.264*** -0.263***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
UB × After(1996) -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.027*** -0.020**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Log of sales at close in 2010 $ -0.043*** -0.042***
(0.002) (0.003)
Log of no. employees 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Syndicate FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-year FE N Y Y Y
Year FE Y N N N
N 11,852 11,852 11,852 10,301
Notes: In general, the sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. Ob-
servations are at the (aggregate) package/loan level. The sample in the fourth column is limited
to loans with one lead arranger. The dependent variable corresponds to the (average) share of the
loan retained by the lead arranger(s), and is defined between 0 and 1. UB is an indicator variable
for whether at the time of the loan transaction any one of the (participating or lead) banks was a
universal bank. After(1996) is an indicator variable for whether the loan was issued on or after
August 1, 1996. Syndicate fixed effects for all participating and lead banks at the package level
are included for all banks that were or eventually became universal banks, whereas all remaining
commercial banks are grouped together in one category. Industry-year fixed effects are based on
two-digit SIC codes of borrower firms. Robust standard errors (clustered at the package level) are
in parentheses.
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Table 30
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Concentration of Loan Shares –
Package Level
Concentration of loan shares ∈ [0, 1]
Sample All All All One LA
UB -0.331*** -0.324*** -0.305*** -0.306***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
UB × After(1996) -0.050*** -0.041*** -0.029*** -0.026**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Log of sales at close in 2010 $ -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.002) (0.003)
Log of no. employees 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Syndicate FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-year FE N Y Y Y
Year FE Y N N N
N 11,852 11,852 11,852 10,301
Notes: In general, the sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. Ob-
servations are at the (aggregate) package/loan level. The sample in the fourth column is limited to
loans with one lead arranger. The dependent variable is a Herfindahl index which is equal to the
sum of the squared loan shares of all (participating or lead) banks in the syndicate, and varies from
zero to one (maximal concentration). UB is an indicator variable for whether at the time of the
loan transaction any one of the (participating or lead) banks was a universal bank. After(1996) is
an indicator variable for whether the loan was issued on or after August 1, 1996. Syndicate fixed
effects for all participating and lead banks at the package level are included for all banks that were or
eventually became universal banks, whereas all remaining commercial banks are grouped together in
one category. Industry-year fixed effects are based on two-digit SIC codes of borrower firms. Robust
standard errors (clustered at the package level) are in parentheses.
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Table 31
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Participant Shares – Package Level
Average participant share ∈ [0, 1]
Sample All All All One LA
UB 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.099***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
UB × After(1996) 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log of sales at close in 2010 $ 0.007*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.002)
Log of no. employees 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Syndicate FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-year FE N Y Y Y
Year FE Y N N N
N 11,852 11,852 11,852 10,301
Notes: In general, the sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. Ob-
servations are at the (aggregate) package/loan level. The sample in the fourth column is limited to
loans with one lead arranger. The dependent variable corresponds to the average share of the loan
retained by the participants (but not by any lead arranger), and is defined between 0 and 1. UB is
an indicator variable for whether at the time of the loan transaction any one of the (participating
or lead) banks was a universal bank. After(1996) is an indicator variable for whether the loan was
issued on or after August 1, 1996. Syndicate fixed effects for all participating and lead banks at the
package level are included for all banks that were or eventually became universal banks, whereas all
remaining commercial banks are grouped together in one category. Industry-year fixed effects are
based on two-digit SIC codes of borrower firms. Robust standard errors (clustered at the package
level) are in parentheses.
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Table 32
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Lead Shares – Package Level,
Comparative Statics
Average lead share ∈ [0, 1]
Sample Less More Less More
stock-return volatility idiosyncratic volatility
UB -0.303*** -0.234*** -0.294*** -0.236***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
UB × After(1996) -0.067** 0.014 -0.084** 0.017
(0.032) (0.020) (0.034) (0.020)
Log of sales at close in 2010 $ -0.035*** -0.049*** -0.035*** -0.049***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Log of no. employees 0.005** -0.002 0.006** -0.002
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Syndicate FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-year FE Y Y Y Y
N 3,625 3,625 3,629 3,621
Notes: In general, the sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. Ob-
servations are at the (aggregate) package/loan level. In the first and second column, we limit the
sample to loans that are associated with six-year firm-level stock-return volatility (from t− 5 to t)
in the bottom and top 50%, respectively. In the third and fourth column, we limit the sample to
loans that are associated with six-year idiosyncratic volatility (from t−5 to t) in the bottom and top
50%, respectively. The dependent variable corresponds to the (average) share of the loan retained
by the lead arranger(s), and is defined between 0 and 1. UB is an indicator variable for whether at
the time of the loan transaction any one of the (participating or lead) banks was a universal bank.
After(1996) is an indicator variable for whether the loan was issued on or after August 1, 1996.
Syndicate fixed effects for all participating and lead banks at the package level are included for all
banks that were or eventually became universal banks, whereas all remaining commercial banks are
grouped together in one category. Industry-year fixed effects are based on two-digit SIC codes of
borrower firms. Robust standard errors (clustered at the package level) are in parentheses.
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Table 33
Impact of Universal-bank Financing on Bankruptcy – Package Level
Bankruptcy within ten years ∈ {0, 1}
Sample All All All One LA
UB -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.038** -0.041**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
UB × After(1996) -0.002 0.002 0.011 0.013
(0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Log of sales at close in 2010 $ -0.057*** -0.061***
(0.007) (0.007)
Log of no. employees 0.012** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006)
Syndicate FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-year FE N Y Y Y
Year FE Y N N N
N 7,171 7,171 7,171 6,722
Notes: In general, the sample consists of all loans successfully issued by publicly listed firms. Ob-
servations are at the (aggregate) package/loan level. The sample in the fourth column is limited to
loans with one lead arranger. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the bor-
rowing company was delisted for bankruptcy-related reasons in the ten years following the loan-issue
year. Bankruptcy is identified using the following CRSP delisting codes: any type of liquidation
(400-490); price fell below acceptable level; insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity; insufficient
(or non-compliance with rules of) float or assets; company request, liquidation; bankruptcy, declared
insolvent; delinquent in filing; non-payment of fees; does not meet exchange’s financial guidelines for
continued listing; protection of investors and the public interest; corporate governance violation; and
delist required by Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). UB is an indicator variable for whether
at the time of the loan transaction any one of the (participating or lead) banks was a universal bank.
After(1996) is an indicator variable for whether the loan was issued on or after August 1, 1996.
Syndicate fixed effects for all participating and lead banks at the package level are included for all
banks that were or eventually became universal banks, whereas all remaining commercial banks are
grouped together in one category. Industry-year fixed effects are based on two-digit SIC codes of
borrower firms. Robust standard errors (clustered at the package level) are in parentheses.
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C.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 18
Because c(·) is strictly convex, borrowing costs are minimized by providing equal shares to all lenders.
Since sn∗ >
1
N to all banks, providing a loan share
1
N is inconsistent with monitoring. Hence, the
firm must provide a share greater than 1N to at least one bank to induce monitoring. Since the firm
requires only one bank to monitor, it chooses the one with the lowest required share. This is bank
n∗. To minimize borrowing costs conditional on the choice of lead arranger, the firm then provides
equal shares to all remaining banks.
Proof of Proposition 20
Here, we fully characterize the optimal contract under asymmetric information. Recall that the
optimal contract is the solution to the following program:
v = max
{w(·),κ1(·)}
∑
z
Pr(z) [Q∗(z) (X − w(ẑ∗(z)))− κ1(ẑ∗(z)] (P)
s.t (i) for every (z, ẑ)
a∗(z, ẑ) = argmax
a
Q(a, z, ẑ)w(ẑ) + κ1(ẑ)− c(a, z) (IC)
(ii) for every z
ẑ∗(z) = argmax
z′
Q(a∗(z, z′), z, z′)w(z′) + κ1(z′)− c(a∗(z, z′), z) (REV)
(iii) w(z) ≥ 0 for every z, (LL)
and v is the borrower’s pledgeable income. We solve this problem by first deriving the optimal con-
tract within each contract class, and then characterize which contract class is optimal. Throughout,
we sometimes ease notation by specializing (IC). In particular, we say that the pair {w, κ} provides
incentives to implement the growth option if κ ≥ k1 and
qhw ≥ pw + κ, (IMP)
and that {w, κ} provides incentives to deter the gamble if
pw ≥ qlw. (DET)
To further simplify notation, we denote the optimal contract within each contract class by an asterisk
throughout the Appendix. We also make use of the fact that it is never optimal to provide additional
capital beyond the required k1: in any optimal contract, we must have κ
∗
1(z) ≤ k1 for all z.
Optimal Implementation Contract
In an implementation contract, the bank provides incentives to implement the growth option, but
does not provide incentives to deter the gamble. Since we want to implement the growth option, we
have that κ1(h) = k1, and since we are considering an implementation contract, {w(h), k1} satisfies
(IMP) but not (DET), and {w(l), κ1(l)} does not satisfy (DET).
First, suppose that {w(l), κ1(l)} satisfies (IMP). Then it must be the case that κ1(l) = k1, since the
growth option cannot be implemented otherwise. Since {w(h), κ1(h)} and {w(l), κ1(l)} both satisfy
(IMP) but not (DET), the borrower always chooses the same action in every state. Since (REV)
requires that the borrower’s report maximize the borrower’s payoff given its action, we must have
qhw(l) = qhw(h) and qlw(l) = qlw(h). Otherwise, the firm would always prefer to report the state
in which its expected wages are higher. Using the latter condition, program (P) can be specialized
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to:
v = max
w(h)
γ
(
qh(X − w(h))− k1
)
+ (1− γ) (ql(X − w(h))− k1) (P’)
s.t qhw(h) ≥ pw(h) + k1, (29)
where (29) will be binding at the optimum. Let w∗ denote the solution to this program. Since
p2 ≥ qh2 > 0, it must be the case that w∗2 = 0. We then ask whether the bank prefers to pay wages
to the borrower in state 1 or in state 3. If the bank pays wages in state 1, providing ∆ units of
incentives requires wages of ∆
qh1−p1
. The expected cost of providing ∆ units of incentives using wage
payments in state 1 is thus ∆
γqh1+(1−γ)ql1
qh1−p1
. By the analogous argument, the cost of providing ∆
units of incentives using wage payments in state 3 is ∆
γqh3+(1−γ)ql3
qh3−p3
. As such, it is cheaper to provide
incentives in state 3 than in state 1 if and only if
q˜3
qh3 − p3
<
q˜1
qh1 − p1
. (30)
Since ql3 > p3 and q
l
1 > p1 by assumption, Assumptions 4 and 5 jointly imply that q
h
3 > q
3
l and
qh1 ≤ ql1. In addition, we know from Assumption 5 that
qh3
qh3 − p3
<
qh1
qh1 − p1
.
Hence it follows that q˜3 < q
h
3 and q˜1 > q
h
1 , and
q˜3
qh3 − p3
<
qh3
qh3 − p3
<
qh1
qh1 − p1
<
q˜1
qh1 − p1
.
Therefore, (30) is always satisfied given Assumption 5, so we have {w∗(l), κ∗1(l)} = {w∗(h), κ∗1(h)} =
{w(h), k1}.
Next, suppose that {w(l), κ1(l)} does not satisfy (IMP). The binding revelation constraint in state
l is then given by
qlw(l) + κ1(l) = q
lw(h) + k1. (31)
Since {w(h), k1} satisfies (IMP), we can again specialize program (P) to (P’). Equation (31) implies
that we again have {w∗(l), κ∗1(l)} = {w∗(h), κ∗1(h)} = {w(h), k1} whenever (30) is satisfied, which we
have shown to be the case. Hence, the firm receives expected wages W I = (1−γ)k1+ q˜h3 k1qh3−p3 = W˜ ,
and pledgeable income is v̂I = q˜X − γk1 −W I .
Optimal Deterrence Contract
In a deterrence contract, the bank provides incentives to deter the gamble, but does not provide
incentives to implement the growth option. It is easy to verify that w = 0 provides incentives to
deter the gamble. Hence, the contract {0, 0,0, 0} deters the gamble in every state of the world. By
the limited-liability constraint w ≥ 0, we also know that {w∗(l), κ∗1(l)} = {w∗(h), κ∗1(h)} = {0, 0}
is the deterrence contract that maximizes pledgeable income. The firm receives expected wages
WD = 0, and pledgeable income is v̂D = pX.
Optimal Full-incentive Contract
We now characterize the optimal full-incentive contract. We proceed in two steps. First, we char-
acterize the optimal full-incentive pooling contract; that is, we consider the case in which the same
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contract is offered in every state of the world, independently of the firm’s report. Second, we char-
acterize the optimal full-incentive separating contract, in which the firm receives state-contingent
contracts based on its report, subject to a truth-telling constraint. We then discuss whether a
pooling or a separating full-incentive contract is preferred.
Step 1: Optimal full-incentive pooling contract
We look for a pooling contract in which {w, κ1} is offered in every state of the world, and satisfies
both (DET) and (IMP). Since this is a pooling contract, truth-telling constraints are irrelevant.
Given that we want to implement the growth option in the high state, we must have κ1 = k1. The
contracting problem can then be stated as:
v = max
w
γ
(
qh(X − w)− k1
)
+ (1− γ) (p(X − w)− k1) (P”)
s.t qhw ≥ pw + k1 (32)
pw ≥ qlw (33)
w ≥ 0. (34)
As before, we let w∗ denote the solution to this program.
Lemma 7. The implementation constraint (32) and the deterrence constraint (33) are binding.
Proof. Suppose that (32) is not binding, and that wi > 0 for at least one i. Then the bank can
reduce expected wages by offering w = 0. But this violates (32). Hence, (32) must be binding. Next,
suppose that (33) does not bind. By Assumption 5, the bank will satisfy (32) by offering wages only
after X3. But by Assumption 4, doing so violates (33), and hence (33) cannot be slack.
It is easy to show that the bank will never offer wages in state 1. In particular, in our proof of the
optimal implementation contract, we have shown that
γqh3 + (1− γ)p3
qh3 − p3
<
γqh1 + (1− γ)p1
qh1 − p1
.
Therefore, it is cheaper to satisfy (32) by offering wages in state 3 than in state 1. Since ql3 − p3 <
ql1 − p1, paying any given wage in state 3 rather than state 1 also relaxes (33).
To maximize pledgeable income, calibrate the optimal full-incentive pooling contract from w = 0,
noting that (33) holds while (32) is violated at w = 0. Given that we must have w1 = 0, we must
increase w3 to satisfy (32). But increasing w3 while holding the remaining elements of w fixed
violates (33). Hence, we must increase w2 simultaneously. The cheapest way to do so is such that
(33) holds exactly. Differentiating (33) yields the requirement:
∂w2
∂w3
= ξ
with ξ ≡ ql3−p3
p2−ql2
. We then choose the change in w3 such that (32) holds with equality. This requires a
wage payment of ω ≡ k1
(qh3−p3)−ξ(p2−qh2 )
in state 3. Hence w∗ = {0, ξω, ω}. The firm receives expected
wages WFIPooling = q̂2ξω+ q̂3ω+(1−γ)k1, and pledgeable income is v̂FIPooling = q̂X−γk1−WFIPooling.
Given our parametric assumptions, it follows directly that WFIPooling > W
I .
Step 2: Optimal full-incentive separating contract
We now characterize the optimal full-incentive separating contract. To do so, we first define a
particular class of wage schedules:
Definition 11. w is a pure-equity wage schedule if w = αX for some α ∈ [0, 1].
These wage schedules are useful for the following reason:
Corollary 11. Any pure-equity wage schedule satisfies (DET).
Proof. Follows from qlX < pX.
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A full-incentive separating contract consists of a menu {w(h), κ1(h), w(l), κ1(l)} in which
{w(h), κ1(h)} satisfies (IMP) and {w(l), κ1(l)} satisfies (DET). We begin by showing that a con-
tract in which {w(h), κ1(h)} also satisfies (DET) cannot improve upon a full-incentive pooling con-
tract.
Lemma 8 (Partial Payoff Equivalence of Pooling and Separating Contracts). Let
{w(h), κ1(h)} satisfy both (IMP) and (DET) under a full-incentive separating contract. Then the
maximum attainable payoff is the same as under a full-incentive pooling contract.
Proof. Since {w(h), κ1(h)} satisfies (DET), the revelation constraint in state l is given by
pw(l) ≥ pw(h) + κ1.
Since this constraint must bind in equilibrium, we have that
pw(l) = pw(h)− κ1. (35)
We know that there always exists a pure-equity w(l) that delivers this value and satisfies (DET).
Next, we must pick w(h) to be the highest-value repayment schedule that satisfies (IMP) and (DET).
From the previous step, we know that this is the optimal full-incentive pooling contract. Computing
expected values under the restriction in (35) delivers the desired result.
Hence, full-incentive separating contracts cannot improve upon full-incentive pooling contracts when-
ever {w(h), κ1(h)} satisfies both (IMP) and (DET). Since satisfying (DET) in isolation is costless,
it is also never optimal to require {w(l), κ1(l)} to satisfy (IMP). We therefore consider separating
contracts where {w(h), κ1(h)} satisfies (IMP) but not (DET), and {w(l), κ1(l)} satisfies (DET) but
not (IMP). We can, thus, restrict attention to contracts in which κ1(h) = k1 and κ1(l) = 0.
Pledgeable income then is the solution to the program:
v = max
w(h),w(l)
γ
(
qh(X − w(h))− k1
)
+ (1− γ)p(X − w(l))
s.t qhw(h) ≥ pw(h) + k1 (36)
pw(l) ≥ qlw(l) (37)
pw(l) ≥ qlw(h) + k1 (38)
qhw(h) ≥ pw(l) (39)
w(l) ≥ 0 and w(h) ≥ 0, (40)
where (38) and (39) denote the truth-telling constraints in states l and h, respectively, while (36)
and (37) denote the respective incentive constraints.
Lemma 9. The truth-telling constraint (38) is binding.
Proof. Since w(h) = 0 does not satisfy (36), we must have that wi(h) > 0 for at least one i. Suppose
that (38) is slack. Then setting w(l) = 0 is optimal, because doing so does not violate (37) or tighten
(39), and maximizes pledgeable income. But since wi(h) > 0 for at least one i, w(l) = 0 violates
(38), a contradiction.
Since (38) is binding, use (38) in (39) to give
qhw(h) ≥ q(w(h) + k1. (41)
Combining (41) and (36) yields a combined incentive constraint on w(h) of the form
qhw(h) ≥ max{qlw(h), pw(h)}+ k1. (42)
By Assumption 5, the cheapest way to satisfy this equation is to pay wages in state 3 only. Since
238
ql3 > p3, it follows that w
∗(h) =
{
0, 0, k1
qh3−ql3
}
. Since (38) is binding, w∗(l) is the pure-equity wage
schedule that satisfies
pw∗(l) = qlw∗(h) + k1.
Accordingly, the firm receives expected wages WFISeparating = q˜3
(
k1
qh3−ql3
)
+(1−γ)k1, and pledgeable
income is v̂FISeparating = q̂X − γk1 −WFISeparating. It follows directly that WFISeparating > W I .
Given these preliminaries, it is now straightforward to characterize the optimal full-incentive con-
tract. In particular, assuming that a tie is split in favor of a separating contract, the optimal
full-incentive contract is a separating contract if and only ifWFISeparating ≥WFIPooling. In the optimal
full-incentive contract, the firm receives expected wages WFI = min{WFISeparating,WFIPooling}, and
pledgeable income is v̂FI = q̂X − γk1 −WFI .
Having characterized the optimal contract within each class of contracts, we can now determine
the optimal contract class. In particular, the optimal contract class is the one that delivers the
highest pledgeable income under asymmetric information. Assuming that ties are broken in favor
of a full-incentive contract, a deterrence contract is optimal if and only if pX > max{q̂X − γk1 −
WFI , q˜X − γk1 − W˜}. An implementation contract is optimal if and only if q˜X − γk1 − W˜ >
max{q̂X − γk1 −WFI , pX}. A full-incentive contract is optimal if and only if q̂X − γk1 −WFI ≥
max
{
q˜X − γk1 − W˜ , pX
}
. Equivalently, a full-incentive contract is optimal if and only if
Πl ≥ Πl ≡ W
FI − W˜
1− γ and Π
h ≥ Πh ≡ W
FI + γk1
γ
.
Finally, since the optimal asymmetric-information contract is the one that delivers the highest
pledgeable income across all contract classes, it must be the case that
v̂ = max
{
q̂X − γk1 −WFI , q˜X − γk1 − W˜ , pX
}
.
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